

1 ***I. Introduction***

2  
3  
4 Q\_1. Please state your name.

5  
6 A\_1. Steve Brown.

7  
8 Q\_2. Where do you work?

9  
10 A\_2. I work in the Office of the Attorney  
11 General.

12  
13 Q\_3. What is your job title?

14  
15 A\_3. I have been the Economist in the  
16 Consumer Advocate and Protection  
17 Division since 1995. A statement of my  
18 credentials appears later.  
19

20 ***II. Opinions***

21  
22 Q\_4. Please give your opinions on what the just  
23 and reasonable rates are for Tennessee's  
24 ratepayers receiving natural-gas  
25 distribution service from Atmos.  
26

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1    **A\_4.**        Tennessee's ratepayers must provide a  
2                   reasonable equity return to the providers  
3                   of natural-gas distribution services, but  
4                   such a return must be based on verified  
5                   information, and the return must be free  
6                   from the influence of capital-gains  
7                   speculation.

8  
9                   In my opinion Tennessee's ratepayers are  
10                  obliged to fund Atmos's investments  
11                  through a return to equity motivated by  
12                  wealth-creation through dividends rather  
13                  than wealth-creation through capital-gains  
14                  speculation. Tennesseans should bear an  
15                  overall capital cost of 6.6%, and no more.


16  
17                  The capital-cost components are 8% to  
18                  equity, 5.52% to long term debt, and 5.09%  
19                  to short term debt. These capital costs  
20                  apply to a capital structure composed of  
21                  44.3% equity, 43.1% long term debt, and  
22                  12.6% short term debt, which sum to 100%.

23  
24                  The costs and capital structure are shown  
25                  in my Schedule 1. If Tennessee's  
26                  ratepayers have to fund Atmos at a rate  
27                  more than 6.6%, the increase represents  
28                  profit achieved through capital-gains  
29                  speculation rather than profit through  
30                  dividend payments. Such an increase is not  
31                  necessary because Atmos is a low-risk  
32                  company.

1           The capital cost embodies verified data  
2           from the United States Securities And  
3           Exchange Commission. In my opinion the  
4           best forecast of future financial  
5           performance is past performance. Atmos has  
6           publicly declared that it has no  
7           obligation or duty to update forecasts of  
8           future financial performance, whether such  
9           performance relates to Tennessee or any  
10          state where Atmos operates.

11  
12          My Schedule 2 places into the record the  
13          fair-warning that Atmos gives to investors  
14          and consumers. Having issued its warning,  
15          Atmos is to be taken at its word. Thus my  
16          opinion on just and reasonable rates is  
17          based on verified information. Otherwise,  
18          Tennessee's ratepayers have no protection  
19          from arbitrary financial predictions. In  
20          the marketplace a competitive environment  
21          protects consumers from having to pay  
22          wayward prices for services because  
23          competition gives consumers a choice of  
24          suppliers. Atmos is a monopoly, facing no  
25          competition from any other natural-gas  
26          distributor. Thus Atmos's financial  
27          forecasts are not a reasonable basis for  
28          setting prices to ratepayers in Tennessee.  
29          In the past Atmos made good on its  
30          warning, never updating its bills to  
31          consumers to account for the company's  
32          declining interest costs, which are shown  
33          in the next page of my testimony.

**Count On Atmos Not Updating Its Forecasts:**  
 From Rutherford County In Middle Tennessee, To Obion In The West, To Sullivan In The East,  
 Atmos's Customers Continue To Pay Utility Bills As If Atmos's Debt Costs Are 9.67%



1       Atmos has not lowered its rates in over 11  
2       years, but it has, like all natural-gas  
3       distributors, raised its dividends to  
4       stockholders. However, my research for this  
5       case has led me to discover that only 37% of  
6       publicly-traded companies pay dividends to  
7       their stock holders. The other companies  
8       rely on capital-gains to reward their  
9       stockholders. Thus, Atmos's need for an  
10      equity return must be judged according to  
11      its need to maintain stockholders' dividend  
12      payments, not according to Atmos's desire to  
13      offer capital-gains to its stockholders. In  
14      fact, the Federal Reserve Board's transcript  
15      from its Open Market Committee Meeting of  
16      March 22, 1994 says in part at page 40:  
17      "Everything we know about markets is that  
18      abnormal rates of return, especially those  
19      built on capital gains, cannot persist."  
20      Therefore, I pared away economic data  
21      dominated by capital-gains speculation until  
22      the data was reduced to a reliable core for  
23      Tennessee's ratepayers.

