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TESTIMONY OF SHARON NORRIS J.R.A. DOCKET ROOM

ON BEHALF OF

COMPSOUTH

DOCKET NO. 04-00150

FEBRUARY 25, 2005

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. I am Sharon Norris and my business address is P.O. Box 658, Loganville, Georgia 30052.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE.

A. My education and relevant work experience are as follows. I received a degree in Distributive Education from DeKalb College in 1972. I have been employed in the telecommunications industry for over thirty-one years. I began my career with Southern Bell in 1973, in one of its Commercial Business offices in Atlanta, Georgia. From 1973 until 1983, I held various positions in Southern Bell's business offices, business marketing organizations, retail stores, and support staff organizations. In 1983, at the time of the Bell Telephone breakup, I chose to move from Southern Bell to AT&T, where I worked in the Consumer Sales Division of American Bell and later AT&T Information Systems. From 1985 until 1991, I worked in the Human Resources department of AT&T. In 1991, I

1 transferred to AT&T's Law and Government Affairs Division. Initially, I served
2 as a loaned executive to the Governor's Efficiency Commission for the State of
3 Georgia. In this capacity, I examined current government practices and policies
4 designed to increase government efficiency. In 1995, I became AT&T's
5 representative to the Georgia Public Service Commission. In this role, I
6 advocated AT&T's position on regulations and issues regarding opening local
7 exchange markets to competition. I continued in this role until 1997, when I also
8 began to monitor and analyze BellSouth's compliance with its obligations to
9 provide AT&T nondiscriminatory access to BellSouth's Operational Support
10 Systems ("OSS") throughout its nine-state territory. I retired from AT&T in
11 1998, and am now a consultant with SEN Consulting, Inc. In this capacity and on
12 behalf of AT&T, I continued through 2004 to monitor and analyze BellSouth's
13 compliance with its obligations.

14 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT AND THE**
15 **SCOPE OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES.**

16 A. I am a consultant with SEN Consulting, Inc. engaged by CompSouth.

17 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PARTICIPATED IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS**
18 **THAT RELATE TO THIS PROCEEDING?**

19 A. Yes. I have participated in Commission proceedings regarding BellSouth's
20 wholesale performance measures in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and North
21 Carolina.

1 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

2 A. My testimony has three primary goals: 1) to discuss the purpose of performance
3 measures and enforcement mechanisms, 2) to advise the Tennessee Regulatory
4 Authority ("TRA") of other state proceedings relevant to this case, and 3) to
5 provide the TRA information regarding BellSouth's performance under the
6 current performance assessment plan.

7 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE BACKGROUND FOR THE PERFORMANCE**
8 **ASSESSMENT PLAN CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN TENNESSEE?**

9 A. Certainly. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority opened Docket No. 01-00193,
10 *Docket to Establish Generic Performance Measurements, Benchmarks and*
11 *Enforcement Mechanisms For BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.*, on February
12 21, 2001 to develop a common set of performance measurements, associated
13 standards, and enforcement mechanisms to ensure BellSouth provides
14 nondiscriminatory access to its network elements in accordance with the
15 requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Hearings pursuant to this
16 proceeding were held August 20, 2001 through August 23, 2001. On May 14,
17 2002, the TRA issued its *Order Setting Performance Measurements, Benchmarks*
18 *and Enforcements Mechanisms*, Docket No. 01-00193. On June 28, 2002, in
19 response to various motions for clarification and/or reconsideration filed by
20 BellSouth, Brooks Fiber Communications of Tennessee, MCImetro Access
21 Transmission Services, LLC and MCI WorldCom, the TRA issued its *Amended*
22 *Final Order Granting Reconsideration and Clarification and Setting Performance*

1 *Measurements, Benchmarks and Enforcement Mechanisms* replacing the May 14,
2 2002 Order. On July 12, 2002, BellSouth filed a *Motion for Reconsideration of*
3 *the TRA's Amended Final Order*. Subsequently, on August 7, 2002, during the
4 course of a separate proceeding in Docket No. 97-00309, the parties signed a
5 *Settlement Agreement* in which the parties agreed that:

6 In resolution of the contested issues in Docket 01-00193, the parties
7 will request the Authority to adopt as the 'Tennessee Performance
8 Assurance Plan' the identical service quality measurement plan and
9 self-effectuating enforcement mechanism adopted by the Florida
10 Public Service Commission in Docket No. 000121-TP on February
11 14, 2002, as it exists today and as it may be modified in the future,
12 plus the Tennessee Performance Measurements for Special Access
13 contained in the Order Setting Performance Measurements,
14 Benchmarks and Enforcement Mechanisms issued in this docket on
15 June 28, 2002. *See Settlement Agreement* at 2, Docket No. 97-
16 00309, dated August 7, 2002.

17 **Q. WHAT WERE THE TRA'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE NEED**
18 **FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND ENFORCEMENT**
19 **MECHANISMS IN ITS ORDER IN DOCKET 01-00193 DATED JUNE 28,**
20 **2002?**

21 A. The Authority found that its "duty to ensure that the CLECs have
22 nondiscriminatory access to all essential unbundled network element ("UNE")
23 processes, including pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair
24 and billing, is cognizable under both state and federal law...The purpose of
25 performance measurements, benchmarks, and self-effectuating enforcement
26 mechanisms is to provide a mechanism for *establishing, assessing and enforcing*
27 *the level of service BellSouth provides to CLECs to assure non discriminatory*
28 *access* to all essential UNEs (emphasis added). Absent nondiscriminatory access

1 to these UNEs, the CLECs' ability to offer Tennessee consumers quality service
2 in a timely manner is limited, thereby thwarting the statutorily mandated policy of
3 fostering competition among telecommunication service providers." (See Order at
4 page 4)

5 **Q. ARE THE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TRA'S JUNE 28, 2002 ORDER**
6 **STILL RELEVANT?**

7 A. Absolutely. The need for assessing and enforcing the level of service BellSouth
8 provides to CLECs to assure non discriminatory access is as vital today to the
9 CLECs' ability to offer Tennessee consumers quality service in a timely and cost
10 effective manner as it was in 2002 when the TRA issued its Order.

11 **Q. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE CURRENT PLAN MUST REMAIN IN**
12 **PLACE?**

13 A. No. In fact, the Authority's *Final Order Accepting Settlement agreement and*
14 *adopting performance measurements, benchmarks and enforcement mechanisms*
15 dated October 4, 2002, states that "the parties agreed not to seek amendments to
16 the plan until December 2003, after which the TRA in its discretion may conduct
17 a review of the plan and the parties are free to recommend modifications." (See
18 Order at page 7)

19 However, any changes considered by the TRA should be carefully
20 evaluated to ensure that non-discriminatory access continues to be assessed and
21 enforced by the Plan.

1 **Q. HAS ANY PARTY RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE CURRENT**
2 **PLAN?**

3 A. Yes. On May 13, 2004, BellSouth filed a motion for the establishment of a New
4 Performance Assurance Plan.

5 **Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH BELL SOUTH'S PROPOSAL?**

6 A. Yes. BellSouth's May 13, 2004 proposal filed in Tennessee appears to be very
7 similar to the changes it requested be made to the current Florida plan. (BellSouth
8 initially filed its petition for new performance plan in Florida on May 12, 2004.
9 Subsequently, at the Florida Public Service Commission's ("PSC") request, both
10 BellSouth and the CLECs proposed changes to BellSouth's current plan on July
11 28 and August 18, 2004).

12 **Q. WHAT HAS OCCURRED REGARDING THIS ISSUE IN FLORIDA**
13 **SINCE BELL SOUTH FILED ITS PROPOSAL THERE?**

14 A. In June, 2004, the Florida PSC initiated a review of BellSouth's *current* Service
15 Quality Measurement ("SQM") and Self Effectuating Enforcement Mechanism
16 ("SEEM") plans. Matrices of a total of well over 150 BellSouth and CLEC issues
17 and positions were developed and were discussed in a series of face-to-face
18 workshops and conference calls consisting of BellSouth, CLECs, and Florida PSC
19 Staff. (See attached Exhibits A, B, and C) Since late July 2004, several face-to-
20 face meetings have occurred, conference calls have been held almost weekly, and
21 approximately forty related filings have been made. The Florida PSC Staff plans
22 to determine by February 28 whether a new SEEM plan proposed by Staff can be
23 agreed to by the parties or whether the issue needs to be set for hearing.

1 Similarly, the Florida Staff has requested that the parties advise by March 3
2 whether they can stipulate to a new SQM plan proposed by Staff.

3 **Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND THE AUTHORITY DO WITH THE**
4 **WORK BEING DONE IN FLORIDA?**

5 A. CompSouth recommends that the Authority adopt any SQM or SEEM plans (or
6 any portions thereof) agreed to by the parties in Florida. While any agreement in
7 Florida will represent compromise from the parties' desired positions, the issues
8 resolved in Florida mirror issues raised in Tennessee, and therefore should be
9 acceptable for implementation in Tennessee as well. Because these agreed-to
10 plans will likely be considerably different than the current plans, CompSouth also
11 recommends that the Authority order a review of the plans six months after
12 implementation to determine whether adjustments to the revised plan are
13 necessary.

14 **Q. DO THE STATE SPECIFIC RESULTS IN TENNESSEE REQUIRE A**
15 **TENNESSEE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT PLAN?**

16 A. No. BellSouth's processes and operational support systems may be assessed by a
17 common set of performance measures, while results are reported specifically for
18 each state.

19 **Q. DO YOU HAVE COMMENTS REGARDING THE NEW PERFORMANCE**
20 **ASSURANCE PLAN FILED IN MAY 2004 BY BELL SOUTH IN**
21 **TENNESSEE?**

22 A. Yes. Most of the issues raised in BellSouth's filing are included in the three
23 exhibits I referenced earlier in my testimony, and the responses in those exhibits

1 would also be applicable in Tennessee as well. Further, given the age of the
2 current proposal and the potentially significant impact of the work underway in
3 Florida on these same issues, CompSouth will update its comments in its rebuttal
4 testimony.

5 **Q. DO YOU HAVE OTHER INFORMATION YOU BELIEVE THE**
6 **AUTHORITY SHOULD CONSIDER IN THIS MATTER?**

7 A. Yes. Clearly any changes being contemplated, especially changes that eliminate
8 or reduce requirements on BellSouth, should be reviewed in concert with
9 BellSouth's compliance with the current plan. Particular attention should be
10 given to the measures that BellSouth consistently misses to determine why they
11 would rather pay penalties than provide the required service level.

12 Also, BellSouth should not be allowed to unilaterally cease reporting data
13 or making SEEM payments simply because there is a change in law that may
14 relieve BellSouth of any of its obligations to provide any UNE or UNE
15 combinations pursuant to Section 251 of the Act. Separate from its obligations
16 under Section 251, BellSouth continues to be obligated to provide non-
17 discriminatory access to certain elements and services under Section 271 of the
18 Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Tennessee statutes. To ensure BellSouth's
19 compliance with these requirements of non-discriminatory access, performance
20 measures covering services provided pursuant to Section 251, Section 271, or
21 Tennessee statute should be included in any Performance Assessment Plan
22 ordered by this Authority.

1 **Q. IS BELL SOUTH CURRENTLY PROVIDING SERVICE TO CLECS**
2 **COMPLIANT WITH THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THIS**
3 **AUTHORITY?**

4 A. In numerous cases it is not. Further, many instances of non-compliance are
5 chronic. I reviewed BellSouth's Tennessee 2004 CLEC aggregate performance
6 reports posted on its Performance Measurement and Analysis Platform ("PMAP")
7 web-site and found that BellSouth reported the following:

8 For its measure of Timely Return of Rejection Notices for partially mechanized
9 orders, BellSouth's failures to provide compliant service included the following:

10

Product	SQM
2W Analog Loop Non design	Missed 8 of 12 months
2W Analog Loop --Design	Missed 9 of 12 months
Digital Loop<DS1	Missed 6 of 12 months
UNE ISDN	Missed 6 of 12 months
LNP	Missed 8 of 12 months
Line Splitting	Missed 6 of 12 months

11
12 For its measure of Timely Return of Firm Order Confirmations ("FOCS") for
13 partially mechanized orders, BellSouth's failures to provide compliant service
14 included the following:
15

Product	SQM
Resale residence	Missed 6 of 12 months
Resale -- business	Missed 9 of 12 months
2W Analog Loop w/LNP--Design	Missed 9 of 12 months
Digital Loop<DS1	Missed 11 of 12 months
Digital Loop >=DS1	Missed 5 of 12 months
UNE-P	Missed 5 of 12 months
UNE ISDN	Missed 7 of 12 months
LNP	Missed 7 of 12 months
Line Splitting	Missed 10 of 12 months
UNE xDSL	Missed 11 of 12 months
Line-sharing	Missed 12 of 12 months
UNE Other Non-Design	Missed 5 of 12 months
EELs	Missed 10 of 12 months

16

For its measure of non-discriminatory Order Completion Intervals, BellSouth's failures to provide compliant service included the following:

Product	SQM
2 wire analog loop non-design, non-dispatch	Missed 4 of 12 months
UNE-P Dispatch in	Missed 11 of 12 months
Digital Loop <DS1 –dispatch	Missed 8 of 12 months

For its measure of non-discriminatory Customer Trouble Report Rates, BellSouth's failures to provide compliant service included the following:

Product	SQM
Resale residence-dispatch	Missed 11 of 12 months
Digital Loop<DS1-dispatch	Missed 12 of 12 months
Digital Loop >=DS1-dispatch	Missed 9 of 12 months
UNE Combo-Other-dispatch	Missed 11 of 12 months
UNE xDSL –dispatch	Missed 8 of 12 months
Line-sharing-dispatch	Missed 9 of 12 months

For its measure of non-discriminatory Maintenance Average Duration Intervals, BellSouth's failures to provide compliant service included the following:

Product	SQM
Digital Loop<DS1-non-dispatch	Missed 8 of 12 months
Digital Loop >=DS1-dispatch	Missed 10 of 12 months
Digital Loop >=DS1-non-dispatch	Missed 12 of 12 months

Other examples of repeated or chronic performance failures by BellSouth include:

- Speed of Answer in Order Center--missed 4 of 12 months
- LNP Disconnect Timeliness –missed 11 out of 12 months.
- Change Management measures
- % of Change Requests implemented on time—missed 8 of 10 times
- % software errors corrected on time--missed 12 of 12 months for each of this measure's 3 sub-measures

1 **Q. DOES THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDED ABOVE INCLUDE ALL**
2 **OF BELL SOUTH'S PERFORMANCE VIOLATIONS FOR TENNESSEE**
3 **IN 2004?**

4 A. No. The information above is only intended to provide the more egregious
5 examples of BellSouth's performance failures, as reported by BellSouth,
6 including sub-measures which contain multiple repeat or chronic failures by
7 BellSouth.

8 **Q. IS BELL SOUTH CURRENTLY PAYING PENALTIES IN TENNESSEE**
9 **FOR ITS NON-COMPLIANT PERFORMANCE?**

10 A. Yes. While BellSouth will undoubtedly claim it provides excellent service to
11 CLECs and the remedy or penalty payments it makes to CLECs are the result of
12 problems with the mechanism of the plan, BellSouth's own analysis of its
13 performance results I described earlier counters that claim. Indeed, individual
14 CLECs may have suffered even more severe discrimination that is not apparent
15 from the CLEC aggregate results above.

16 Following is a table that depicts BellSouth's 2004 penalty payments in
17 Tennessee. Tier 1 represents those payments made to CLECs, and Tier 2 those
18 payments made to the state of Tennessee.

Month	Tier 1 Payments	Tier 2 Payments
January	\$1,098,983	\$96,500
February	\$1,085,100	\$119,000
March	\$1,125,142	\$109,750
April	\$1,409,304	\$97,550
May	\$1,157,093	\$86,150

June	\$1,244,716	\$70,500
July	\$1,162,851	\$78,300
August	\$1,109,900	\$94,650
September	\$977,800	\$104,600
October	\$893,098	\$85,250
November	\$775,160	\$68,500
December	\$872,838	\$96,500

1

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In sum, in spite of the penalties paid in Tennessee, BellSouth continues its pattern of chronic poor performance for numerous sub-measures, in addition to numerous other frequent failures. Any revisions to the current plan considered by the Authority should strive to correct this problem; that is set penalties at a level that will incent BellSouth to provide non-discriminatory performance.

7

Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

8


A. Yes.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded electronically and via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Guy M. Hicks
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.
333 Commerce Street
Suite 2101
Nashville, TN 37201-3300

on this the 25th day of February, 2005.