24  
25      Setting just and reasonable rates requires  
26      the selection of companies comparable to the  
27      company whose rates are in question. The  
28      "comparable companies" method for rate-  
29      setting is a long-standing regulatory  
30      principle which has the effect of preventing  
31      the arbitrary determination of equity costs.  
32

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1 Unique or arbitrary conditions that may  
2 affect Atmos's financial behavior are  
3 avoided when the opinions are founded on  
4 the behavior of the comparables. The use  
5 of "comparables" for regulatory-decision  
6 making is akin to judging behavior  
7 according to rules rather than judging  
8 behavior according to the identity of the  
9 company. Although nothing in rate-setting  
10 is absolute and inflexible, the  
11 "comparable companies" method is a tried-  
12 and-true measure for arriving at just and  
13 reasonable rates.

14  
15 I have chosen 10 companies to form a  
16 comparable group. They are AGL Resources,  
17 KeySpan, LaClede Group, New Jersey  
18 Resources, NICOR, Northwest Natural Gas  
19 Company, Peoples Energy Corporation,  
20 Piedmont, Southwest Gas Corporation, and  
21 WGL Holdings. These are the same companies  
22 I chose in CAPD's show-cause filing of  
23 September 15, 2005 regarding Atmos. These  
24 are also the companies which the Tennessee  
25 Regulatory Authority accepted as forming a  
26 comparable group in Docket 04-00034 to  
27 assess the proposed rates of Chattanooga  
28 Gas, a subsidiary of AGL Resources.  
29 However, in this docket AGL Resources is  
30 in the comparable group and Atmos is the  
31 company whose rates are being assessed.  
32

1 My Schedule 3, pages 1 to 10, displays the  
2 capital structures for each company for  
3 each fiscal year from 2003 to 2005. More  
4 specifically, the capital structure is  
5 taken from each comparable company's SEC  
6 form 10-K for each comparable company's  
7 most recent fiscal year. Each form 10-K  
8 has the benefit of being audited. I use  
9 the SEC's data as a means of building in  
10 accountability and objectivity into the  
11 capital structure, and limiting the  
12 capital structure to data verified by  
13 auditors who are independent of the  
14 company. Also, the three-year period  
15 generally matches the Authority's rate-  
16 case guidelines calling for three years of  
17 historical data.

18  
19 My Schedule 4 displays a short-term debt  
20 cost of 5.09%. Short-term debt cost is  
21 determined directly by the Federal Reserve  
22 Board. In January 2002 short-term debt  
23 cost dropped below 2%, moved to a minimum  
24 of 1% a year later, and did not return to  
25 2% again until November 2004, when the  
26 Reserve Board appeared to change course by  
27 raising interest rates. The cost of 5.09%  
28 in my Schedule 4 is reasonable given the  
29 change in the Board's policy.  
30

1 My Schedule 5 displays Atmos's current  
2 cost of long-term debt cost of 5.52%. Data  
3 at the top of the schedule ties directly  
4 to the long-term debt displayed in a  
5 portion of Atmos's SEC 10-K filing, which  
6 is shown in the bottom half of Schedule 5.

7  
8 My Schedule 6 displays one method I  
9 employed to determine the appropriate  
10 equity return. I used the traditional  
11 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method,  
12 where equity cost is the sum of a  
13 dividend yield and dividend growth.  
14 The DCF analysis suggests a reasonable  
15 equity return of 8%, which is close to  
16 the top of the range, shown on the  
17 schedule in the lower right, under the  
18 column named "Range Of Suggested DCF  
19 Equity Returns To The Stock Holder."

20  
21 In my opinion the DCF is a sound  
22 model, not easily construed to give  
23 results far from the mainstream.  
24 Dividends and dividend yields are well  
25 tracked by web sites, newspapers,  
26 newsletters, and other forms of the  
27 popular press. In my opinion the  
28 public availability of the inputs and  
29 the ease with which they can be  
30 applied explain why the model appears  
31 in every rate case and in every  
32 jurisdiction.