Henry Walker

BellSouth Proposed Changes

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
1	Reporting 2.1. . with BellSouth's SQMs and pay penalties in accordance with the applicable SEEMs, which are posted on the Performance Measurement Reports website.	Clarification and correction.	> CLECs AGREE	> Parties agree. > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 2 Reporting, item 2.1 should state .. and pay penalties in accordance with the applicable SEEMs, which are posted on the Performance Measurement Reports website.
2	Reporting 2.2 BellSouth will also provide electronic access to the available raw data underlying the SQMs.	Correction.	> CLECs AGREE	> Parties agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that section 2 Reporting item 2.2 should state. BellSouth will also provide electronic access to the raw data underlying the SQMs.
3	Reporting 2.4 Final validated SEEM reports will be posted on the Performance Measurements Reports website on the 15th day of the month, following the posting of final validated SQM reports for that data month or the first business day thereafter.	Clarification	> CLECs AGREE > provided the language change does not negate responsibility to provide SEEM payments 15 days after month that succeeds the data month	> Parties agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 2 Reporting, item 2.4 should state Final validated SEEM reports will be posted on the Performance Measurements Reports website on the 15th of the month, following the posting of final validated SQM reports for that data month or the first business day thereafter.
4	Reporting 2.6: BellSouth shall pay penalties to the Commission, in the aggregate, for all reposted reposted SQM reports in the amount of \$400 per day See Appendix G for definition of "reposted"	Only changes that are significant enough to trigger reposting according to the criteria could have a meaningful effect on data accuracy.	> CLECs DISAGREE > Due to the criteria associated with reposting determinations, sanctions for incomplete or inaccurate reporting could be mitigated BellSouth has provided no rationale for elimination of their obligation to pay penalties for incomplete or inaccurate reporting The penalty is intended to motivate BellSouth to be complete in its reporting BellSouth should not be	> Staff agrees with BST's position > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 2 Reporting, item 2.6 should state BellSouth shall pay penalties to the Commission, in the aggregate, for all reposted SQM reports in the amount of \$400 per day. See Appendix G for definition of "reposted"

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
5	Reporting 2.7 Tier II SEEMS payments and Administrative fines and penalties for late, incomplete, and reposted reports will be sent via Federal Express to the Commission. Checks and the accompanying transmittal letter will be postmarked on or before the 15th of the month or the first business day thereafter.	To the extent that posted performance measurement reports are incomplete, the Reposting Policy covers the requirements to repost the data, and consequently to pay associated penalties. Accordingly, there is no need to reflect separately a penalty associated with incomplete reports. Wording is also provided to clarify that the due day for the postmarked transmittal of payments is based on the first relevant business day based on standard business practices.	allowed to hide bad results through an incomplete or inaccurate report > CLECs DISAGREE IN PART AND AGREE IN PART > CLECs disagree with the elimination of penalties for incomplete reporting. It is possible to have an incomplete report that might not trigger the reposting requirement, yet either way the CLECs are still disadvantaged by not having complete data. An incomplete report may even meet the reposting criteria and still not get reposted, thus incurring no penalty. CLECs can agree with the payment terms, but would prefer the modified language to be as follows or the first business day thereafter, "when the 15th falls on a non-business day"	> Staff agrees with BST's position with modified language as suggested by CLECs > Staff recommends that Section 2 Reporting, item 2.7 should be revised to state: Tier II SEEMS payments and Administrative fines and penalties for late, and reposted reports will be sent via Federal Express to the Commission. Checks and the accompanying transmittal letter will be postmarked on or before the 15th of the month or the first business day thereafter, when the 15th falls on a non-business day.
6	Reporting 2.9 BellSouth will provide documentation of late and incomplete occurrences during the reporting month that the data is posted to the website	Language is applicable to performance measurement data posting as required by the SQM only and not SEEM.	> CLECs Disagree > CLECs disagree that only applies to SQM. Requirement is currently included in the SEEM Administrative Plan CLECs are entitled to information about inaccurate and late SEEM reports as well as SQM reports If BellSouth does not provide the documentation, CLECs have no way of being noticed that the report's content were incomplete. The omission may not be visibly noticeable	> Staff agrees with CLEC position. > Staff recommends that Section 2 Reporting item 2.9 should state BellSouth will provide documentation of late and incomplete SEEM Reports during the reporting month that the data is posted to the website. These notations may be viewed on the Performance Measurements website from the PMAP home page on the Current Site Updates link.
7	Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms 3.1 BellSouth will participate in six month annual review cycles starting six months after one year from the date of the Commission order.	The review process lasts for several months and a series of six-month review cycles is not feasible Therefore, BellSouth propose an annual review cycle, which may be more manageable for all parties involved	> CLECs AGREE with the following addition Any party may petition for a review if special problems result from the last Order to commence all or a partial review before the annual but no sooner than six months after the last Order.	> Staff agrees with BST's position > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 3 Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanism, item 3.1 should state: BellSouth will participate in annual review cycles starting one year from the date of the Commission order
8	Modification to Measures Review of Measurements and	Unnecessary because Commission or Staff will establish schedule.	> CLECs DISAGREE Given the limited CLEC resources, this	> Upon further discussion Parties agree to delete

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	Enforcement Mechanisms 3.2 BellSouth and the ALECs shall file any proposed revisions to the SEEM plan one month prior to the beginning of each review period.		entry helps to facilitate required planning to ensure that the comments are prepared in a timely manner.	Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that section 3 Review Of Mechanisms and Enforcement Mechanisms, item 3.2 be deleted.
9	<u>Modification to Measures-Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms</u> 3.3 From time to time, BellSouth may be ordered by the Florida Public Service Commission to modify or amend the SQMs or SEEMs. Nothing will preclude any party from participating in any proceeding involving BellSouth's SQMs or SEEMs from advocating that those measures be modified.	Superfluous	CLECs DISAGREE. This language is essential. This language provides the staff with the flexibility to exercise its authority to recommend changes outside the proposed annual review process such as when BellSouth's performance dictates.	Upon further discussion Parties agree to delete. Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that section 3 Review Of Mechanisms and Enforcement Mechanisms, item 3.3 be deleted
10	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.1 Enforcement Measurement Elements – performance measurements identified as SEEM measurements within the SEEM in this plan.	Correction to reflect removal of SEEM submetric identification from SQM.	CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs need clarification and do not understand the proposed change	Staff agrees with CLECs position. Staff recommends that the Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.1 original language should be retained: <i>Enforcement Measurement Elements – performance measurements identified as SEEM measurements within the SEEM Plan.</i>
11	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.2 Enforcement Measurement Benchmark compliance – performance established by the Commission used to evaluate the performance of BellSouth and each ALEC for CLECs for penalties where no analogous retail process, product or service is feasible.	Clarification and correction	CLECs AGREE. If BellSouth leaves in established by the Commission	Parties Agree with modified language as suggested by CLECs Staff recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.2 should state: Enforcement Measurement Benchmark compliance –level of performance established by the Commission used to evaluate the performance of BellSouth for CLECs where no analogous retail process, product or service is feasible.
12	Enforcement Mechanisms	Clarification and correction.	CLECs AGREE	Parties Agree

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	Definitions 4.1.3 <i>Enforcement Measurement</i> <i>Retail a Analog c Compliance</i> – comparing performance levels provided to BellSouth retail customers with performance levels provided by BellSouth to the CLEC. ALEC customer for penalties measures where retail analogs apply.			> Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.3 should state: <i>Enforcement Measurement Retail Analog Compliance</i> – comparing performance levels provided to BellSouth retail customers with performance levels provided by BellSouth to the CLEC customer for measures where retail analogs apply.
13	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.4 <i>Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value</i> – means by which enforcement will be determined using statistically valid equations. The Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value properties are set forth in Appendix C, incorporated herein by this reference <u>D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.</u>	Correction.	> CLECs AGREE	> Parties Agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.5 should state <i>Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value</i> – means by which enforcement will be determined using statistically valid equations. The Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value properties are set forth in Appendix D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.
14	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1.5 Cell - . all BellSouth retail ISDN (POTS) services, for residential customers, .	Clarification and Correction	> CLECs DISAGREE > This change does not represent a clarification or correction. ISDN does represent a different cell level of disaggregation	> Upon further discussion parties agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.5 should state > Cell - all BellSouth retail (POTS) services, for residential customers,
15	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.8 <i>Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms</i> – assessments paid directly to the Florida Public Service Commission or its designee. Tier 2 Enforcement Mechanisms are triggered by	Clarification and correction.	> CLECs DISAGREE > The proposed change adds confusion to the definition and does not delineate the fact that compliance is determined at the submetric level. CLECs recommend replacing deleted language with "of a Tier-2 submetric"	Staff recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.5 should be revised to state <i>Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms</i> – assessments paid directly to the Florida Public Service Commission or its designee. Tier 2 Enforcement

Florida Public Service Commission SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	three consecutive monthly failures in Tier 2 enforcement measurement elements in which BellSouth performance is out of compliance or does not meet the benchmarks for the aggregate of all CLEC ALEC data as calculated by BellSouth for a particular Tier-2 Enforcement Measurement Element.			Mechanisms are triggered by three consecutive monthly failures at the submetric level in which BellSouth performance is out of compliance or does not meet the benchmarks for the aggregate of all CLEC data..
16	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.9-Affiliate—person that (directly or indirectly) owns or controls, is owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “own” means to own an equity interest (or the equivalent thereof) of more than 10Percent	This term is not used in applying the methodology of the Plan therefore the definition is not needed.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE ➤ The definition should be retained such that a common understanding, pertaining to designated data, that should be excluded in determining Tier 1 @ Tier 2 compliance. The PSC decision stated that, “We will monitor the BellSouth ALEC affiliate performance metrics results provided each month until an assessment can be made of the data’s relevance and significance. At this time, no use should be made of the affiliate data for determining Tier 1 or Tier 2 compliance.” The definition used for affiliate comes from the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which also prohibits the ILECs from discriminating in favor of their affiliates as well as their own retail customers. The definition used for affiliate comes from the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which also prohibits the ILECs from discriminating in favor of their affiliates as well as their own retail customers	➤ Staff agrees with CLECs position ➤ Staff recommends that the Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.9 original language should be retained Affiliate – person that (directly or indirectly) owns or controls, is owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person For purposes of this paragraph, the term “own” means to own an equity interest (or the equivalent thereof) of more than 10Percent
17	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.9 Affected Volume – that proportion of the total impacted CLEC volume or CLEC Aggregate volume for which remedies will be paid.	New definition required for operation of proposed transaction-based remedy mechanism	➤ CLECs DISAGREE ➤ CLECs oppose a transaction based plan - See technical matrix to be filed on November 15 for more information , ➤ Further, the use of the word “proportion” is inappropriate, and the word “quantity” should be used instead	➤ Staff agrees with BST’s position with modified language as suggested by CLECs. ➤ Staff recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.9 should be item 4.1 10 and be revised to state

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
				4.1.10 Affected Volume – that quantity of the total impacted CLEC volume or CLEC Aggregate volume for which remedies will be paid.
18	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions <u>4.1.10 Parity Gap – refers to the incremental departure from a compliant-level of service. This is also referred to as “diff” in Appendix D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.</u>	New definition required for operation of proposed transaction-based remedy mechanism.	- CLECs DISAGREE - CLECs disagree to inclusion of the proposed definition given that there is no mention of “parity gap” in the proposed plan.	- Upon further discussion parties agree to delete. - Staff recommends that Section 4.1 Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions, item 4.1.10 Parity Gap should be deleted.
19	Enforcement Mechanisms Application 4.2.1 The application of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms does not foreclose other legal and regulatory claims and remedies available to each <u>CLEC</u> .	Correction.	CLECs Agree	- Parties Agree - Staff accepts BellSouth’s redline and recommends that Section 4.2 Enforcement Mechanisms Application, item 4.2.1 should state The application of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms does not foreclose other legal and regulatory claims and remedies available to each CLEC.
20	Enforcement Mechanisms Application <u>4.2.2 ... performance and the payment of any Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms shall not be used as evidence that BellSouth has not complied with or has violated any state or federal law or regulation.</u> The payment of any Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanism to a CLEC shall be credited against any liability associated with or related to BellSouth’s service performance	These changes are to avoid situations where the CLECs are paid multiple times for problems associated with the same transaction or occurrence. Certainly the purpose of plans like the SEEM plan is not to unduly penalize BellSouth and unjustly enrich the CLECs Similarly, Tier-2 penalties, which are paid to the Commission, should not represent dual assessments against BellSouth for the same performance related problems Clarification to remove potential controversy about whether the	- CLECs DISAGREE - This change is unnecessary. Moreover, what is suggested violates public policy. The SEEM payments are not related or connected to civil damages; they are a penalty imposed by the regulatory agency to deter anti-competitive behavior. To allow such penalty payments to be offset against civil damages is void and against public policy. “Any liability associated with or related to BellSouth’s service performance” pertains to civil damages, and this Commission does not have the jurisdiction to limit in advance any remedies available to a CLEC in a	To be discussed further

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	both Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms and any other assessments or sanctions imposed by the Commission. CLECs will not oppose any effort by BellSouth to set off Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms from any assessment imposed by the Commission. 4.2.4 The Enforcement Mechanisms contained in this Plan have been provided by BellSouth on a voluntary basis in order to maintain compliance between BellSouth and each CLEC. As a result, CLECs may not use the existence of this section or any payments of any Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms under this section as evidence that BellSouth has not complied with or has violated any state or federal law or regulation. 12/6/04 CAI #1 12/6/04 BAI #1	proposed SEEM can be mandated.	judicial proceeding against BellSouth > The proposed set off of Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms is inappropriate for the same reasons BellSouth's desire to dilute the deterrent effect of these penalty payments cannot be sanctioned. > This addition to address a "potential controversy" is unnecessary and indeed provokes that dispute. It is an inaccurate statement and accordingly should not be included. The FL PSC also has previously ruled against such an offset when BellSouth tried with Supra Communications and Information Systems, Inc.: "In re : Investigation into the establishment of operations support systems permanent performance measures for incumbent local exchange telecommunications companies (BellSouth track) Docket No. 000121A-TP Order No. PSC-02-1082-FOF-TP > Issued: August 8, 2002 > The FL PSC found that "Allowing BellSouth to offset would defeat the self-effectuating nature of the Plan . The most effective way for BellSouth to avoid payments to Supra during resolution of the billing dispute is by ensuring that it meets all its metrics" > CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose a transaction based plan. See Row 1 of Technical Matrix to be filed on November 15.	
21	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.1.1 All OCNs and ACNAs for individual CLECs will be consolidated for purposes of calculating transaction measure-based failures.	Transaction-based plan rather than a measure-based plan is proposed.		> To be determined > Staff's strawman proposes a transaction-based plan. In the event that the Commission approves or the parties agree to a transaction-based plan, BellSouth's redline would be acceptable.
22	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology	Correction.	> CLECs AGREE.	> Parties Agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	4.3.1.2 When a measurement has five or more transactions for the CLECALEC, calculations will be performed to determine remedies according to the methodology described in the remainder of the document.			recommends that Section 4 3 Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology, item 4 3 1 2 should state When a measurement has five or more transactions for the ALEC, calculations will be performed to determine remedies according to the methodology described in the remainder of the document
23	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.2 Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms will be triggered by BellSouth's failure to achieve applicable Enforcement Measurement Compliance or Enforcement Measurement Benchmarks for the State of Florida for given Enforcement Measurement Elements for three consecutive months. The based upon the method of calculation is set forth in Appendix D, incorporated herein by this reference-Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.	Clarification.	> CLECs AGREE.	> Parties Agree > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4 3 Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology, item 4.3.2 should state: Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms will be triggered by BellSouth's failure to achieve applicable Enforcement Measurement Compliance or Enforcement Measurement Benchmarks for the State of Florida for given Enforcement Measurement Elements for three consecutive months The method of calculation is set forth in Appendix D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description. [specific contents of Appendix D to be determined]
24	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.2.1 Tier- 2 Enforcement Mechanisms apply, for an aggregate of all CLEC-ALEC data generated by BellSouth, on a per measurement-transaction basis for a particular Enforcement Measurement Element for which BellSouth has reported non-compliance.	See the discussion for section 4.3.1.3 above concerning the recommended change for Tier 1 from per-measure to a per-transaction based plan.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Issue of transaction basis vs measurement to be discussed in technical matrix response. Question for BellSouth. What is the difference between "particular" and "each"?	> To be determined > Staff's strawman proposes a transaction-based plan In the event that the Commission approves or the parties agree to a transaction-based plan, BellSouth's redline would be acceptable
25	Enforcement Mechanisms	Clarification and to ensure	> CLECs AGREE, subject to resolution	> Parties Agree

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.1 If BellSouth performance triggers an obligation to pay Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms to a <u>CLECALLEG</u> or an obligation to remit Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms to the Commission or its designee, BellSouth shall make payment in the required amount by the 15th day of the second month following the month for which disparate treatment was incurred on the day upon which the final validated SEEM reports are posted on the Performance Measurements Reports website as set forth in Section 2.4 above.	consistency.	of concerns raised in response to Section 2.4.	➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.1 should state. If BellSouth performance triggers an obligation to pay Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms to a CLEC or an obligation to remit Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms to the Commission or its designee, BellSouth shall make payment in the required amount on the day upon which the final validated SEEM reports are posted on the Performance Measurements Reports website as set forth in Section 2.4 above.
26	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.2 For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay a <u>CLECALLEG</u> the required amount, BellSouth will pay the <u>CLECALLEG</u> 6% simple interest per annum.	Correction.	➤ CLECs AGREE	➤ Parties Agree ➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.2 should state: For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay a CLEC the required amount, BellSouth will pay the CLEC 6% simple interest per annum
27	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.3 For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay the Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, BellSouth will pay the Commission an <u>additional</u> \$1,000 per day.		➤ CLECs AGREE.	➤ Parties Agree ➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.3 should state. For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay the Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, BellSouth will pay the Commission an additional \$1,000 per day