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1    **Q\_5.            What further evidence supports your**  
2                    **opinion that 8% is a reasonable equity**  
3                    **return?**

4  
5    **A\_5.**           In my opinion there is ample evidence.  
6                    The return of 8% is well above Atmos's  
7                    debt cost of 5.52%. My Schedule 7  
8                    substantiates that the natural-gas  
9                    distributors consider the steady  
10                   payment of a dividend as a driving  
11                   force in their behavior. I found  
12                   nothing to indicate that capital-gains  
13                   are a motivating financial concern.

14  
15                   Therefore, my opinion is that the  
16                   reasonableness of an 8% return should  
17                   be judged against other dividend-  
18                   paying companies. To that end I  
19                   constructed my Schedule 8. It is based  
20                   on data for over 6000 companies in the  
21                   Morningstar online-data-base which  
22                   maintains a five-year history of  
23                   financial data found in annual SEC  
24                   Form 10-K reports filed with the  
25                   Securities and Exchange Commission by  
26                   companies throughout the United  
27                   States.

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
1        Schedule 8 has eight large data boxes  
2        numbered (1) through (8) for eight  
3        different sets of companies. Each box  
4        number has a description under it, and  
5        under the description are five columns  
6        of data for the specific group of  
7        companies in the box.

8  
9        For example, Schedule 8's lower left  
10       side displays a box labeled "(5) -  
11       NYSE" for the New York Stock Exchange.  
12       Underneath that label is the  
13       description "NYSE - 1980 Companies  
14       With A Market Value Of \$21,680  
15       Billion." Just below the description,  
16       on the left, is a column labeled  
17       "Percent of NYSE Companies Paying  
18       Dividends." Beneath the label is the  
19       figure of "58%." To the left of the  
20       "58%" figure is the term "Current."  
21       The economic meaning is that just 58%  
22       of the NYSE equity-listed companies  
23       paid dividends to their stockholders  
24       in the Fiscal Year 2005, which most  
25       often ends in December. The rest of  
26       the companies relied on capital gains  
27       to reward their shareholders, which  
28       means the shareholder gets no reward  
29       unless the stock is sold.

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1 To the right of "58%" is the figure of  
2 "61%" which indicates that the  
3 dividend-paying companies accounted  
4 for 61% of the market value of the  
5 NYSE equity-listed companies Fiscal  
6 Year 2005. To the right of "61%" is  
7 the figure of "1.89%" which is the  
8 median dividend yield of the NYSE's  
9 dividend-paying companies. To the  
10 right of "1.89%" is the figure of "9%"  
11 which is the median dividend growth of  
12 the dividend-paying companies.  
13 Finally, to the right of "9%" is the  
14 figure of "32%" which is the median  
15 dividend payout of the dividend-paying  
16 companies. Each data box is read in  
17 the same way.

18  
19 Many companies do not make dividend  
20 payments, and thus are unlike Atmos  
21 and the comparable companies. An 8%  
22 equity return for Atmos is  
23 appropriately evaluated as just and  
24 reasonable by looking to a group of  
25 companies most like the comparables.  
26 That group is the S&P 500 because most  
27 of its companies pay dividends, shown  
28 as the data in box 7: "(7) - S&P 500."  
29 The chart on the next page displays  
30 Schedule 8's data and plainly shows  
31 the close similarity of the S&P 500 to  
32 the comparable group.  
33



1  
2 A major difference between the two  
3 groups lies in the dividend yield and  
4 dividend growth. The S&P 500 has a  
5 dividend yield of only 1.54%, well  
6 below the 4.18% yield for the  
7 comparable group. On the other hand,  
8 S&P 500 has a dividend growth rate of  
9 11% but the comparable group has a  
10 growth rate of just over 2%. The low  
11 growth rate combined with high yield  
12 is a sign that the comparable  
13 companies are low risk in comparison  
14 to the broader group.

15  
16 **Q\_6. In your opinion is Morningstar's data**  
17 **accurate and complete?**

18  
19 **A\_6.** Yes. In my opinion the data is  
20 accurate and complete.