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
28	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.4. ... within sixty (60) days after the payment due date of the performance measurement report for which the obligation arose ... within thirty (30) days after its findings along with 6 percent simple interest per annum. However, the ALEC shall be responsible for all administrative costs associated with resolution of disputes that result in no actual payment. Administrative costs are those reasonable costs incurred in the resolution of the disputed matter. Such costs would include, but not be limited to, postage, travel and lodging, communication expenses, and legal costs. If BellSouth and the ALEC have exhausted good faith negotiations and are still unable to reach a mutually agreeable settlement pertaining to the amount disputed, the Commission will settle the dispute. If Commission intervention is required, a mediated resolution will be pursued.	Clarification and correction	CLECs DISAGREE 1 Elmination of "payment due" did not require clarification. The PSC Order reflected that the claim should be submitted 60 days after the payment due date. 2. Addition of language "of the performance measurement report for which the obligation arose" basically reduces the time allotted to CLECs for amassing the level of details to substantiate their claims 3 BellSouth provides no substantiation for deletion of the remaining language Deletion of this language limits CLEC escalation options.	Staff agrees with BellSouth's position with modified language provided in BellSouth's 11/23/04 action item 2. Staff recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.4 should state: If a CLEC disputes the amount paid for Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms, the CLEC shall submit a written claim to BellSouth within sixty (60) days after the payment date. BellSouth shall investigate all claims and provide the CLEC written findings within thirty (30) days after receipt of the claim. If BellSouth determines the CLEC is owed additional amounts, BellSouth shall pay the CLEC such additional amounts within thirty (30) days after its finding along with 6% simple interest annum
29	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.5 At the end of each calendar year, an independent accounting firm, mutually agreeable to the Florida Public Service Commission and BellSouth, shall certify that all penalties under that the results of all penalties under Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms were	The deleted portion is covered to the extent necessary by revised audit provisions. The Audit Policy is provided herein as section 4.8. Correct oversight by adding procedure to address clarification requests for Tier 2 by the Commission, which already exists for Tier 1 for	CLECs DISAGREE 1 First, the CLECs do not agree with the proposed audit policy. Second, the Audit Policy, as described in section 4.8, makes no mention of the Audit Policy including tasks represented in the language marked for deletion. CLECS AGREE in Part and Disagree in Part. CLECs agree that Tier II claims should be included. However, CLECs	Staff agrees with BellSouth's position with modified language provided in BellSouth's 11/23/04 action item 2 Staff recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.5 should state: For Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, if the Commission requests clarification of an amount paid, a written claim shall be

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	paid and accounted for in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). These annual audits shall be performed based upon audited data of BellSouth's performance measurements. <u>For Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, if the Commission requests clarification of an amount paid, a written claim shall be submitted to BellSouth within sixty (60) days after the date of the performance measurement report for which the obligation arose. BellSouth shall investigate all claims and provide the Commission written findings within thirty (30) days after receipt of the claim. If BellSouth determines the Commission is owed additional amounts, BellSouth shall pay such additional amounts within thirty (30) days after its findings along with 6% simple interest per annum.</u> 11/23/04 BAI #2	CLECs.	object to the specific language—See Item 2 in Row 28 above	submitted to BellSouth within sixty (60) days after the payment date BellSouth shall investigate all claims and provide the Commission written findings within thirty (30) days after receipt of the claim. If BellSouth determines the Commission is owed additional amounts, BellSouth shall pay such additional amounts within thirty (30) days after its findings along with 6% simple interest per annum.
30	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts <u>4.4.6. BellSouth may set off any SEEM payments to a CLEC against undisputed amounts owed by a CLEC to BellSouth pursuant to the Interconnection Agreement between the parties, which have not been paid to BellSouth within ninety (90) days past the Bill Due Date as set forth in the Billing Attachment of</u>	Prevent unreasonable situation where BellSouth is paying SEEM to a CLEC who is not paying an undisputed bill	> CLECs DISAGREE This is similar to what is proposed in Section 4 2 2, in that BellSouth is attempting to collapse all SEEM payments into offsets against its other obligations and liabilities. This must be rejected Here, it is BellSouth's discretion as to whether the amount is "undisputed" and has "not been paid" and there is no opportunity for CLEC input.	> Staff agrees with CLECs position. > Staff recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.6 should be deleted.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	the Interconnection Agreement		BellSouth alone is the arbiter of whether the set off is appropriate, a situation ripe for the abuse of anti-competitive activity. Thus, the concept is inappropriate (SEEM payments are penalties which cannot be treated as a civil damage set off) and its proposed implementation is dangerous (BellSouth alone as the decision maker promotes anti-competitive behavior. BellSouth alone is the arbiter of whether the set off is appropriate, a situation ripe for the abuse of anti-competitive activity. Thus, the concept is inappropriate (SEEM payments are penalties which cannot be treated as a civil damage set off) and its proposed implementation is dangerous (BellSouth alone as the decision maker promotes anti-competitive behavior). Also see response to Row 20.	
31	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts <u>4.4.7 Any adjustments for underpayment or overpayment of calculated Tier 1 and Tier 2 remedies will be made consistent with the terms of BellSouth's Policy On Reposting Of Performance Data and Recalculation of SEEM Payments, as set forth in Appendix G of this document.</u>	This provision is provided to formalize the incorporation of the Reposting Policy.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE There are circumstances, other than those triggered by the Reposting Policy that could necessitate the issuance of an adjustment. Adjustments, unrelated to the Reposting Policy, should not be prohibited due to this proposed language. Additionally, the Reposting Policy is already formalized by being an existing section of the SEEM plan	To be discussed further
32	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts <u>4.4.8 Any adjustments for underpayments will be made in the next month's payment cycle after the recalculation is made. The final current month PARIS reports will reflect the final paid</u>	Clarify by stating current practice used to make adjustments and address CLEC questions.	➤ CLECs AGREE, WITH CAVEAT CLECs agree that adjustments should be included in the plan. However, the current and proposed process for handling adjustment questions is currently ineffective. CLECs have consistently not been able to acquire the level of detail to understand or gain knowledge of the source of adjustments by using the	➤ Parties agree; however, staff further agrees with CLEC caveat that not enough information has been provided to staff or the CLECs to acquire the level of detail to understand the source of adjustments ➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	dollars, including adjustments for prior months where applicable. Questions regarding the adjustments should be made in accordance with the normal process used to address CLEC questions related to SEEM payments.		“normal process used to address CLEC questions related to SEEM payments.” Also see CLEC Coalition Filings of August 18, 2004 and October 11, 2004 on this issue.	Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts, item 4.4.8 should be revised to state: Any adjustments for underpayments will be made in the next month's payment cycle after the recalculation is made. The final current month PARIS reports will reflect the final paid dollars, including adjustments for prior months where applicable. Questions regarding the adjustments should be made in accordance with the normal process used to address CLEC questions related to SEEM payments. ➤ Staff recommends that an additional provision be added to Section 4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier -1 and Tier-2 Amounts that details The procedures for disclosing source of adjustments and cites the requirements as to what information should be disclosed and how
33	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.1 BellSouth's total liability for the payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms shall be collectively and absolutely capped at 39% of net revenues in Florida, based upon the most recently reported ARMAIS data.	Addressed in new Section 4.7 entitled "Enforcement Mechanism Cap."	➤ CLECs DISAGREE BellSouth has provided no substantiation for reducing the "Enforcement Mechanism Cap." BellSouth has provided no rationale that would cause a different determination than the 39% ordered by this Commission and consistent with the FCC's guidance on effective enforcement mechanisms in its first Communications Act Section 271 approval for Verizon (then Bell Atlantic's) in-region long distance entry ➤ CLECs DISAGREE. The language, "failure to follow established and documented procedures", is very broad. Therefore, the rationale	➤ Staff agrees with BST's position ➤ Staff recommends that Section 4.5 Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability, item 4.5.1 should be deleted from this section and moved to section 4.7 (see number 40 below)
34	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitation of Liability 4.5.2: BellSouth will not be obligated to pay Tier-1 or Tier-2 if such noncompliance results	Clarifies current provisions by stating additional specific instances where BellSouth should not be obligated to pay SEEM.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. The language, "failure to follow established and documented procedures", is very broad. Therefore, the rationale	➤ Staff agrees with BellSouth's with modifications per the CLEC comments and additional language provided in BellSouth's 11/23/04 action item 5. ➤ Staff recommends that Section 4.5

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	from. <u>failure to follow established and documented procedures</u> 11/23/04 BAI #5		provided by BellSouth does not address the proposed change	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability, item 4.5.2 should be 4.5.1 and be revised to state: BellSouth will not be obligated to pay Tier 1 or Tier 2 Enforcement Mechanisms for non-compliance with a performance measure if such non-compliance results from a CLECs acts or omissions that cause or contribute towards failed or missed performance measures. These acts or omissions include but are not limited to, accumulation and submission of orders at unreasonable quantities or times, failure to follow publicly available procedures, or failure to submit accurate orders or inquiries. BellSouth shall provide each CLEC and the Commission with reasonable notice of, and supporting documentation for, such acts or omissions. Each CLEC shall have 14 days from the filing of such Notice to challenge, through the dispute resolution provisions of this plan, the claims made by BellSouth. BellSouth shall not be obligated to pay any amounts subject to such disputes until the dispute is resolved NOTE: In consideration of this, staff is revisiting dispute resolution policy proposed in section 4.9 (see number 42 below)
35	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.3 BellSouth shall not be obligated for Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms for non-compliance with a performance measure if such non-compliance was the result of an act or omission by a CLEC that was in bad faith.	Covered in revised Section 4.5.2.	➤ CLECs AGREE	➤ Parties Agree ➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that Section 4.5 Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability item 4.5.3 should be deleted

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
36	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.4 ...a Force Majeure event (as defined in the most recent version of BellSouth's standard Interconnection Agreement)	Clarification by identifying the specific source of the definition of a Force Majeure event	> CLECS DISAGREE This should be defined in the Plan, not in an external document created by BellSouth CLECs oppose tying the definition of Force Majeure to an unarbitrated agreement The definition should be included in the SEEM and agreed on by CLECs and the Commission for clarity to all parties	> Staff agrees with BST's position with modifications provided in BellSouth 11/23/04 Action Item #7 > Staff recommends Section 4 5 Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability item 4 5.4 should be revised to state: 4 5.2 BellSouth shall not be obligated to pay Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms for non-compliance with a performance measurement if such non-compliance was the result of any event that performance under this SQM/SEEM Plan is either directly or indirectly prevented, restricted, or interfered with by reason of fire, flood, earthquake or like acts of God, wars, revolution, civil commotion, explosion, acts of public enemy, embargo, acts of the government in its sovereign capacity, labor difficulties, including without limitation, strikes, slowdowns, picketing, or boycotts unavailability of equipment from vendor, changes requested by a CLEC, or any other circumstances beyond the reasonable control and without the fault or negligence of BellSouth BellSouth, upon giving prompt notice to the Commission and CLECs, shall be excused from such performance on a day-to-day basis to the extent of such prevention, restriction, or interference, provided, however, that BellSouth shall use diligent efforts to avoid or remove such causes of non-performance To be discussed further: 1 Commission approval and removal of Force Majeure provision. 2 Challenges by CLECs (through dispute resolution 3. Informing the Commission of

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
37	Enforcement Mechanisms Affiliate Reporting 4.6 Affiliate Reporting-Change of Law	This is a new section that uses the section number previously designated for Affiliate Reporting.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. This change is unnecessary, as set forth in the comments in the next Response	restoration/recovery processes ➤ To be discussed further
38	Enforcement Mechanisms Affiliate Reporting-Change of Law 4.6.1 <u>Upon a particular Commission's issuance of an Order pertaining to Performance Measurements or Remedy Plans in a proceeding expressly applicable to all CLECs, BellSouth shall implement such performance measures and remedy plans covering its performance for the CLECs, as well as any changes to those plans ordered by the Commission, on the date specified by the Commission. If a change of law relieves BellSouth of the obligation to provide any UNE or UNE combination pursuant to Section 251 of the Act, then upon providing the Commission with 30 days written notice, BellSouth will cease reporting data or paying remedies in accordance with the change of law.</u> <u>Performance Measurements and remedy plans that have been ordered by the Commission can currently be accessed via the Internet at http://dmap.bellsouth.com. Should there be any difference between the performance measure and remedy plans on BellSouth's</u>	The Affiliate Reporting section is eliminated because it is irrelevant for SEEM. That is, this provision is unnecessary to determine whether BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access. The standards for nondiscriminatory access are defined for each metric in the SQM. Adds specific provision to address how changes of law will be handled in SEEM. This provision represents a reasonable balance between providing adequate notice that payments will cease with prompt relief for BellSouth to discontinue payments that should no longer be required.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE This change is unnecessary and should be rejected. First, it apparently would an Order from another state commission to be implemented in Florida. Second, it would allow BellSouth to unilaterally cease reporting data or paying remedies, which is inappropriate and would promote anti-competitive activity. Third, it misconstrues the law. Separate from its obligations under Section 251, BellSouth continues to be obligated to provide non-discriminatory access to certain elements and services under Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Florida statutes. To ensure BellSouth's compliance with these requirements of non-discriminatory access, performance measures such as those implemented by this Commission are crucial. Further, excusing BellSouth from providing non-discriminatory access to these wholesale elements and services is against the public interest and the purpose of service quality measurements. Also see CLEC Coalition's Issues List and Comments filed on September 13, 2004. ➤ Further, the Commission may deem certain wholesale services to be critical to CLECs that are not designated as UNEs as it has with special access and may chose to impose remedies. Although Florida has not applied remedies to special access measures, it is	To be discussed further

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	website and the plans the Commission has approved as filed in compliance with its orders, the Commission-approved compliance plan will supersede as of its effective date.		not barred from doing so at the 8 th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the Minnesota PUC's inclusion of a special access performance enforcement plan is not preempted by the FCC even though services may be classified as interstate	
40	Affiliate Reporting—Enforcement Mechanism Cap BellSouth shall provide monthly results for each metric for each BellSouth-ALEC affiliate; however, only the Florida Public Service Commission shall be provided the number of transactions or observations for BellSouth-ALEC affiliates. Further, BellSouth shall inform the Commission of any changes regarding non-ALEC affiliates' use of its OSS databases, systems, and interfaces. 4.7 Add Section: Enforcement Mechanism Cap	Separates provisions related to the Enforcement Mechanism Cap into its own section. Formerly, this information was reflected in section 4.5.I.	> CLECs DISAGREE BellSouth's reasoning does not address the deletion of the Affiliate Reporting section. Therefore, no rationale has been stated to revisit the Commission's decision on Affiliate Reporting. Further, Sec 251 (c) (2) (C) says incumbents have the duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network—"that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnection." Also see response to Row 33 above regarding enforcement cap.	> Staff disagrees with BellSouth's position to delete. > Staff recommends that Section 4 6 Enforcement Mechanisms Affiliate Reporting, item 4 6 1 language should be retained with modifications BellSouth shall provide monthly results for each metric for each BellSouth-ALEC affiliate. Upon request, the Florida Public Service Commission shall be provided the number of transactions or observations for BellSouth-ALEC affiliates. Further, BellSouth shall inform the Commission of any changes regarding non-ALEC affiliates' use of its OSS databases, systems, and interfaces. > Staff agrees with BellSouth's position to add new section Enforcement Mechanism Cap > Staff recommends that new section 4 7 Enforcement Mechanism Cap, item 4 7 1 should state. BellSouth's total liability for the payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms shall be collectively and absolutely capped at 36 % of net revenues in Florida, based upon the most recently reported ARMIS data. > Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
				recommends that new section 4 7 Enforcement Mechanism Cap, item 4.7.2 should state If projected payments exceed the state cap, a proportional payment will be made to the respective parties. ➤ Staff accepts BellSouth's redline and recommends that new section 4 7 Enforcement Mechanism Cap, item 4.7.3 should state If BellSouth's payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms would have exceeded the cap referenced in this plan, a CLEC may commence a proceeding with the Commission to demonstrate why BellSouth should pay any amount in excess of the cap. The CLEC shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate why, under the circumstances, BellSouth should have additional liability. ➤ Staff recommends for BellSouth to revise and incorporate audit policy as discussed and agreed upon in SQM section of six-month review BellSouth should further incorporate appropriate changes to the audit policy where SEEM should be referenced
41	Audits 4 8 - 4 8 1 Add new section: Audits	Incorporates a more thorough audit plan into SEEM. Having all parties share in the cost provides equal incentive to limit the scope of the audit to meaningful activities.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE BellSouth has not provided any rationale to justify changing auditing provisions ordered by this Commission. BellSouth should continue to audit its PMQAP and the performance data. Additionally, BellSouth is obligated to provide compliant performance and uses its performance reporting as evidence of that compliant performance. Therefore, BellSouth should continue to incur the cost of the audit since it's required for BellSouth's purposes. ➤ CLECs AGREE	
42	Dispute Resolution 4:74.9 Notwithstanding any other provision of the Interconnection Agreement	Correction.		➤ Parties Agree, however, staff proposes further modifications ➤ Staff recommends that Section 4.9 Enforcement Mechanisms Dispute