21  
22 For example, my Schedule 9 is drawn  
23 from Morningstar's data and provides  
24 another reason to employ the S&P500 as  
25 a standard: it has representation from  
26 the NYSE and the NASDAQ and the  
27 distribution of market values closely  
28 matches the distribution of market  
29 values across the various markets.  
30

1 My Schedule 10 shows that a steady  
2 stream of high returns is not typical  
3 in the economy, as shown by the S&P  
4 500 and the Dow Jones 30 Industrial  
5 Index, both of which use NASDAQ and  
6 NYSE companies.

7  
8 My Schedule 11 displays certain  
9 comments at the NASDAQ website  
10 regarding the S&P 500 index and the  
11 NYSE Composite Index, which I note  
12 that Atmos has relied on in the past.

13  
14 My Schedule 12 displays betas from the  
15 NASDAQ website and further shows that  
16 NASDAQ uses the S&P 500 to calculate  
17 betas, a standard measure of risk. The  
18 values of the betas, which average  
19 only .34, confirm that the comparable  
20 group and Atmos are low-risk companies  
21 in comparison to the market as a  
22 whole. According to the beta, the  
23 comparable group is only one-third as  
24 risky as the broader market, and Atmos  
25 is only one-fourth as risky as the  
26 broader market.

27  
28 My Schedule 13 pages 1 to 11 display  
29 web pages at NASDAQ, showing the betas  
30 for each company in the comparable  
31 group and Atmos.  
32

NASDAQ's betas are an input in my Risk Premium model.

**Q\_7. What is the Risk Premium model?**

**A\_7.** The model is meant to assure that the equity return should have a premium over debt cost. Equity investments are riskier than debt because equity investments occasionally lose money, thus equity investors require a risk premium or a higher return than debt. For example, equity holders are last in line for the distribution of earnings and also last in line for distribution of liquidation proceeds. In both cases the debt holders are paid first. Any funds left are distributed to the equity holders. Therefore, the cost of equity is the debt yield plus a risk premium for the company.

**Q\_8. What is the procedure for deriving the cost of equity from this risk premium model?**

**A\_8.** The procedure has six steps:

1. Estimate the market's current cost of debt -  $K_d$ .

---

1           2. Estimate market-wide rate  
2           of return for common equity -  
3            $R_m$ .

4  
5           3. Estimate the market-wide  
6           risk-free investment -  $R_f$ .

7  
8           4. Take the difference  
9           between steps 2 and 3

10  
11          5. Multiply the difference by  
12          a "Beta" -  $B_e$ .

13  
14          6. Add the result of step 5  
15          to the debt cost in step 1.  
16          The result is the estimated  
17          cost of equity from the risk  
18          premium model

19  
20          
$$K_e = K_d + (B_e) * (R_m - R_f)$$

21  
22  
23          My Schedule 14 shows the results:

24  
25          
$$8.0\% = 5.92\% + 0.332(9.93\% - 3.72\%)$$

26  
27  
28    Q\_9.       **What do you use to estimate  $K_d$ , the**  
29               **market's current cost of debt?**

30  
31    A\_9.       I use 5.92%, as shown in my Schedule  
32               15. Atmos has said in its most recent  
33               SEC 10-K that its bonds are

---

1 "investment grade," which corresponds  
2 to "triple A" or "AAA" rating. The  
3 rates in Schedule 15 are very recent  
4 rates from the Federal Reserve Board,  
5 and capture the Reserve Board's recent  
6 decisions raising interest rates, just  
7 as my Schedule 4 does. Even though  
8 Atmos's long term debt cost is 5.52%,  
9 the market's current cost of debt is  
10 just that, a market rate and not a  
11 specific company's cost.  
12

13 **Q\_10. What do you use to estimate  $R_m$ ,**  
14 **market-wide rate of return for common**  
15 **equity?**

16  
17 **A\_10.** My Schedule 16, near the bottom,  
18 displays a figure of 9.93%, the actual  
19 historical returns to the S&P500 since  
20 1925. This figure is taken from  
21 Ibbotson Associates Yearbook- Stocks  
22 Bonds, Bills and Inflation for 2005,  
23 as noted at the bottom of the  
24 Schedule. The Ibbotson Associates  
25 Yearbook for 2005, page 61, describes  
26 the index: "The large company stock  
27 total return index is based upon the  
28 S&P Composite Index. This index is  
29 readily available, carefully  
30 constructed, market-value-weighted  
31 benchmark of large company stock  
32 performance...Currently, the S&P  
33 Composite Index includes 500 of the

1 largest stocks (in terms of stock  
2 market value) in the United States."