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	between BellSouth and each CLEC, any dispute regarding BellSouth's performance or obligations pursuant to this Plan shall be resolved by the Commission.			Resolution item 4.9.1 should be revised to state Notwithstanding any other provision of the Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth and each CLEC, if a dispute arises regarding BellSouth's performance or obligations pursuant to this Plan, BellSouth and the CLEC shall negotiate in good faith for a period of thirty (30) days to resolve the dispute. If at the conclusion of the 30 day period, BellSouth and the CLEC are unable to reach a resolution, then the dispute shall be resolved by the Commission.
43	<u>Regional and State Coefficients</u> <u>Section 4.10</u> 11/23/04 BAI #6	Provided for completeness of documentation Describes method currently used to apportion penalties calculated for regional measures and modified based on the proposed change from a measurement-based plan to a transaction-based plan	> CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. The CLECs agree to the inclusion of an explanation for Regional & State Coefficients However, the description is incomplete and, perhaps, contradictory Although there are specific definitions for the "regional" and "state" coefficients for Tiers I and II, respectively, there did not appear to be a statement of how the coefficients are to be used in the remedy calculations, nor any examples. Also, Section 4.10 states that "[a] regional coefficient is calculated to split Tier I payments among CLECs" but the coefficients in App. E seem designed to split payments among states, for a specific CLEC. -Thus, CLECs cannot agree at this time because the discussion of these coefficients is incomplete and seemingly contradictory, and therefore CLECs require clarification before providing a	> Upon further discussion, parties agree to the following modifications to Section 4.10 Regional and State Coefficients as provided in BellSouth 11/23/04 Action Item #6: Some metrics are calculated for the entire BellSouth region, rather than by state Where these metrics are a Tier 1 SEEM submetric, a regional coefficient is calculated to determine the amount of the penalty for the CLEC in each state For example, the Acknowledgement Completeness Measurement can be measured for an individual CLEC, but only at the regional level In several states it is also a Tier 1 SEEM submetric. Thus, if there is a failure in this measurement for a CLEC, it is necessary to determine the amount of penalty for the CLEC in each state A Regional Coefficient is used to do this. (Appendix E, Section E.6 describes the method of calculating the Regional Coefficients.) The amount of Tier 1 penalty for the CLEC in a state is determined by multiplying the calculated

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
			final response	penalty for the measurement in the state by the Coefficient for the state
44	Fee Schedule Liquidated Damages for Tier-2 Measures Table 2 Appendix A, Table A.2, reflects the current and proposed changes to the Fee Schedule. See Redlined SEEM plan, Exhibit B, for proposed changes.	Same rationale as for Table I above. See Attachment I to this exhibit for the rationale for changes in specific fees.	1. CLECs DISAGREE (Comments apply to fees for Tier 1 and Tier 2 measures) It is inappropriate to refer to these payments as "liquidated damages", a legal term of art referring to the amount parties to a contract negotiate in advance as the agreed upon damages in the event of a breach Liquidated damages offer certainty because the parties know in advance that they have agreed upon a certain amount which will be paid, even if the actual damages later prove to be different. These payments have none of the elements of liquidated damages Accordingly, it is inaccurate to use that term in describing these payments. In addition, it is of concern that BellSouth would attempt to insert that language in the document when it so obviously should not be included That it now appears indicates that BellSouth wants it included in order to make the argument, no matter that it is specious, in other legal proceedings that penalty payments under this plan should operate as the only remedy available for damages CLECs have suffered. 2. The purpose of the remedy plan is to deter poor performance, not make providing poor performance an ILEC cost of doing business.	A state coefficient is calculated to split Tier 2 payments for regional metrics among states by submetric > See Fee Schedules proposed in staff's strawman
			3. BellSouth's statement that the proposed fee schedule is designed to mirror the relationship typically found	

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
			in commercial transactions bears no direct relationship to the SEEM plan as this is not a commercial transaction where both parties are negotiating on an equal footing. In fact, CLECs are disadvantaged from the outset, as BellSouth is in complete control of the facilities necessary to CLEC survival in the telecommunications arena. As a result, BellSouth's attempts to reduce their obligations to those present in a commercial transaction are meaningless and confusing. Furthermore, BellSouth's rationale for relating the proposed fee schedule to the charges CLECs actually incur by domain is flawed and incomplete. The intent of the penalty payments is to provide an incentive against BellSouth backsliding in their performance to CLECs. BellSouth's proposal only considers some of the tangible costs to the CLEC. For example, if BellSouth's actions during the Ordering phase were to result in the loss of a CLEC customer, the costs to the CLEC would be more than just the service order charge. In addition to the service order charge from BellSouth, the CLEC will also incur either a manual or electronic loop make-up charge, not to mention the time and expense incurred by CLEC resources in dealing with that customer and their order. On top of that, BellSouth's proposal does not consider the CLEC's foregone revenue from that customer. And for the Collocation domain, BellSouth states that they used only the application fee to derive the penalty amount for missed collocation transactions. There are several other non-recurring charges that are billed to CLECs than just the application fee. Why	

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
45	SEEM Sub-metrics Applicable to all SEEM sub-metrics Tables B-1 and B-2. General approach taken to set of measures included in plan.	Generally, one measure of timeliness and one measure of accuracy should apply to each major domain; e.g., Ordering, Provisioning, Maintenance & Repair, etc. In addition to the specific reasons given below, BellSouth is proposing to move closer to this general concept with the following changes. Also, measures of some intermediate processes were removed because such process may have little if any customer effect and any significant customer effect would likely be reflected in other measures.	were n't these included along with the application fee in determining the penalty amounts? - CLECs DISAGREE - CLECs need clarification of the specific rationale associated with the deletion of each individual metric since the BellSouth reasoning is not applicable to each deleted metric. - CLECs do not agree to deleting metrics that BellSouth is failing or that have not been implemented as ordered.	Appendix B should be retained showing applicable Tier 1 SEEM sub-metrics (Table B-1) and Tier 2 SEEM sub-metrics (Table B-2) in accordance with the SQM disaggregation as agreed upon by the parties in the six-month review.
46	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure OSS-1 Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure OSS-1, Average Response Interval and Percent within Interval (Pre-Ordering/Ordering), from Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	- CLECs DISAGREE - See CLEC SQM matrix filed on August 27, 2004 for rationale.	See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
47	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure OSS-4 Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure OSS-4, Response Interval (Maintenance & Repair), from Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	- CLECs DISAGREE - See CLEC SQM matrix filed on August 27, 2004 for rationale.	See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
48	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure PO-1 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure PO-1, Loop Makeup -Response Time-Manual, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	- CLECs DISAGREE - See CLEC SQM matrix filed on August 27, 2004 for rationale.	See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
49	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-1	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM	- CLECs DISAGREE - See CLEC SQM matrix filed on August	See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	Measures O-3 & O-4; (PFT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics BellSouth recommended combining measure O-4, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with measure O-3, Flow-Through Service Request (Summary). Thus, measure O-4 would no longer exist as a separate measure and measure O-3, as modified, would only apply to Tier 2; Tier 1 would not apply. Also change disaggregation for this measure as follows: 1. Combine Residence and Business into Resale. 2. Combine UNE Loop & Port Combo and UNE Other into UNE. The resulting disaggregation would be: Resale, UNE and LNP.	recommends that measures O-3; <i>Percent Flow-Through Service Requests (Summary)</i> , and O-4, <i>Percent Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail)</i> be combined into a single SQM that shows both the Aggregate CLEC data (Summary) and CLEC Specific data (Detail). The SEEM penalty, in BellSouth's proposal, would apply to the Aggregate CLEC data as a Tier 2 measure only. Flow Through results are based on the operation of regional systems and impact CLECs equally, based on the products or feature that they order. Because this measure captures performance related to an electronic process that uses regional systems, problems that occur are not limited to individual CLECs, as intended when Tier 1 penalties apply. Flow through typically only increase the standard for measuring FOC timeliness by 7 hours. The mechanized FOC Timeliness standard is 95% in 3 hours and for orders that do not flow through and should do so, the FOC Timeliness standard is 95% in 10 hours. Such delay periodically does not directly affect the CLECs ability to provide service to its customers. As such, intermittent deficiencies, particularly with the high benchmark do not indicate a significant problem. Consequently, penalties should only apply if there are persistent problems in this area, which is the situation that Tier 2 was designed to address.	CLECs oppose the deleted disaggregation in SEEM as problems with flow through for certain types of orders would be hidden and un-remedied if combined with a large-volume product with high-flow-through rates. With so many product types lumped together, masking of CLEC specific flowthrough problems would easily occur without sanction based on BellSouth's proposal. BellSouth's claims of "regional systems" does not negate the fact that flowthrough varies depending on what is ordered and that flow-through results by CLEC vary widely today. UNE Loop & Port Combo and UNE-P orders are treated significantly different than a data CLEC's UNE orders. Most, if not all, of a data CLEC's UNE orders involve designed products. BellSouth's ordering process for designed products is more complex than the process used for non-designed products. By lumping all types of UNE products together, you combine very dissimilar products and the opportunity to mask poor performance on specific products increases. CLECs disagree with BellSouth's proposed disaggregation. See CLEC August 27, 2004 response to collapsing disaggregation.	disaggregation.
			BST, please explain how the industry as a whole can be harmed, but not an individual CLEC.	

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
		Further, the nature of electronic systems usually makes this problem largely self-correcting and any harm that occurs affects the industry as a whole not an individual CLEC. Therefore, this measure should be included in Tier 2 only. Finally, since all CLECs are affected similarly, Tier 1 penalties should not apply. If BellSouth's performance for a given month triggers the Low Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved. The proposed disaggregation for this measure in the SEEM plan is the same as the SQM. See the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale for this change.	CLECs are not all affected similarly. See attached Flow-Through Detail report for 09/04.	
52	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-8; (RI) Table B-I, Tier 1 Sub-metrics Remove Partially Mechanized and Non-Mechanized disaggregations for O-8; Reject Interval; from Tier 1 and Tier 2.	BellSouth's Proposed SQM disaggregates the Reject Interval measurement by 3 methods of submission - fully mechanized, partially mechanized and non-mechanized (manual). For an effective enforcement plan, however, only the fully mechanized portion of this measurement should be included since this is the method of submission where the preponderance of CLEC activity occurs. Also, such treatment provides a further incentive for CLECs to move to electronic system that BellSouth has expended huge resources to develop and maintain at the CLECs request. Finally, partially mechanized and non-mechanized methods of	CLECs DISAGREE. All product types cannot be ordered via a fully mechanized means. However, these CLECs whose businesses rely on these product types also cannot tolerate long reject interval. This metric's disaggregation should continue to include partially mechanized and non-mechanized, as well as product level disaggregation. Further, the August 04 FL MSS report disputes its contention that the preponderance of LSRs are fully mechanized. Of the approximately 28,500 LSRs submitted 20% were fully mechanized, 11% were non mechanized and 70% were partially mechanized. Further, since 90% of the LSRs were submitted electronically, CLECs have	See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
53	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-9; (FOCT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure O-9; Firm Order Confirmation (FOC) Timeliness, from the both Tier 1 and Tier 2	This measure was proposed for removal from the SQM. See the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale. It should be noted that although this measure is being removed from SEEM, this function will still be measured in the new measurement <i>Firm Order Confirmation Average Completion Interval</i> (FOCI) that BellSouth is proposing to include in both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. The FOCI measure will combine the two current measures, <i>FOC Timeliness</i> and <i>Average Completion Interval</i> (OCI) & <i>Order Completion Interval</i> Distribution, into a single metric as requested by CLECs in the past. Since the failure to return FOCs to CLECs in a timely manner will show up in the FOCI metric, which is proposed for both Tier 1 and Tier 2, including <i>FOC Timeliness</i> in the SEEM plan as well would result in dual penalties for the same failure. Therefore, BellSouth's proposal excludes <i>FOC Timeliness</i> from the SEEM plan.	submitted electronically, CLECs have largely moved to the electronic OSS. BellSouth provided no evidence to support its allegation that CLECs can or are gaming the system. Since the current SEEM plan permits BellSouth to seek adjustments for CLECs who act in bad faith, presumably it does not have any evidence. ➤ CLECs DISAGREE. Contrary to BellSouth's comments, BellSouth did not propose for removal of this measure from the SQM. The CLEC do not agree that the FOCI measure is appropriately structured. The artificial padding of intervals that include ILEC "FOC" times render this measure completely useless for monitoring for discrimination. See CLEC comments filed on August 27, 2004. Therefore, the FOC should be retained as a Tier 1 & Tier 2 measure.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
54	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-II; (FOCRC) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics Remove measure O-II; Firm Order	BellSouth's proposal excludes this measure from Tier 1 of the SEEM plan and includes it as a Tier 2 measure only. This is not a primary	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose removal of Tier 1 remedies. BellSouth has not explained why missing FOCs and Rejects do not	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
55	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-4 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure P-4, Average Completion Interval (OCI) & Order Completion Interval Distribution, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	Indicator of the timeliness or accuracy of the ordering process. The systems and processes that generate Reject Notices and FOCs are regional in nature and this measure simply tracks whether one of these two responses to a request was sent – not how long it takes to send it. If a response is not sent it is typically due to a system problem, which affects CLECs in general rather than only specific CLECs. Further the cure is fairly simple, which is for the CLEC to resubmit the order. Consequently this area becomes a problem only if persistent problems arise, which makes it more appropriate to include this measure in Tier 2 only. Further, Tier 1 penalties are already paid, and would be paid under BellSouth's proposal, for the Reject Interval and FOCI measures. Further, if BellSouth's performance for a given month triggers the Low Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved. Although this measure is being removed from SEEM, this function will still be measured in the new measurement <i>Firm Order Confirmation Average Completion Interval (FOCI)</i> that BellSouth is proposing to include in both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. The FOCI measure will combine the two current measures, <i>FOC Timeliness</i> and <i>Average Completion Interval (OCI)</i> & <i>Order Completion Interval Distribution</i> ,	harm CLECs' relationships with customers, as well as CLEC costs. It is important to measure how quickly CLECs receive a FOC or a rejection. It is equally important to measure whether CLECs received one or the other at all BellSouth's "cure" is not simple, it is very costly to the CLEC and customer affecting, since resubmitting an LSR incurs an additional service order change and further delays the provisioning of an end-user's circuit	> See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
		into a single metric as requested by the CLECs in the past. Since the failure to complete orders within appropriate intervals will show up in the FOCI metric, which is proposed for both Tier 1 and Tier 2, including a separate OCI measure in the SEEM plan as well would result in dual penalties for the same failure.		
56	SEEM Sub-metrics New Measure: FOCI Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Add the measure Firm Order Confirmation Average Completion Interval to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM.	New measure that combines former measures FOC Timeliness and Average Completion Interval. These two functions are proposed to be in SEEM.	> CLECs DISAGREE CLEC oppose this measure as a replacement for OCI Tier 1 and Tier 2 measures. See CLEC concerns in August 27, 2004 filing	> See staff's position on SQM disaggregation
57	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-7A; HCT Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Combine the existing disaggregation levels for measure P-7A, Coordinated Customer Conversions Hot Cut Timeliness - Percent within Interval, into single a single sub-metric for "UNE Loops."	The proposed SQM reflects two levels of disaggregation for this measure, namely "Non-IDLC" and "IDLC." See the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale for that change. For purposes of the SEEM plan, while the proposed disaggregation for this metric in SEEM only reflects one category for "UNE Loops," the calculations for penalties actually applies the separate benchmarks for Non-IDLC and IDLC Loops. The penalties would simply be reported as a single category designated as UNE Loops.	> CLECs DISAGREE. Reports should match disaggregation and penalty calculation.	> See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
58	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-7C; (PT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure P-7C, Hot Cut Conversions - Percent Provisioning Troubles Received within 5 Days (formerly 7 Days) of a Completed Service Order,	BellSouth's proposal excludes this measure from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. This is because the same data are captured in the measure <i>Percent Provisioning Troubles within "X" Days</i> , which is included in Tier 1 and Tier 2. Including both these measures in SEEM would subject BellSouth to dual penalties for the same failure.	> CLECs DISAGREE This metric specifically seeks to motivate compliant hot cut performance. Based on the proposed disaggregation for Percent Troubles within "X" Days, all UNE loop performance would be consolidated and hot cut specific performance would be masked.	> See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
59	from Tier 1 and Tier 2 SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-8 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure P-8, Cooperative Acceptance Testing, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE CLECs oppose the deletion of this measure. It is imperative that CLECs receive trouble-free loops at installation. This measure is a key indicator of the support that BellSouth gives CLECs that order xDSL loops and should not be deleted. Further, as facilities-based competition increases, so may the number of orders requiring cooperative testing. ➤ CLECs AGREE.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
60	SEEM Sub-metrics New measure: CNDD Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Add measure CNDD, Non- Coordinated Customer Conversions - Percent Completed and Notified on Due Date, to both Tier 1 and Tier 2	BellSouth proposes to add this new measure to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. This measure, as described in the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004, captures the percentage of non-coordinated customer conversions that BellSouth completes and provides notification to the CLEC on the due date. Considering the increased role that non coordinated hot cuts may have in the future and the potential direct impact on customer service this measure is being proposed for inclusion in SEEM.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE CLECs oppose changing these measures to Tier 2 only. As facilities-based competition increases, so may the number of LNP orders. Now is not the time to eliminate incentives for BellSouth to provide compliant support. Secondly, an aggregate view of performance can easily mask poor CLEC-specific performance if these processes are so automated and centralized, why does BellSouth need 12 hours (or even 4 hours) to work a non- trigger disconnect (Measure P-13D)?	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
61	SEEM Sub-metrics Measures P-13B (LOOS), P-13C (LAT), and P-13D (DTNT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics Remove measures P-13B, LNP- Percent Out of Service < 60 Minutes, P-13C, Percentage of Time BellSouth Applies to IO-Digit Trigger Prior to the LNP Order Due Date (LAT), and P-13D, LNP- Disconnect Timeliness (Non- Trigger) (DTNT), from Tier 1 of SEEM.	BellSouth's proposal includes these three measures as Tier 2 only. These metrics evaluate a combination of largely automated processes and procedures performed by technicians in a centralized work center. The result is that the processes are the same from CLEC to CLEC and, if there is a problem, the problem affects all CLECs, rather than an individual CLEC. Consequently, a Tier-2 enforcement mechanism is appropriate for these measurements. Further, if BellSouth's performance for a given month triggers the Low	➤ CLECs DISAGREE CLECs oppose changing these measures to Tier 2 only. As facilities-based competition increases, so may the number of LNP orders. Now is not the time to eliminate incentives for BellSouth to provide compliant support. Secondly, an aggregate view of performance can easily mask poor CLEC-specific performance if these processes are so automated and centralized, why does BellSouth need 12 hours (or even 4 hours) to work a non- trigger disconnect (Measure P-13D)?	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
62	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure M&R-2; CTRR Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure M&R 2, Customer Trouble Report Rate, from both Tier 1 and Tier 2.	Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved. This measure is neither an indicator of timeliness nor accuracy of maintenance and repair. It is not a measure of whether troubles actually exist, but is at best a broad indicator of whether customers choose to submit trouble reports. Consequently, low results do not mean that there is a performance problem, instead it simply provides information that indicates whether a part of the maintenance process needs to be examined to see if a problem exists. Experience has shown that results vary widely due to differences in the way that CLECs choose to maintain their services. For example, some CLECs do a better job of isolating troubles to their network than others. Those that don't isolate troubles well have higher trouble report rates, and it hardly seems appropriate to penalize BellSouth because a CLEC did not isolate its troubles properly. Also, very small differences in performance result in large penalties for this measure as shown in the examples in our comments. Typically, some of the highest penalties are paid for this measure, and it is typically one of the areas where the measure usually indicates a high level of performance for both CLECs and retail. For example, overall, Trouble reports rate are usually less than 3% and the difference between CLEC and retail	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. BellSouth is correct that CTRR is not an indicator of accuracy nor timeliness. CTRR is a measure of how well BellSouth maintains the network for CLEC services compared to its retail services. This measurement is very important in terms of CLECs ability to provide reliable service at parity with BellSouth retail. Further, BST and other ILECs should have this metric in part to ensure that CLECs are not put on the worst facilities in the network, and suffer greater trouble rates because of it. BellSouth provides no evidence that some CLECs do a better job of isolating troubles than others and even when CLECs do a poor job, the exclusions in the measurement provide BellSouth with protection from poor isolation. Furthermore, BellSouth's comment that some CLECs do a better job of isolating troubles to their network than others, doesn't take into consideration that in some cases BellSouth limits the ability of some CLECs to test for troubles at all. For example, if a Line Sharing customer has reported a trouble on a loop, BellSouth is able to run an MLT test on that loop at any time. However, the data CLEC is prohibited from running the same test to isolate troubles as long as a trouble ticket remains open. The CLEC must wait until BellSouth closes the trouble ticket to isolate troubles on the	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
		performance is less than 2%, but the penalties are among the highest of any measure. This occurs even though for many of the reports no actual trouble exists. SEEM penalties will apply to the measures Maintenance Average Duration and Repeat Troubles, which together measure the accuracy and timeliness of Maintenance and Repair efforts.	data portion of that loop. This practice puts the CLEC at a disadvantage to BellSouth and delays the CLEC's ability to repair data problems in a timely manner. This measure should remain in SEEM as it is a critical indicator of BellSouth performance.	
63	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure M&R-5 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure M&R-5, Out of Service (OOS) > 24 hours, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for rationale.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs opposed removal of this measure from SEEM. See SQM matrix filed on August 27, 2004	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
64	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-1 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics For measure B-1, Invoice Accuracy, change the disaggregation to eliminate separate submetrics for Interconnection, Resale and UNE.	This metric is simply an indication of whether BellSouth provides the CLECs with accurate bills. There is no need to show separate disaggregations for Interconnection, Resale and UNE.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE BellSouth should not be allowed to discriminate by mode of entry, and aggregate its results to mask performance Again, BellSouth wants to overlook the fact that performance does vary by CLEC. The billing experience of a CLEC who only resells BellSouth's service will more than likely be significantly different from the experience of a CLEC who only purchases UNEs from BellSouth CLECs proposed these disaggregations because the remedies should be targeted to fixing problematic area in the billing	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
65	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-3 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure B-3, Usage Data Delivery Accuracy, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for rationale.	➤ CLEC DISAGREE. CLECs opposed removal of this measure from SEEM. See matrix filed on August 27, 2004.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