3  
4 **Q\_11. Why are you using historical data to**  
5 **estimate the risk premium?**

6  
7 **A\_11.** Historical data provides a way to  
8 smooth out the wild fluctuations in  
9 the risk premium, which is the  
10 difference between the risk-free  
11 return and market return to common  
12 equity. Since return to debt is fairly  
13 stable, the fluctuations are caused by  
14 the wide swings in the return to  
15 equity. For example, if the return to  
16 common equity is large in one year, so  
17 is the premium, if the return is small  
18 the next year, the premium will be  
19 negative.  
20

21 **Q\_12. Why are you using the years from 1925**  
22 **through 2004 to measure the risk**  
23 **premium?**

24  
25 **A\_12.** Ibbotson provides historical  
26 information on the risk premium from  
27 1925 through 2004, and these years  
28 represent the entire term for which  
29 information is available. Using the  
30 entire data avoids any element of  
31 subjectivity that may influence the  
32 selection of only a portion of the  
33 data.

---

1  
2 **Q\_13. Why are you using 9.93% as the**  
3 **estimate of the market-wide rate of**  
4 **return to common equity?**

5  
6 **A\_13.** I use that figure because it  
7 represents normal performance in the  
8 market: 9.93% is the actual annual  
9 rate of growth in the value of the S&P  
10 500 companies. One dollar invested in  
11 the S&P at year end 1925, with  
12 dividends reinvested, grew to \$2533.20  
13 by year end 2004; this represents a  
14 compound annual growth rate of 9.93%.  
15 The year-by-year change is shown  
16 columns 3 and 6.

17  
18 In my Schedule 16 the figure of 9.93%  
19 contrasts with figure of 12.39%, which  
20 is an "arithmetic average" of  
21 percentage changes, otherwise known as  
22 a "fool's gold" calculation.

23  
24 **Q\_14. Why is the figure "12.39%" a "fool's**  
25 **gold" calculation?**

26  
27 **A\_14.** The figure is a "fool's gold"  
28 calculation because it overstates the  
29 true percentage increase when  
30 percentage increases are averaged with  
31 percentage decreases.  
32

1           Here is an example of the "fool's  
2           gold" calculation. If I bought a stock  
3           two years ago for \$1000 and the market  
4           price declined to \$500, I would have a  
5           loss of 50% in that year. If by a  
6           miracle the stock climbed back to  
7           \$1000 the next year, I would have a  
8           100% gain even though I have the same  
9           amount of money I started with.

10  
11           If I took that to a bank and asked for  
12           a loan on the basis of my percent  
13           gain, I think I would be turned down.  
14           The average gain over two years is the  
15           "arithmetic" mean, which is 25%, i.e.,  
16            $(-50\% + 100\%)/2$ . Any historical record  
17           averaging percentage losses and  
18           percentage gains to get an average  
19           percent increase always overestimates  
20           the true gain.

---

1           The calculation is accurate only in  
2           the case where there have always been  
3           gains. In this situation the average  
4           return and the "fool's gold"  
5           calculation are identical. A  
6           divergence between the two numbers  
7           indicates that in some years there  
8           were no gains and losses. The greater  
9           the divergence, the greater the losses  
10          in the market. The difference between  
11          "9.93%" and "12.39%" in my Schedule 15  
12          indicates plenty of losses over the  
13          years.

14  
15   Q\_15.       **What represents the market-wide risk-**  
16               **free investment,  $R_f$ ?**

17  
18   A\_15.       I am using the three-month U.S.  
19               Treasury bills displayed in my  
20               Schedule 17.