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Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
66	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-10 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure B-10, Percent Billing Errors Corrected in "X" Business Days, from Tier 1	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan. Matrix filed on July 28, 2004, for rationale.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs opposed removal of this measure from SEEM. BellSouth is currently failing at the Tier 2 level for this measure. BellSouth's claim of having low dollar values is false and attributed to the fact that BellSouth is inappropriately excluded claims that are disputed. Those disputed claims, which happen to be wrongfully excluded, have high dollar value. Therefore, BellSouth has no valid rationale for deleting this measure.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
67	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure C-3: PMDD Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics For measure C-3, Collocation Percent of Due Dates Missed, remove the separate disaggregations for Virtual, Physical, which were further disaggregated by Initial and Augment.	This metric simply tracked whether a committed due date is met or missed. Specific disaggregation by Virtual or Physical (also Initial and Augment) is unnecessary. This especially true since BellSouth rarely missed a due date for this measure.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. Whether or not BellSouth's performance has been at parity or not should be of no consequence to the disaggregation of this measure. Virtual and physical collocations are significantly different in nature and cost. In some cases, virtual collocation arrangements are a greater source of revenue than are physical arrangements. Combining these disaggregations could mask disparate treatment, if BellSouth were to favor virtual arrangements over physical ones. The same is true for "Initial" and "Augments" as BellSouth treats initial and augment applications far too differently for them to be lumped together.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
68	SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Measurement Disaggregation – General Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Decrease the level of disaggregation for many SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2 measurements. The measures within the Provisioning and Maintenance & Repair domains for which BellSouth proposes a reduction in	As discussed concerning the excessive disaggregation in the current SQM, there are a large number of sub-metrics for which there is little or no activity month-to-month. There is, obviously, no benefit to maintaining the current level of disaggregation, which produces so many meaningless data reports. The resulting need, therefore, and the approach reflected in BellSouth's proposal, is for more aggregation rather than	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs agree that many submetrics in the current SEEM disaggregation have no volume for some, or even all, CLECs. Obviously, empty submetrics are of no value, but they also cause no harm. CLECs also agree that small volumes increase the statistical variation associated with ILEC/CLEC comparisons. However, this concern must be balanced against the fallacy of lumping unlike products together for performance	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.

Florida Public Service Commission SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
	disaggregation are shown below (the actual changes to the level of disaggregation is shown in Appendix B, Tables B-1 and B-2, of the redlined SEEM plan included in this filing as Exhibit B): Provisioning 1. PIAM: Percent Installation Appointments Met (currently reflected as P-3, Percent Missed Installation Appointments). 2. PPT: Percent Provisioning Troubles within 5 Days (previously 30 Days) of Service Order Completion. Maintenance & Repair 1. PRAM: Percent Repair Appointments Met (currently reflected as MR-1, Percent Missed Repair Appointments) 2. MAD: Maintenance Average Duration 3. PRT: Percent Repeat Customer Troubles within 30 Days The proposed SEEM disaggregation for Pre-Ordering and Ordering measures is the same as the proposed SQM disaggregation except where already noted.	disaggregation. That is, grouping similar sub-metrics together for purposes of making more meaningful determinations of compliant performance. Beyond the disaggregation issues associated with the SQM, however, the design and intended functioning of the SEEM plan requires additional aggregation beyond that reflected in the SQM. Of course, the problem of the vast majority of sub-measures reflecting little or no activity is compounded in the SEEM plan: for Tier 1. This is because in addition to the several levels of disaggregation in the SQM, SEEM Tier 1 calculations require further disaggregation by individual CLEC. Specifically, SEEM currently contains 830 sub-metrics at the Tier 1 level. There are over 200 CLECs in Florida. Since Tier 1 sub-metrics apply to all CLECs, there is a potential for over 166,000 SEEM determinations (830 sub-metrics x 200 CLECs). Too many sub-metrics (which are subject to further disaggregation and granularity) result in few or no transactions (or activity) in many sub-metrics. For example, an analysis of SEEM data for Florida taken from the three-month period of August through October 2003 indicated that, on average, there was no activity for 97% of the CLEC specific opportunities for the 830 SEEM measures. Additionally, the truncated-Z statistical methodology uses like-to-	determination. While truncated Z was designed to allow aggregation of cells with difference mixes of difficulty to serve, it was not intended for combining results that differed substantially in terms of whether performance was in parity. Such heterogeneity in performance can easily mask extreme discrimination for some products if service is nondiscriminatory for others. Inappropriate aggregation will only produce flawed results. CLECs are willing to reduce disaggregation but not at the expense of accurate parity determinations. To address BellSouth concerns, CLECs continue to recommend a joint viewing of data at the cell level such that a joint disaggregation proposal can be developed. BellSouth continues to make claims of low volumes for some disaggregations, but has not provided it in a format that would allow other parties with access to the data to verify or invalidate those claims or to understand how combining the low volume products with other products will affect performance results. Also, in many cases, CLECs are focused on comparing like to like and are willing to drop disaggregations with no activity so long as the right retail analog for what is being ordered is used	

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
		like comparisons at very granular level called cells so masking of poor performance by good performance is a minimal problem if it exists at all as indicated by an analysis conducted by AT&T. The truncated Z methodology was specifically designed to allow aggregation of several products without creating a problem with masking. According to the design of the statistical methodology used in the SEEM plan, given that like-to-like comparisons are made at the cell level, it is unnecessary for the SEEM plan payment categories of sub-metrics to be the same as the SQM level, which is used for reporting and monitoring.		
69	SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Retail Analogs B.3 Add new section to show the retail analogs for the measures in the SEEM plan.	Added for completeness of SEEM documentation.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE Inappropriate disaggregation results in inappropriate analogs.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
70	SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Benchmark Thresholds B.4 Add new section to show the benchmarks for the measures in the SEEM plan.	Added for completeness of SEEM documentation.	➤ CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART CLECs do not disagree to BellSouth's addition of a table showing the SEEM benchmark thresholds, however we do disagree with a majority, if not all of the thresholds BellSouth has proposed. Our disagreements with these thresholds are discussed with each metric.	➤ See staff's position on SQM disaggregation.
71	Appendix F OSS Tables F.1 – F.2 Added the OSS designations to SEEM	This section was added to reflect the OSS applied to the SEEM plan parity determinations.	➤ CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART CLECs do not disagree to BellSouth's addition of a table showing OSS designations, but disagree with list See matrix filed on August 27, 2004 for more information	To be discussed further (needed?)

Row	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response	Staff Position
72	Appendix G Reposting of Performance Data and Recalculation of SEEM Payments Reposting policy added to the SEEM plan.	This is the policy concerning the reposting of data that was approved by the Commission. This policy is included in the SEEM plan documentation for completeness.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE CLECs are not opposed to the inclusion of the policy, but are opposed to portions of the contents. These objections have been discussed in related filings.	➤ Staff recommends for BellSouth to revise and incorporate reposting policy as discussed and agreed upon in SQM section of six-month review.

CLEC Coalition Proposed Changes

Proposed Change	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response	Staff Position
Administrative Review: After 6 consecutive violations, the affected CLEC has the right to request an administrative review by Staff Similarly, after 6 months of Tier 2 violations, any CLEC with volume for that submeasure has the right to request an administrative review.	At the review, the CLEC could propose additional actions to identify the source of that problem and to alleviate it	> This provision is unnecessary. The CLECs have always had the right to request an administrative review whenever it believes that BellSouth's performance to CLECs is discriminatory or causes harm. > Further, while the statistical test may suggest that BST's performance was out of parity for 6 consecutive months, this does not necessarily indicate that there was a material difference between retail and CLEC performance levels.	> Staff believes this provision is unnecessary, the CLECs have always had the right to request an administrative review whenever it believes that BellSouth's performance to CLECs is discriminatory or causes harm
PARIS Reporting The CLEC Coalition requests that this Commission require BellSouth to report the specific information in its CLEC-specific PARIS reports for each submeasure to Disclose Degree of Non-Compliance The CLEC Coalition proposes that BellSouth be required to Disclose Source of Adjustments and cite detailed requirements as to what information should be disclosed and how	Disclose Degree of Non-Compliance > Currently: o Inadequate to understand level of severity o Only remedy amounts are provided o No underlying data for compliance determination calculations > Disclose degree of non-compliance for a given violation > Greater visibility into non-compliance determination > Better understanding of how remedy amounts were derived > Data currently reported in LA, but not necessarily useful to them > Should help to provide delta comparisons Disclose Source of All Adjustments > Currently: o No disclosed substantiation for adjustments o No reference linking adjustment to a notification or description to clearly determine the source o Multiple adjustments, possibly from different errors, sometimes posted in single total adjustment	> It was unclear how the CLECs wanted the report formatted and what information it should contain CLECs provided additional information in their responses to action items filed on 10/11/04 BellSouth is reviewing that information and will discuss in upcoming workshops. > With respect to the proposed requirement to "Disclose Source of Adjustments," BellSouth worked with several CLECs in the LA workshops and thought that the report format developed met the CLECs' identified needs. > If that format is not sufficient, BellSouth needs more definitive and specific, not general, input on the desired disclosure format CLECs are requesting. CLECs provided additional information in their responses to action items filed on 10/11/04 BellSouth is reviewing that information and will discuss in upcoming workshops	> Paris Reporting > To be discussed further (see Appendix A and Appendix B in CLEC action item responses filed 10/11/04 > Staff agrees with CLEC's position > Staff recommends that an additional provision should be added after item 4.4.7 in section 4 4 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier 1 and Tier-2 amounts The new provision should detail the procedures for disclosing source of adjustments and the requirements as to what information should be disclosed and how. [see number 32 above]



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November 15, 2004

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms. Blanca Bayó, Director
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Re: Docket No. 000121A-TP

Dear Ms. Bayó:

Attached please find the CLEC Coalition's Response to Staff's "Technical" matrix in the above-referenced docket. Pursuant to the Commission's Electronic Filing Requirements, this version should be considered the official copy for purposes of the docket file. Copies of this document will be served on all parties via electronic and U.S. Mail.

Thank you for your assistance with this filing.

Sincerely yours,

s/ Tracy W Hatch

Tracy W. Hatch

TWH/scd
Attachment
cc: Parties of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the CLEC's Reply was served by

U.S. Mail this 15th day of November 2004 to the following:

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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Docket No. 000121A-TP

**SEEM
“TECHNICAL” MATRIX**

CLEC Coalition Proposed Changes

Row #	Proposal Concepts	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response
1	Measure-Based Concept	> Transaction-based remedies provide an incentive for BellSouth to give worse service, in order to suppress CLEC volumes > Maintains continuity with the current remedy plan. > Addresses the need for sufficient remedies even at small volumes > Violations give evidence of processes being out of parity. Measure-based plans tie the remedy to motivating behavior to provide incentive to fix the process.	
2	Base Remedy Payment Calculation $d * \text{SQRT}(n) * B$ d = disparity index B = CLEC Perf / Applicable Std. - 1 B = Factor varies by Meas./ Prod. Cat.	> Essential to incorporate severity considerations in the determination of the remedy amount. > Measures severity in terms of the CLEC performance relative to either the ILEC performance or a designated benchmark > Disparity index derived based on like-to-like comparisons > Disparity index capped to avoid extreme remedies when BellSouth's support for its own customers is extremely better than how it supports CLEC customers. > Incorporates volume while maintaining adequate incentives at low volumes and avoiding extreme incentives at high volumes > Remedies designed to be close to the remedy amounts in the current SEEM fee schedule. > Bases remedies on the disparity index which is similar to what FPSC Staff previously recommended.	
3	\$25,000 Limit on First Month Violation	> Addresses concerns raised about the magnitude of per submetric remedy amounts.	
4	Small Volume Cap	> Further limits potential remedies at small volumes for proportion parity measures. > Address concerns about large remedies at low volumes.	

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposal Concepts	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response
5	Persistence Factor	> Remedy amounts for Tier 1 should escalate in the same fashion across all domains > BellSouth continually reports below-standard performance for some submeasures > Factors approximate those in current fee schedule.	
6	Tier 2	> Status Quo > Allows the Tier 1 implementation to be evaluated prior to disruption caused by modifications. If the modified Tier 1 proves to enable the generated remedies to be effective in motivating compliant performance by BellSouth, then potential changes associated with Tier 2 would be avoided.	

BellSouth Proposed Changes

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
1	Remedy Plan based on Transaction-based system	Transaction-based approach: > Inherently scalable > Straightforward variation of penalties based on severity > Does not require a proxy for severity, such as a disparity index – which has proven to be very subjective and untenable, thus arbitrary > Transaction-based plan is preferable as a general proposition, from a practical standpoint > Currently, at least 40 states, including Florida, use transaction-based plans	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Remedy amounts should be based primarily on the size of the difference between the ILEC and CLEC means or proportions in order to provide incentive for BellSouth to improve the service process. > Remedies in a transaction based system are inherently tied more to CLEC volumes than to the disparity in service levels, resulting in insufficient incentives to improve service at low CLEC volumes. Consequently, transaction-based remedies provide an incentive for BellSouth to give worse service, in order to suppress CLEC volumes. > Estimating, and even defining, disparate transactions for interval measures is arbitrary (see Rows 2 and 4). > Even if a method is established for counting “disparate transactions,” there is no basis for setting a per-transaction remedy amount (see Rows 5-6).
2	Quantifying disparate transactions	> Counts number of disparate transactions and pays penalties on those > For Party Measures, the most direct and logical approach: - o Alter the most damaging “out-of-parity” situations first - o Alter next most damaging until “parity” is achieved > Corrects transactions having greatest potential customer impact first, before correcting those having lesser potential impact > For Benchmark Measures, the disparate transactions are simply the number of additional transactions that must be changed for the better to meet the benchmark.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Any definition of disparate transactions for mean (interval) measures is inherently arbitrary. > Consider a single cell in which ten CLEC customers receive a service in a mean of 4.0 hours. If the goal is to reduce the mean to 3.0 hours, that could be accomplished by reducing all ten service times by 25% each or, perhaps, by reducing one service time by 10 hours, for example, from 15 hours to 5 hours. Is there one disparate transaction, or are there ten? > Similarly, suppose that “zeroing out” cell A (with 5 CLEC transactions) or Cell B (with 10 CLEC transactions) would each increase truncated Z by the same amount. What is the basis for giving one cell precedence over the other?

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
3	Interpolation for Total Affected Volume	> All transactions in final cell may not need to be altered for "parity" > Appropriate action: interpolate to bring sub-metric into "parity"	> CLECs AGREE.

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
4	Parity Point versus Detection Point	BellSouth is obligated to pay penalties under SEEM only up to the point necessary to achieve "parity" of service for CLECs.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > The repeated use of the word "parity" in the BST reasoning for Rows 3 and 4 clearly support using the parity point, not the detection point. In Row 4, BellSouth states that it "is obligated to pay ... only up to the point necessary to achieve 'parity' of service." The point where parity is achieved for the observed data is where the truncated Z statistic equals 0. > The CLECs recognize that the magnitude of disparity between service processes is measured with uncertainty. The statistical tests allow for this uncertainty in making the compliance determination. Consequently, BellSouth may be found in compliance even though the observed service for CLEC customers is inferior to that for BellSouth's customers. > However, once performance has been determined to be in violation, the goal should be to estimate the magnitude of disparity in the process. By various principles, disparity should be estimated relative to the parity point and not the detection point > In general, statisticians estimate a quantity in a population (or process) by the corresponding quantity in a sample. For this application, that means estimating the magnitude of disparity in the process by the size of the observed disparity (i.e., relative to the parity point). In contrast, measuring disparity relative to the detection point yields a very biased estimate. > BellSouth's proposed method, results in estimating disparate transactions by a lower confidence limit for that quantity. While the lower confidence limit may correspond to the truth some of the time, that argument would be equally valid in favor of using the upper confidence limit (equidistant from the parity point on the other side).
5	Amounts per transaction	> Current transaction-based fees in other states:	> CLECs DISAGREE.

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		- o Outdated - o Continued use is unwarranted and inefficient - o Resulted from evidence presented to GPSC in 2000 - o Developed with much less CLEC activity - o Fee schedule artificially high, although thought to be too low initially - o Penalty amount/transaction – excessive relative to typical rate for service - o Artificially high fee schedule compounded with increased CLEC activity cause transaction-based payment to scale too high - o Existing and new plans require BST to provide CLECs better service in the aggregate than retail in order to eliminate penalty payments because: - o Performance for each CLEC is compared to BST's average performance across a geographic area - o Contrary to intent of SEEM - o A more rationale fee schedule reduces the effect of this occurrence while still deterring backsliding very effectively. - o More in line with rebates in commercial transactions where performance guarantees are provided.	- o BellSouth proposes to set amounts that purport to compensate CLECs for harm suffered from BellSouth's sub-parity service. The CLECs disagree with this basis for setting amounts per transaction. - o Instead, CLECs believe that final remedy amounts need to be set at levels that provide effective incentives to improve service to CLEC customers. BellSouth's standard fee schedule is very likely to generate remedies that could be treated as costs of doing business as usual. This Commission has recognized that payments to the CLECs are a crucial aspect of the plan. Additionally, this Commission has previously concluded that "it is arguable that payments to ALECs under our plan do not even fall within the realm of "liquidated damages" but, instead, are a mechanism to level the competitive playing field when BellSouth does not, or cannot, meet the benchmarks" (Page 122 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-POF-JP dated September 10, 2001) - o The standard fee schedule also falls far short, even as compensation for damages suffered. - o Many types of expenses/costs are experienced by the CLEC when BellSouth fails to perform as required. For example, a missed appointment can cause the CLEC to have to re-negotiate with its customer, possibly supplement its service order, and potentially re-schedule its own personnel for the new due date. OSS failures can cause labor-intensive, costly workarounds or total roadblocks that keep other metrics from even being implicated because orders cannot move forward. These types of substantial costs are ignored in BellSouth's proposal. Remedies need to be at a level where BellSouth will have the incentive to expend capital or add to its labor costs to keep orders flowing smoothly toward completion. - o Customers may be lost before they are even installed. Revenue losses may correspond to

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
			multiple years of service, and this revenue may not just be from POTS type services but more enhanced applications and long distance services. In addition, word of mouth from these departing customers may chill the CLECs market growth as well > BellSouth's proposed fee schedule is completely inadequate when compared to other states, with large gaps even in Month 1 and exponential gaps by Month 6 (See Attachment A). > Also see Row 44 of CLEC non-technical matrix. > For submetrics that are out of parity, BellSouth's proposal is very likely to underestimate the number of disparate transactions. In some cases, the statistical test will fail to trigger a violation. Even when performance is found to be in violations, BellSouth's proposal to measure disparate transactions only up to the detection point would most often lead to an underestimate. Larger amounts per transaction are needed to compensate for these two sources of underestimation.
6	"High Performance" / "Standard Performance" / "Low Performance" Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology (Tier 1) Section 4.3.1.4: <u>If BellSouth's performance in the current month should exceed the baseline level by three standard deviations, no Tier-1 payment will apply for any CLEC in that month.</u> Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology (Tier 2) Section 4.3.2.2: <u>If BellSouth's performance, as measured by the average percent of submetrics met for the three months used to determine whether Tier 2 applies in the current data month, exceeds the baseline performance by three standard deviations, no Tier-2 payment will apply for any CLEC in the current data month.</u>	> Implements new anti-backsliding mechanism > Two fee schedules proposed - o New standard fee schedule - o Low performance schedule • Will apply if performance materially deteriorates from current levels • Same as fee schedule currently in all other transaction-based SEEMs for BellSouth - o Allay any concerns that Proposed SEEM is too soft to deter backsliding - o If performance deteriorates by a statistically significant degree from baseline, then fees increase dramatically - o Permits BellSouth to avoid penalties w/ statistically significant improvement in overall performance.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > BellSouth's proposal permits it to discriminate in targeted measurement areas and against individual CLECs with impunity. > Assuming that service performance stayed at the same level as in recent months, CLECs believe that remedies based on the proposed Standard Performance fee schedule would be greatly reduced from current levels. CLECs do not believe that BellSouth's current performance warrants such a change, as even current levels of payments have been insufficient to improve performance. > The proposed method for selecting which fee schedule to use in any month is seriously flawed.

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Need example showing how this will work for each possible combination: Benchmark/Parity/Mean/Proportion.	> Professed role of SEEM: provide another mechanism to deter backsliding in performance > SEEM is not the only means available CLECs to address performance problems with BellSouth. Other mechanisms also exist to address backsliding: - o Complaints to federal and state commissions - o Monitoring by those same commissions - o Contract provisions - o Court actions > Facts show that there has been no backsliding under the current SEEM > Provision requires SEEM fee schedule to revert to a much more punitive fee schedule, consistent with the levels applicable in current transaction-based plans SEEM if performance deteriorates materially. > New positive Additional incentive relieves BST of payments if a material improvement in overall performance occurs - o To improve performance - o To partially compensate for the risk of reverting to fee schedule used currently for other transaction-based plans > Existing plan requires BST to provide CLECs better service in the aggregate than retail in order to eliminate penalty payments because: Performance for each CLEC is compared to BST's average performance across a geographic area - o Contrary to intent of SEEM This mechanism puts a limit on this occurrence if performance improves significantly.	> Most important, the measure of compliance is far too general—lumping together all measure domains and products. As such, it may easily miss performance deterioration in selected areas that proves devastating to individual CLECs. Alternatively, BellSouth's proposed methodology might trigger the High Performance fee schedule—where no remedies are paid—even though performance has not improved in areas critical to CLECs. > These concerns are far from hypothetical because it is BellSouth that controls where it focuses its efforts to improve, or not, performance for CLEC customers > Furthermore, the methodology is flawed because it relies on the SQM submetrics and the SQM statistical tests, which do not disaggregate to cells for making like-to-like comparisons or use the balancing critical value. These differences mean that the methodology could easily miss a substantial decline in SEEM compliance that does not appear in SQM tests > Finally, CLECs disagree with using 12 current months as the standard for calibrating future performance. The benchmarks and analogs established by the Commission should be used to determine compliance, not BellSouth's historical performance.
7	Disaggregation	> The disaggregation for SEEM should be different from the SQM so that the statistical methodology can function according to design > Report Structure changed to eliminate categories with little or no volume, resulting in data that should be more concise and meaningful. For example, >=10 lines/circuits virtually never has any data in the reports. These low volumes render the measure virtually useless to evaluate	> CLECs DISAGREE. > The SEEM disaggregation must balance two concerns: maintaining adequate volumes at the submetric level while not aggregating heterogeneous products that can mask discrimination BellSouth's proposed disaggregation goes too far in aggregating distinct products and services. > The CLECs recognize that many submetrics in

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		performance. > The products in the low volume disaggregations will continue to be included in the results. They will simply be part of another category instead of reported separately. > Cell structure, as defined by wire Center, dispatched, service-type, # of circuits as previously agreed upon by BellSouth and the CLECs ensures like-to-like comparisons > Truncated-z statistical methodology as previously developed jointly by BellSouth and CLECs permits aggregation of these cells into submetrics to improve validity of results without masking poor performance. > Recent testing of truncated z methodology by CLECs confirmed that mechanism does permit cell aggregation without masking as designed. > The level of disaggregation should allow for a statistically meaningful number of transactions in each submetric > Because Tier 1 penalties are calculated by individual CLEC, with too much disaggregation, the spread of transactions across cells means the vast majority of cells show little or no activity.	the current SEEM disaggregation have little or no volume for some CLECs. Small volumes are undesirable because they increase both Type I and Type II error rates. Consequently, the current disaggregation may require some modification > It is equally important to avoid combining submetrics in ways that allow masking discrimination, which can happen if BellSouth provides discriminatory service for some product(s) but parity or better service for other product(s) combined into the same submetrics > Paragraph 6 of the BST Reasoning, which refers to recent testing of the truncated z methodology, contains several mischaracterizations of that effort. First, the work was joint with BellSouth, with only BellSouth and its consultants having access to the raw data. Second, the analysis found numerous instances of systematic heterogeneity, i.e., cases where the performance received by CLECs (relative to parity) was significantly better for one group of cells (e.g., dispatch) than for another (e.g., non-dispatch). Third, the analysis used data from Louisiana, where volumes were generally low, so it may not have uncovered problems that exist in Florida. In particular, there was almost no opportunity to look for heterogeneity among products. > Disaggregation should allow for like-to-like comparisons. The current set of submetrics facilitates accurate comparisons of results to expected performance. However, BellSouth's proposal does not. For example, BellSouth proposes UNE Loops be combined in the Order Completion Interval Measure, despite differences in the standard offered interval based on type of loop and volume ordered. (See Attachment B) And BellSouth's own performance reports confirm significant differences in intervals between dispatch and non-dispatch orders. (For example, the Florida

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
8	Degree of Escalation	> Tier 1 fee amounts would only escalate in month 2 > Tier 1 fees were designed to be liquidated damages – no reason to conclude that damages continue to escalate each month. > CLECs would continue to receive payments at the increased Month 2 level if the condition persists > Tier 2 penalties, which were designed to be punitive, apply beginning in month 3 > More fully utilizes the Tier 2 mechanism, which was designed to address cases of persistent metric failures	MSS Report for September for the OCI measure for 2 wire analog lop design reports an interval of 9.92 days for dispatch and 4 6 days for non-dispatch) Clearly dispatch orders use difference processes and different personnel and so should be evaluated separately. > Referring to disaggregation for penalty assessment, this Commission has previously concluded, “We find that this product reaggregation is inappropriate for penalty determination. We find BellSouth product disaggregation for compliance purposes shall match what we have approved for product reporting purposes.” (See page 102 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP dated September 10, 2001.) > CLECs DISAGREE. > Escalation for repeated violations serves to focus remedies on submetrics most in need of attention > Tier 1 fees were not designed by the Commission to be liquidated damages (See response in Row 5 above) > The current SEEM fee schedule includes six months of escalation, with penalties for a sixth violation reaching approximately three times the base amount. > Despite that provision, chronic violations continue to occur for various submetrics > Consequently, it would be a mistake to dilute the period or magnitude of escalation from the current levels. The CLEC’s proposed escalation factors maintain this incentive. > <i>See Attachment A</i> for magnitude of escalation in other states.

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
9	To pay or not to pay for only 1 failed month Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1.7: Tier-1 Enforcement mechanisms - . for any <u>two</u> consecutive months as calculated by BellSouth. Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology Section 4.3 1. Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms will be triggered ... in a given month for two (2) consecutive months	> Situation more likely problematic when volumes are low - o Currently, due to excessive disaggregation - o Still to some extent in Tier 1 for proposed plan > Does not represent discriminatory practice > Some failures are anomalies: - o No systemic changes required to address failures - o Random occurrences: • temporary random system malfunction • random human error - o No corrective action can be taken - o Neither predictable nor preventable - o Penalty clearly inconsistent with objectives of SEEM. > Assessing penalties based on a single-month failure equates statistical significance with materiality - o Only deals in probabilities and not certainties - o Depends on inputs for certain materiality parameters such as Delta, Psi and Epsilon - o Only identify statistically significance - o Cannot determine actual materiality > Virtually removes likelihood of assessing remedies for random occurrences. > Proposed for each Domain, where such timeliness and accuracy are measured: - o 1 measure of timeliness - o 1 measure of accuracy > Measures of some intermediate processes were removed - o Little, if any, customer effect - o Any significant customer effect would likely be reflected in other measures	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Requiring two consecutive months of violations before any remedy payments occur destroys the concept of balancing error probabilities. Doing so increases the probability that no remedy payment will occur given that a material difference exists, while decreasing the probability that a payment will occur given that the processes are in parity. See Action Item 3 of CLEC filing dated October 11, 2004.
10	<u>Measured to be included in SEEM</u>	> Proposed for each Domain, where such timeliness and accuracy are measured: - o 1 measure of timeliness - o 1 measure of accuracy > Measures of some intermediate processes were removed - o Little, if any, customer effect - o Any significant customer effect would likely be reflected in other measures	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Please see CLEC response to rows 45 – 66 of non-technical matrix for each specific metric. Additionally, CLECs note that this Commission has previously found that both directly customer affecting measures e.g. missed appointments, as well as process metrics such as FOCs and rejections which are “critical to ALECs in providing quality service in a timely manner” are appropriate for the enforcement mechanisms. > (See page 94 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP dated September 10, 2001.