21  
22   Q\_16.       **What is the market-wide risk free rate**  
23               **of return,  $R_f$ , based on three-month**  
24               **bills?**

25  
26   A\_16.       The risk free rate is 3.72%, which is  
27               the annual growth rate in the value of  
28               the three-month treasury bills from  
29               1926 to 2004. Therefore, the time  
30               frame of the risk-free rate matches  
31               the time frame of the market-wide  
32               return to common equity. Schedule 16  
33               shows the 79 year history for returns

---

1 to Treasury bills, and in the entire  
2 time there is no loss. The "fool's  
3 gold" calculation displays an  
4 "arithmetic average" of 3.76%. It is  
5 slightly higher than the actual rate  
6 because there were no gains in several  
7 years. The three-month rate is the  
8 best measure of a riskless rate  
9 because it is the shortest-term rate.

10  
11 **Q\_17. Does the risk premium model require**  
12 **that the risk free rate be based on**  
13 **long term debt or on short term debt?**

14  
15 **A\_17.** Neither one is required because the  
16 term of the debt is not material. The  
17 critical aspect is that the debt must  
18 be risk free.

19  
20 **Q\_18. Why is the three-month treasury bill the**  
21 **best measure of a riskless rate?**

22  
23 **A\_18.** There are three reasons:

24  
25 1. The three-month bill is a debt  
26 instrument. This fits with the  
27 risk premium's basic premise: the  
28 return to debt is less than the  
29 equity return and equity return is  
30 determined by referencing debt.

---

1           2. Of all the other debt  
2           instruments measures that could be  
3           used -- long-term corporate bonds,  
4           long-term government bonds, and  
5           intermediate term government bonds  
6           -- the three-month bill provides  
7           the lowest rate. This is  
8           consistent with the financial  
9           concept that rates decline as risk  
10          declines, and risk declines as the  
11          the duration of the note declines.

12  
13          3. A three-month bill is free from  
14          losses but the other debt  
15          instruments are not, i.e., they  
16          are riskier forms of investment  
17          than the three-month bill, which  
18          is why their rates are higher. Of  
19          all the debt instruments, the  
20          three-month bill is the safest.

21  
22          Investors are also absolutely  
23          certain of what cash flows will be  
24          received and when they will be  
25          received. Unlike the other debt  
26          instruments, the three-month bill  
27          carries no risk of default or loss  
28          of principal.

29  
30    Q\_19.       **Is there a way to use long term bonds**  
31                **as a riskless rate?**  
32

---

1   **A\_19.**       No. Long term bonds could be used as a  
2                   riskless rate if the bonds were truly  
3                   riskless but that is not the case.

4  
5   **Q\_20.**       **What is the Consumer Advocate's**  
6                   **position on rate design?**

7  
8   **A\_20.**       The Consumer Advocate has generally  
9                   supported across-the-board rate  
10                  changes. At this time however, the  
11                  Consumer Advocate has not seen any  
12                  evidence that would suggest the need  
13                  to alter the across-the-board  
14                  approach.

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20                This completes my testimony at this time

21  
22   **III.    Statement of Credentials and**  
23            **Experience**

24  
25   **Q\_21.**       **What experience do you have regarding**  
26                   **utilities?**

27  
28   **A\_21.**       In 1995 I began work as an economist  
29                   in the Consumer Advocate and  
30                   Protection Division (CAPD) of the  
31                   Attorney General's Office. I have also  
32                   appeared as a witness for CAPD in  
33                   several cases before the Tennessee

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1 Regulatory Authority (TRA). From 1986  
2 to 1995 I was employed by the Iowa  
3 Utilities Board as Chief of the Bureau  
4 of Energy Efficiency, Auditing and  
5 Research, and Utility Specialist and  
6 State Liaison Officer to the U.S.  
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. From  
8 1984 to 1986 I worked for Houston  
9 Lighting & Power as Supervisor of Rate  
10 Design. From 1982 to 1984 I worked for  
11 Arizona Electric Power Cooperative as  
12 a Rate Analyst. From 1979 to 1982 I  
13 worked for Tri-State Generation and  
14 Transmission Association as Power  
15 Requirements Supervisor and Rate  
16 Specialist. Since 1979 my work spanned  
17 many issues including cost of service  
18 studies, rate design issues,  
19 telecommunications issues and matters  
20 related to the disposal of nuclear  
21 waste.

22  
23 **Q\_22. What is your educational background?**

24  
25 **A\_22.** I have an M.S. in Regulatory Economics  
26 from the University of Wyoming, an  
27 M.A. and Ph.D. in International  
28 Relations with a specialty in  
29 International Economics from the  
30 University of Denver, and a B.A. from  
31 Colorado State University.  
32

1    **Q\_23.**        **Dr. Brown, have you authored any**  
2                    **articles relating to your profession?**

3  
4    **A\_23.**        Yes, my articles have appeared in  
5                    Public Utilities Fortnightly.

6  
7    **Q\_24.**        **Are you and have you been a member of**  
8                    **any professional organizations, Dr.**  
9                    **Brown?**

10  
11   **A\_24.**        Yes, I am a past member of the NARUC  
12                    Staff Committee on Management  
13                    Analysis, a past trustee of and a  
14                    member of the Board for the Automatic  
15                    Meter Reading Association, and a  
16                    current member of the National  
17                    Association of Business Economists.

18  
19   **Q\_25.**        **Have you studied mathematics and**  
20                    **statistics as part of your education?**

21  
22   **A\_25.**        Yes.

23  
24   **Q\_26.**        **Dr. Brown, do you use mathematics and**  
25                    **statistics in combination with**  
26                    **economics as part of your profession?**

27  
28   **A\_26.**        Yes.

29  
30  
31  
32   **Q\_27.**        **Where do you work and what is your job**  
33                    **title?**

1  
2 **A\_27.** I am an Economist in the Consumer  
3 Advocate and Protection Division,  
4 Office of the Attorney General.  
5

6 **Q\_28. What are your responsibilities as an**  
7 **Economist?**  
8

9 **A\_28.** I review companies' petitions for rate  
10 changes and follow the economic  
11 conditions that affect the companies.  
12

13 **Q\_29. What experience do you have regarding**  
14 **utilities?**  
15

16 **A\_29.** In 1995 I began work as an economist  
17 in the Consumer Advocate and  
18 Protection Division (CAPD) of the  
19 Attorney General's Office. I have also  
20 appeared as a witness for CAPD in  
21 several cases before the Tennessee  
22 Regulatory Authority (TRA). From 1986  
23 to 1995 I was employed by the Iowa  
24 Utilities Board as Chief of the Bureau  
25 of Energy Efficiency, Auditing and  
26 Research, and Utility Specialist and  
27 State Liaison Officer to the U.S.  
28 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. From  
29 1984 to 1986 I worked for Houston  
30 Lighting & Power as Supervisor of Rate  
31 Design. From 1982 to 1984 I worked for  
32 Arizona Electric Power Cooperative as  
33 a Rate Analyst. From 1979 to 1982 I

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2 Transmission Association as Power  
3 Requirements Supervisor and Rate  
4 Specialist. Since 1979 my work spanned  
5 many issues including cost of service  
6 studies, rate design issues,  
7 telecommunications issues and matters  
8 related to the disposal of nuclear  
9 waste.

10  
11 **Q\_30. What is your educational background?**

12  
13 **A\_30.** I have an M.S. in Regulatory Economics  
14 from the University of Wyoming, an  
15 M.A. and Ph.D. in International  
16 Relations with a specialty in  
17 International Economics from the  
18 University of Denver, and a B.A. from  
19 Colorado State University.

20  
21 **Q\_31. Dr. Brown, have you authored any**  
22 **articles relating to your profession?**

23  
24 **A\_31.** Yes, my articles have appeared in  
25 Public Utilities Fortnightly.

26  
27 **Q\_32. Are you and have you been a member of**  
28 **any professional organizations, Dr.**  
29 **Brown?**

30  
31 **A\_32.** Yes, I am a past member of the NARUC  
32 Staff Committee on Management  
33 Analysis, a past trustee of and a

1 member of the Board for the Automatic  
2 Meter Reading Association, and a  
3 current member of the National  
4 Association of Business Economists.

5  
6 **Q\_33. Have you studied mathematics and**  
7 **statistics as part of your education?**

8  
9 **A\_33. Yes.**

10  
11 **Q\_34. Dr. Brown, do you use mathematics and**  
12 **statistics in combination with**  
13 **economics as part of your profession?**

14  
15 **A\_34. Yes.**  
16