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
11	Delta Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1 6: Delta - For individual CLECs submetrics the Delta value shall be determined using Ford's Delta Function as ordered by the Florida Public Service Commission- 1 0 and for the CLEC aggregate the Delta value shall be 0.5	> Single delta value - o Tier 1 of 1 0 - o Tier 2 of 0.5 > Current delta function: - o Initially proposed by Z-Tel's economist Dr. Ford - o To address adjustment to the statistical balancing methodology - o Dr. Ford introduced some confusion about several key hypothesis testing issues (1) statistical hypothesis test's significance level (2) interpretation of a "balanced" hypothesis test (3) reasons for using "balancing" in SEEM plan > No need for "fix" of Dr. Ford's delta function - o No reason to conclude serious flaws are in the balancing methodology - o No indication of problem initially alleged by Dr. Ford in all 7 of BST's states with single delta value > Use of delta function introduces additional variables - o Requiring subjective exercise in determining values - o Probably creates more problems than it solves.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Dr. George Ford introduced the delta function in order to simultaneously address two problems associated with using a fixed delta value for balancing high Type I and Type II error probabilities for submetrics with low CLEC volumes and exorbitant balancing critical values for submetrics with high CLEC volumes. The delta function mitigates both problems. > While addressing the low volume problem, BellSouth's proposal to use a fixed critical value of 1.0 makes the high volume problem much worse > If a fixed value of delta is chosen, it should be set to correspond to the minimum disparity producing a "material" obstacle to competition. In his testimony during Florida's 2001 performance measurement hearings, Dr. Robert Bell illustrated that a delta value of 1.0 corresponded with extreme disparities going far beyond any notion of a minimal material obstacle. For example, if BellSouth misses 5 percent of appointments for its own customers, a delta value of 1.0 corresponds to a material disparity occurring when 44 percent of appointments are missed for CLEC customers (See Direct Testimony of Robert M Bell, Ph D , Docket 000121-TP, March 1, 2001).

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
12	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.5: Trimming	- Originated in Louisiana Workshop in 1999 - CLEC volumes and distributions were much smaller than they are now - Distributional differences no longer a factor - Requires each observation to be discarded be examined to determine if true business reason exists for discarding this real data - Defeats Self Effectuating aspect of SEEM plan	CLECs DISAGREE. - The CLECs recognize that the current algorithm for trimming may result in deleting an inappropriately large fraction of ILEC observations in some instances - However, extreme ILEC observations, whether erroneous or valid, can have undue influence on the modified Z statistic. - The current trimming procedure was designed to provide an automated method for protecting against outliers. - CLECs disagree with unilateral elimination of trimming but welcome the opportunity to jointly develop a simple, self effectuating procedure that protects all parties. CLECs DISAGREE. - See previous rows.
13	Appendix D: Statistical Formulas and Technical Descriptions Beginning on page 101 Revised Section D to incorporate the change from measurement-based plan to a transaction based plan and to change from the floating delta approach, based on the Ford delta function, a fixed delta of 1.0 for Tier 1 and 0.5 for Tier 2. See Exhibit B, Appendix D.	Section D has been substantially revised to reflect the change from a per-measurement based SEEM plan to a per-transaction based SEEM plan Therefore, the entire section is shown in red.	CLECs DISAGREE. See previous rows.
14	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions Section C The statistical process for testing whether BellSouth's (BST) wholesale customers (alternative local exchange carriers or CLECs) are being treated equally with BST's retail customers involves more than a simple mathematical formula. Three key elements need to be considered before an appropriate decision process can be developed. These are the type of: - data - comparison - performance This section describes the properties of a test methodology and the truncated Z statistic for four two types of measures.	This change reflects the fact that BellSouth's proposal does not include rate or ratio measures and to correct ALEC to read CLEC.	CLECs DISAGREE CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix).
15	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions Section C 1 Necessary Properties for a Test Methodology Once the key elements are determined, a test methodology should be developed that complies with the following properties:	Changed to reflect the removal of the trimming of data in the process. See rationale below for Appendix C, section C 1 5.	CLECs DISAGREE. See Row 12.

Florida Public Service Commission SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response		
	• Like-to-Like Comparisons • Aggregate Level Test Statistic • Production Mode Process • Balancing • Trimming				
<u>16</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C 1.1 Like-to-Like Comparisons When possible, data should be compared at appropriate levels, e g wire center, time of month, dispatched residential, new orders. The testing process should: • Identify variables that may affect the performance measure • Record these important confounding covariates • Adjust for the observed covariates in order to remove potential biases and to make the <u>CLEC ALEC</u> and the ILEC units as comparable as possible	Correction	> CLECs AGREE.		
<u>17</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.2 Aggregate Level Test Statistic Each performance measure of interest should be summarized by one overall test statistic giving the decision maker a rule that determines whether a statistically significant difference exists. The test statistic should have the following properties: • The method should provide a single overall index on a standard scale. • If entries in comparison cells are exactly proportional over a covariate, the aggregated index should be very nearly the same as if comparisons on the covariate had not been done. • The contribution of each comparison cell should depend on the number of observations in the cell. • Cancellation between comparison cells should be limited • The index should be a continuous function of the observations.	Correction	> CLECs AGREE.		
<u>18</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.6 Measurement Types The performance measurements that will undergo testing are of four <u>two</u> types: mean, rate, and proportion. <u>mean, rate, and proportion.</u> All <u>Both</u> have similar characteristics. Different types of data are used to calculate them. Table C-1 shows the type of data that is used to derive each measurement type Table C-1: Measurements Types and Data <table><tr><th>Measurement</th><th>Data Used to</th></tr></table>	Measurement	Data Used to	These changes reflect the fact that there are no rate or ratio measures in BellSouth's proposed SEEM plan. There are no ratio measures in the existing SEEM plan either.	> CLECs DISAGREE > CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix).
Measurement	Data Used to				

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change		BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Type	Derive Measure		
	Mean	Interval		
	Ratio	measurements		
	Proportion	Counts		
	Rate			
19	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2 Testing Methodology—The Truncated Z: The calculation of the Truncated Z statistic is described in Appendix A of the "Louisiana Statistician's Report." The methodology described in this document is the same as that described in the "Statistician's Report," however, this document contains extra technical details to avoid undefined situations when programming the technique. In summary, many covariates are chosen in order to provide meaningful comparison levels below the sub-metric level chosen for the parity comparison. This includes such factors as wire center and time of month, as well as order type for provisioning measures. In each comparison cell, a Z statistic is calculated. The form of the Z statistic may vary depending on the performance measure, but it should be distributed approximately as a standard normal, with mean zero and variance equal to one. Assuming that the test statistic is derived so that it is negative when the performance for the CLEC ALLEG is worse than for the ILEC, a positive truncation is done - i.e. if the result is negative it is left alone, if the result is positive it is changed to zero. A weighted average of the truncated statistics is calculated where a cell's weight depends on the volume of BST and CLEC ALLEG orders in the cell. The weighted average is standardized by the subtracting the theoretical mean of the truncated distribution, and this is divided by the standard error of the weighted sum. Summaries based on measurement type are given for the calculation of the cell Z statistic.		These changes are added to make minor corrections and to delete the discussion concerning the Louisiana study, which is not necessary for an understanding of the statistical methodology.	> CLECs AGREE, BASED ON AGREEMENT AT NOVEMBER 8-9, 2004 WORKSHOP TO CHANGE THE FINAL INSTANCE OF "WEIGHTED SUM" TO "WEIGHTED AVERAGE."
20	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C 2 1 Mean Measures For mean measures, an adjusted, asymmetric t statistic is calculated for each like-to-like cell that has at least seven BST and seven CLEC ALLEG transactions. This statistic is an adjustment to the modified z statistic in order to make the		These changes are added for clarification purposes and to delete the discussion concerning the Louisiana study, which is not necessary for the understanding of the statistical methodology.	> CLECs AGREE.

Florida Public Service Commission

SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
21	assumption that the statistic is approximately normally distributed more reasonable even for fairly small sample sizes. The adjusted, asymmetric t statistic is part of the methodology described in the "Statistician's Report," and it has been documented for the statistical community in the August 2001 issue of The American Statistician, a peer review statistics journal. The statistic was created for mean performance measure parity tests in order to reduce the number of permutation tests needed for calculating cell statistics. Several sets of BST/CLEC mean measure data from Louisiana were examined in order to determine when the adjustment results give approximately the same results as a permutation test. The result is that a permutation test is used when one or both of the BST and CLEC ALEC sample sizes is less than seven. The adjusted, asymmetric t statistic and the permutation calculation are described below in Appendix D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description. Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2.2 Proportion Measures For performance measures that are calculated as a proportion, in each adjustment cell, the cell Z and the moments for the truncated cell Z can be calculated in a direct manner. In adjustment cells where proportions are not close to zero or one, and where the sample sizes are reasonably large ($n_{ij}(1-p_{ij}) > 9$), a normal approximation can be used. In this case, the moments for the truncated Z come directly from properties of the standard normal distribution. If the normal approximation is not appropriate, then the Z statistic is calculated from the hypergeometric distribution. <u>Is the exact permutation distribution</u>—In this case, the moments of the truncated Z are calculated exactly using the hypergeometric probabilities	These changes are added for clarification purposes.	> CLECs AGREE.
22	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2.3 Rate Measures The truncated Z methodology for rate measures has the same general structure for calculating the Z in each cell as proportion measures. For the rate measure customer trouble report rate there are a fixed number of access lines in service for the ALEC, b2j, and a fixed number for BST, b1j. The modeling assumption is that the occurrence of a trouble is independent between access lines, and the number of troubles in b access	This proposed deletion of the existing language reflects the fact that there are no rate measures in BellSouth's proposed SEEM plan.	> CLECs DISAGREE > CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix).

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	lines follows a Poisson distribution with mean b where b is the probability of a trouble per 1 access line and $b = (b_1 + b_2)$ is the total number of access lines in service. The exact permutation distribution for this situation is the binomial distribution (the limit for the hypergeometric distribution) that is based on the total number of BST and ALEC troubles, n, and the proportion of BST access lines in service, $q = b_1/b$. In an adjustment cell, if the number of ALEC troubles is greater than 15 and the number of BST troubles is greater than 15, and $n \cdot q(1 - q) > 9$, then a normal approximation can be used. In this case, the moments of the truncated Z come directly from properties of the standard normal distribution. Otherwise, if there are very few troubles, the number of ALEC troubles can be modeled using a binomial distribution with n equal to the total number of troubles (ALEC plus BST troubles.) In this case, the moments for the truncated Z are calculated explicitly using the binomial distribution.		
23	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2.4 Ratio Measures The current plan contains no measures that call for the use of a Z parity statistic.	This change reflects the fact that there are no ratio measures in either the existing or the proposed SEEM plan.	> CLECs AGREE.

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 1 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed ¹ Month 1	GA - Month 1	TX ² - Month 1	NJ ³ - Month 1	MI ⁴ - Month 1
Pre-Ordering	\$10	\$20	\$25 (Low)	Per Measure	\$75
Ordering	\$20	\$40	\$25 (Low)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$80	\$25 (Low)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – Resale	\$45	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – UNE	\$95	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – UNE-P	\$40	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$95 (from UNE)	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair – Resale	\$45	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair UNE	\$35	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair UNEP	\$25	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
LNP	\$95	\$150	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Billing – BIA	\$ 02 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$5	\$1 00	\$25 (Low)	Per Measure	\$75
IC Trunks	\$25	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Collocation	\$3,640	\$5,000	Escalates based on # of days late.	\$75 (Moderate)	Escalates based on # of days late.
Service Order Accuracy	\$20	\$50	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75

¹ Month 1 “Per Affected Item” would not apply unless the same measure was also missed in Month 2.

² The Texas transaction based plan categorizes each measurement as Low, Medium or High.

³ The New Jersey plan assesses a transaction amount based on the severity of the miss. The severity amounts are deemed Minor, Moderate or Major

⁴ The Michigan plan is largely based on the Texas plan, however, all transactions were set at the Medium level

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 2 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 2	GA - Month 2	TX – Month 2	NJ – Month 2	MI – Month 2
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$30	\$50 (Low)	Per Measure	\$150
Ordering	\$25	\$50	\$50 (Low)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$90	\$50 (Low)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning – Resale	\$56	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
LNP	\$95	\$250	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Billing – BIA	\$ 025 of adjusted amount	\$1 00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$50 (Low)	Per Measure	\$150
IC Trunks	\$25	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$150 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 3 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 3	GA - Month 3	TX – Month 3	NJ – Month 3	MI – Month 3
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$40	\$100 (Low)	Per Measure	\$300
Ordering	\$25	\$60	\$100 (Low)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$100	\$100 (Low)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
LNP	\$95	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1 00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$100 (Low)	Per Measure	\$300
IC Trunks	\$25	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$225 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 4 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 4	GA - Month 4	TX – Month 4	NJ – Month 4	MI – Month 4
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$50	\$200 (Low)	Per Measure	\$400
Ordering	\$25	\$70	\$200 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$110	\$200 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
LNP	\$95	\$600	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1 00	\$200 (Low)	Per Measure	\$400
IC Trunks	\$25	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 5 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 5	GA - Month 5	TX – Month 5	NJ – Month 5	MI – Month 5
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$60	\$300 (Low)	Per Measure	\$500
Ordering	\$25	\$80	\$300 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$120	\$300 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
LNP	\$95	\$700	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1 00	\$300 (Low)	Per Measure	\$500
IC Trunks	\$25	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 6 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 6	GA - Month 6	TX – Month 6.	NJ – Month 6	MI – Month 6
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$70	\$400 (Low)	Per Measure	\$600
Ordering	\$25	\$90	\$400 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$130	\$400 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
LNP	\$95	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$400 (Low)	Per Measure	\$600
IC Trunks	\$25	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Tier 2 Measures

Performance Measurement	BellSouth Proposed Tier 2	Georgia Tier 2	Texas Tier 2	Michigan Tier 2
OSS/Pre-Ordering	\$15	\$20	\$300 (Medium)	\$300
Ordering	\$30	\$60	\$300 (Medium)	\$300
Ordering - Flow Through	\$30	\$100	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - Resale	\$68	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - UNE	\$143	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - UNE-P	\$60	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning-UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$143 (from UNE)	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$68	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair-UNE	\$53	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair-UNEP	\$38	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Billing - BIA	\$.03 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	\$300
Billing - BIT	\$8	\$1 00	NA	\$300
LNP	\$143	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$300
IC Trunks	\$38	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$300
Collocation	\$5,460	\$15,000	Escalates Based on the # of days late	Escalates Based on the # of days late.
Change Management	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$200 (Low) / \$75,000 (High per Measure)	\$300
Service Order Accuracy	\$30	\$50	\$200 (Low)	\$300

0

Docket 000121A
CLEC Response to Technical Matrix
November 15, 2004
Attachment B

BELLSOUTH
Local Ordering Handbook

Section 8
Interval Guide

LSOG6 / ELMS6

Release 16.0 / Version 16.0C
Posting Date September 17, 2004

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DDD Calculation

- 1 For LSRs submitted electronically and qualifying for flow-through/electronic processing, the CLEC should reflect the standard interval as the desired due date (DDD).
2. The LCSC will apply the standard interval as follows:
 - (a) When DDD is less than the standard interval, BellSouth® will apply the standard interval.
 - (b) When the DDD is equal to or greater than the standard interval, BellSouth® will apply the DDD as shown on the LSR.
3. In all cases, a later due date than the standard interval may be requested by the CLEC and indicated in the DDD field of the LSR.
4. When a targeted LSR processing interval is listed on the interval chart, it should be added to the standard interval when calculating the DDD. (See UNE interval table.)
5. Intervals are based on business days, excluding Saturdays for business lines and Sunday and holidays for all lines.

Unbundled Network Element (UNE) Interval Table

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Interval	Targeted LSR Interval
Unbundled Loops				
2 Wire analog voice grade loop non-designed (SL1) CHC Does Not = Y	1 - 9	3 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	5 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire analog voice grade loop non-designed (SL1) CHC = Y	1 - 9	4 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	6 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire analog voice grade loop designed (SL2)	1 - 9	4 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	6 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
4 Wire analog voice grade loop	1 - 9	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire ISDN digital loop	1-5	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	12 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Universal Digital Channel (UDC)	1-5	10 business days	See Assumption #5	---
---	6-14	12 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
4 Wire 2.4, 4.8, 9.6, 19.2, 56 or 64 Kbps digital loop	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1 Loop	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS3 /STS1* Loop	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Dark Fiber	1-14	30 business days	2 days	N
	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Share without loop modification	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Share with loop modification	1 - 4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	Y
---	5 - 9 TNs	16 business days	Negotiated	Y
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Line Share with Loop Modification answered with: Pair Change, Pair Change with Line Station Transfer (LST)	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Splitting	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Splitting without loop modification	1-4 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Share DLEC Owned & Bellsouth Owned Splitter	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Share DLEC Owned & Bellsouth Owned Splitter with Loop modification	1-4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	16 business days	See assumption #5	See assumption #5
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Splitting DLEC Owned & Bellsouth Owned Splitter	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Splitting DLEC Owned & Bellsouth Owned Splitter with Loop modification	1-4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	16 business days	See assumption #5	See assumption #5

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
ADSL-2 Wire asymmetrical digital subscriber line loop without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
ADSL-2 Wire asymmetrical digital subscriber line loop with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
HDSL-2 Wire & 4 Wire high bit rate digital subscriber line loop without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
HDSL-2 Wire & 4 Wire high bit rate digital subscriber line loop with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Designed without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Designed with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Non-Designed without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR/Processing Interval	Project Managed
Unbundled Copper Loop - Non-Designed with modification	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Set-up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Set-up (LCSC)	1+	1 business day	See Assumption #5	---
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1+	1 business day	See Assumption #5	---
Loop Concentration (inside plant)				
Unbundled Loop Concentration (ULC) System*	1	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Sub Loops (outside plant)				
Unbundled Sub Loop Feeder	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Sub Loop	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-loop Distribution* Set-up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-Loop Distribution* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1 - 5	3 business days	See Assumption 5	---
---	6 - 14	5 business days	3 Business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	---
Unbundled Sub-loop - INC* Set-Up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-Loop INC* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1 - 5	3 business days	See Assumption 5	---
---	6 - 14	5 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	---
Network Interface Device (NID)				
NID	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed	
---	6-10	7 business days	3 business days	---	
---	11+	10 business days	5 business days	---	
Non-Channelized Transport					
Local Channel DS1*	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---	
Local Channel DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---	
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y	
Dedicated interoffice 2 wire/4 wire voice grade	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y	
Dedicated interoffice DS0	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y	
Dedicated interoffice DS1	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---	
Dedicated interoffice DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y	
Channelized Transport					
Unbundled Channelization (MUX) DS1*	1-5	20 business days	See assumption #5	---	
---	6-14	22 business days	3 business days	---	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y	

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted TSE Processing Interval	Project Managed
Unbundled Channelization (MUX) DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Local Switching (Port)				
2 Wire analog line port (Reqtyp F)	1-10	3 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	11-25	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	25+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Enhanced Extended Links (EELs)				
Voice Grade 2 Wire/4 Wire EELs	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DSO EELs	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1 EELs	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
DS1 EELs Georgia and Kentucky	1-14 circuits	7 business days	See assumption #5	---
DS3/STS-1 EELs*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Conversion of existing UNE-L to UNE-E (Bulk)				
EELS (Voice)	2-99	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Conversion of existing tariffed services to UNE services, including EELs				
A. Spreadsheet DS1 & below, no mixed bandwidth	15 +	37 business days		Y
Verification		7 business days		
Order Issuance		30 business	30 business days	

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
		days	Assumes a verified spreadsheet	
B. Spreadsheet DS3 & above or mixed bandwidth	15+	Negotiable	Negotiable	Y
C. Non-spreadsheet	1-14	12 business days		N
Verification		7 business days		
Order Issuance		5 business days	5 business days	
Non Switch Combinations (NSCs)				
Voice Grade 2 wire/4 wire	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DSO	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
DS3/STS-1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Dedicated Transport (UDT)				
Open AIN (OAIN)				
OAIN tool kit*	1	45 calendar days	10 calendar days	---
OAIN service management system*	1	45 calendar days	10 calendar days	---
CCS7 Signaling Transport Service				
A-Link signaling	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
D-Link signaling	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
STP-signaling transfer point	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
O/S and D/A UNEs				

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Directory assistance transport	1	30 calendar days	7 calendar days	---
Customized Call Routing (selective routing-LCC)				
1-5 LCC	1-5	30 calendar days	7 calendar days	---
6-25 LCC	6-25	60 calendar days	15 calendar days	---
>25 LCC	25+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Access to OSS				
Pre-order*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Order / Provisioning*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Maintenance / Repair*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Access to Databases				
800 database	1	10 calendar days	3 calendar days	---
Line information database (LIDB)	1	60 calendar days	7 calendar days	---

Local Number Portability (LNP)

The Number Portability Interval Guide is used for porting telephone number(s) only. If the porting request includes loops see Unbundled Network Elements (UNE) interval table and use the interval in this table, or the UNE table, whichever is longer. If existing service rearrangement is needed see complex services interval table.

The Number Portability interval table consists of the following terms and definitions:

Terms and Definitions

Term	Definition
Product	BellSouth® Product
Quantity	Numbers, or number blocks
Standard Interval	The number of days required for provisioning of the requested service type. This is the number of days from the time the service order is entered into the service order processing system until the order is completed.
Targeted LSR Processing Interval	The number of days from receipt of request to processing Local Service Request (LSR).
Full Migration	Port all telephone numbers on end user account.
Partial Migration	Port some telephone numbers, leave some telephone numbers, and/or disconnect some telephone numbers.

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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Docket No. 000121A-TP

SEEM
“TECHNICAL” MATRIX

SEEM Technical Matrix
CLEC Coalition Proposed Changes

Row #	Proposal Concepts	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response
1	Measure-Based Concept	> Transaction-based remedies provide an incentive for BellSouth to give worse service, in order to suppress CLEC volumes. > Maintains continuity with the current remedy plan > Addresses the need for sufficient remedies even at small volumes > Violations give evidence of processes being out of parity Measure-based plans tie the remedy to motivating behavior to provide incentive to fix the process.	
2	Base Remedy Payment Calculation $d * \text{SQRT}(n) * B$ d = disparity index = CLEC Perf / Applicable Std. - 1 B = Factor varies by Meas./ Prod. Cat.	> Essential to incorporate severity considerations in the determination of the remedy amount. > Measures severity in terms of the CLEC performance relative to either the ILEC performance or a designated benchmark. > Disparity index derived based on like-to-like comparisons > Disparity index capped to avoid extreme remedies when BellSouth's support for its own customers is extremely better than how it supports CLEC customers. > Incorporates volume while maintaining adequate incentives at low volumes and avoiding extreme incentives at high volumes. > Remedies designed to be close to the remedy amounts in the current SEEM fee schedule. > Bases remedies on the disparity index which is similar to what FPSC Staff previously recommended.	
3	\$25,000 Limit on First Month Violation	> Addresses concerns raised about the magnitude of per submetric remedy amounts.	
4	Small Volume Cap	> Further limits potential remedies at small volumes for proportion parity measures. > Address concerns about large remedies at low volumes.	

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposal Concepts	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response
5	Persistence Factor	> Remedy amounts for Tier 1 should escalate in the same fashion across all domains > BellSouth continually reports below-standard performance for some submeasures > Factors approximate those in current fee schedule.	
6	Tier 2	> Status Quo > Allows the Tier 1 implementation to be evaluated prior to disruption caused by modifications. If the modified Tier 1 proves to enable the generated remedies to be effective in motivating compliant performance by BellSouth, then potential changes associated with Tier 2 would be avoided.	

SEEM Technical Matrix
BellSouth Proposed Changes

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
1	Remedy Plan based on Transaction-based system	Transaction-based approach: ➤ Inherently scalable ➤ Straightforward variation of penalties based on severity ➤ Does not require a proxy for severity, such as a disparity index -- which has proven to be very subjective and untenable, thus arbitrary ➤ Transaction-based plan is preferable as a general proposition, from a practical standpoint ➤ Currently, at least 40 states, including Florida, use transaction-based plans	CLECs DISAGREE. ➤ Remedy amounts should be based primarily on the size of the difference between the ILEC and CLEC means or proportions in order to provide incentive for BellSouth to improve the service process. ➤ Remedies in a transaction based system are inherently tied more to CLEC volumes than to the disparity in service levels, resulting in insufficient incentives to improve service at low CLEC volumes. Consequently, transaction-based remedies provide an incentive for BellSouth to give worse service, in order to suppress CLEC volumes. ➤ Estimating, and even defining, disparate transactions for interval measures is arbitrary (see Rows 2 and 4) ➤ Even if a method is established for counting "disparate transactions," there is no basis for setting a per-transaction remedy amount (see Rows 5-6).
2	Quantifying disparate transactions	➤ Counts number of disparate transactions and pays penalties on those ➤ For Party Measures, the most direct and logical approach: ○ Alter the most damaging "out-of-parity" situations first ○ Alter next most damaging until "parity" is achieved ➤ Corrects transactions having greatest potential customer impact first, before correcting those having lesser potential impact ➤ For Benchmark Measures, the disparate transactions are simply the number of additional transactions that must be changed for the better to meet the benchmark.	CLECs DISAGREE. ➤ Any definition of disparate transactions for mean (interval) measures is inherently arbitrary. ➤ Consider a single cell in which ten CLEC customers receive a service in a mean of 4.0 hours. If the goal is to reduce the mean to 3.0 hours, that could be accomplished by reducing all ten service times by 25% each or, perhaps, by reducing one service time by 10 hours, for example, from 15 hours to 5 hours. Is there one disparate transaction, or are there ten? ➤ Similarly, suppose that "zeroing out" cell A (with 5 CLEC transactions) or Cell B (with 10 CLEC transactions) would each increase truncated Z by the same amount. What is the basis for giving one cell precedence over the other?

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
3	Interpolation for Total Affected Volume	> All transactions in final cell may not need to be altered for "parity" > Appropriate action: interpolate to bring sub-metric into "parity"	> CLECs AGREE.

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
4	Parity Point versus Detection Point	BellSouth is obligated to pay penalties under SEEM only up to the point necessary to achieve "parity" of service for CLECs.	➤ CLECs DISAGREE. ➤ The repeated use of the word "parity" in the BST reasoning for Rows 3 and 4 clearly support using the parity point, not the detection point. In Row 4, BellSouth states that it "is obligated to pay ... only up to the point necessary to achieve 'parity' of service." The point where parity is achieved for the observed data is where the truncated Z statistic equals 0. ➤ The CLECs recognize that the magnitude of disparity between service processes is measured with uncertainty. The statistical tests allow for this uncertainty in making the compliance determination. Consequently, BellSouth may be found in compliance even though the observed service for CLEC customers is inferior to that for BellSouth's customers. ➤ However, once performance has been determined to be in violation, the goal should be to estimate the magnitude of disparity in the process. By various principles, disparity should be estimated relative to the parity point and not the detection point ➤ In general, statisticians estimate a quantity in a population (or process) by the corresponding quantity in a sample. For this application, that means estimating the magnitude of disparity in the process by the size of the observed disparity (i.e., relative to the parity point). In contrast, measuring disparity relative to the detection point yields a very biased estimate. ➤ BellSouth's proposed method, results in estimating disparate transactions by a lower confidence limit for that quantity. While the lower confidence limit may correspond to the truth some of the time, that argument would be equally valid in favor of using the upper confidence limit (equidistant from the parity point on the other side).
5	Amounts per transaction	➤ Current transaction-based fees in other states:	➤ CLECs DISAGREE.

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		- o Outdated - o Continued use is unwarranted and inefficient - o Resulted from evidence presented to GPSC in 2000 - o Developed with much less CLEC activity - o Fee schedule artificially high, although thought to be too low initially - o Penalty amount/transaction – excessive relative to typical rate for service - o Artificially high fee schedule compounded with increased CLEC activity cause transaction-based payment to scale too high. - o Existing and new plans require BST to provide CLECs better service in the aggregate than retail in order to eliminate penalty payments because: - o Performance for each CLEC is compared to BST's average performance across a geographic area - o Contrary to intent of SEEM > A more rationale fee schedule reduces the effect of this occurrence while still deterring backsliding very effectively. > More in line with rebates in commercial transactions where performance guarantees are provided	> BellSouth proposes to set amounts that purport to compensate CLECs for harm suffered from BellSouth's sub-party service. The CLECs disagree with this basis for setting amounts per transaction. > Instead, CLECs believe that final remedy amounts need to be set at levels that provide effective incentives to improve service to CLEC customers. BellSouth's standard fee schedule is very likely to generate remedies that could be treated as costs of doing business as usual. This Commission has recognized that payments to the CLECs are a crucial aspect of the plan. Additionally, this Commission has previously concluded that "it is arguable that payments to ALECs under our plan do not even fall within the realm of "liquidated damages" .. but, instead, are a mechanism to level the competitive playing field when BellSouth does not, or cannot, meet the benchmarks" (Page 122 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP dated September 10, 2001) > The standard fee schedule also falls far short, even as compensation for damages suffered > Many types of expenses/costs are experienced by the CLEC when BellSouth fails to perform as required. For example, a missed appointment can cause the CLEC to have to re-negotiate with its customer, possibly supplement its service order, and potentially re-schedule its own personnel for the new due date. OSS failures can cause labor-intensive, costly workarounds or total roadblocks that keep other metrics from even being implicated because orders cannot move forward. These types of substantial costs are ignored in BellSouth's proposal. Remedies need to be at a level where BellSouth will have the incentive to expend capital or add to its labor costs to keep orders flowing smoothly toward completion > Customers may be lost before they are even installed. Revenue losses may correspond to

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
6	“High Performance” / “Standard Performance” / “Low Performance” Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology (Tier 1) Section 4.3.1.4: <u>If BellSouth’s performance in the current month should exceed the baseline level by three standard deviations, no Tier-1 payment will apply for any CLEC in that month.</u> Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology (Tier 2) Section 4.3.2.2: <u>If BellSouth’s performance, as measured by the average percent of submetrics met for the three months used to determine whether Tier 2 applies in the current data month, exceeds the baseline performance by three standard deviations, no Tier-2 payment will apply for any CLEC in the current data month.</u>	Implements new anti-backsliding mechanism - Two fee schedules proposed - New standard fee schedule - Low performance schedule - Will apply if performance materially deteriorates from current levels - Same as fee schedule currently in all other transaction-based SEEMs for BellSouth - Allay any concerns that Proposed SEEM is too soft to deter backsliding - If performance deteriorates by a statistically significant degree from baseline, then fees increase dramatically - Permits BellSouth to avoid penalties w/ statistically significant improvement in overall performance.	multiple years of service, and this revenue may not just be from POTS type services but more enhanced applications and long distance services In addition, word of mouth from these departing customers may chill the CLECs market growth as well - BellSouth’s proposed fee schedule is completely inadequate when compared to other states, with large gaps even in Month 1 and exponential gaps by Month 6 (See Attachment A). - Also see Row 44 of CLEC non-technical matrix. - For submetrics that are out of parity, BellSouth’s proposal is very likely to underestimate the number of disparate transactions. In some cases, the statistical test will fail to trigger a violation Even when performance is found to be in violations, BellSouth’s proposal to measure disparate transactions only up to the detection point would most often lead to an underestimate Larger amounts per transaction are needed to compensate for these two sources of underestimation CLECs DISAGREE. - BellSouth’s proposal permits it to discriminate in targeted measurement areas and against individual CLECs with impunity. - Assuming that service performance stayed at the same level as in recent months, CLECs believe that remedies based on the proposed Standard Performance fee schedule would be greatly reduced from current levels. CLECs do not believe that BellSouth’s current performance warrants such a change, as even current levels of payments have been insufficient to improve performance. - The proposed method for selecting which fee schedule to use in any month is seriously flawed

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Need example showing how this will work for each possible combination: Benchmark/Parity/Mean/Proportion.	- Professed role of SEEM: provide another mechanism to deter backsliding in performance - SEEM is not the only means available CLECs to address performance problems with BellSouth. Other mechanisms also exist to address backsliding: - Complaints to federal and state commissions - Monitoring by those same commissions - Contract provisions - Court actions - Facts show that there has been no backsliding under the current SEEM - Provision requires SEEM fee schedule to revert to a much more punitive fee schedule, consistent with the levels applicable in current transaction-based plans SEEM if performance deteriorates materially. - New positive Additional incentive relieves BST of payments if a material improvement in overall performance occurs - To improve performance - To partially compensate for the risk of reverting to fee schedule used currently for other transaction-based plans - Existing plan requires BST to provide CLECs better service in the aggregate than retail in order to eliminate penalty payments because: Performance for each CLEC is compared to BST's average performance across a geographic area - Contrary to intent of SEEM This mechanism puts a limit on this occurrence if performance improves significantly.	- Most important, the measure of compliance is far too general—lumping together all measure domains and products. As such, it may easily miss performance deterioration in selected areas that proves devastating to individual CLECs. Alternatively, BellSouth's proposed methodology might trigger the High Performance fee schedule—where no remedies are paid—even though performance has not improved in areas critical to CLECs. - These concerns are far from hypothetical because it is BellSouth that controls where it focuses its efforts to improve, or not, performance for CLEC customers - Furthermore, the methodology is flawed because it relies on the SQM submetrics and the SQM statistical tests, which do not disaggregate to cells for making like-to-like comparisons or use the balancing critical value. These differences mean that the methodology could easily miss a substantial decline in SEEM compliance that does not appear in SQM tests. - Finally, CLECs disagree with using 12 current months as the standard for calibrating future performance. The benchmarks and analogs established by the Commission should be used to determine compliance, not BellSouth's historical performance.
7	Disaggregation	- The disaggregation for SEEM should be different from the SQM so that the statistical methodology can function according to design - Report Structure changed to eliminate categories with little or no volume, resulting in data that should be more concise and meaningful. For example, >=10 lines/circuits virtually never has any data in the reports. These low volumes render the measure virtually useless to evaluate	CLECs DISAGREE. - The SEEM disaggregation must balance two concerns: maintaining adequate volumes at the submetric level while not aggregating heterogeneous products that can mask discrimination. BellSouth's proposed disaggregation goes too far in aggregating distinct products and services. - The CLECs recognize that many submetrics in

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		performance. ➤ The products in the low volume disaggregations will continue to be included in the results. They will simply be part of another category instead of reported separately. ➤ Cell structure, as defined by wire Center, dispatched, service-type, # of circuits as previously agreed upon by BellSouth and the CLECs ensures like-to-like comparisons ➤ Truncated-z statistical methodology as previously developed jointly by BellSouth and CLECs permits aggregation of these cells into submetrics to improve validity of results without masking poor performance. ➤ Recent testing of truncated z methodology by CLECs confirmed that mechanism does permit cell aggregation without masking as designed. ➤ The level of disaggregation should allow for a statistically meaningful number of transactions in each submetric ➤ Because Tier 1 penalties are calculated by individual CLEC, with too much disaggregation, the spread of transactions across cells means the vast majority of cells show little or no activity.	the current SEEM disaggregation have little or no volume for some CLECs. Small volumes are undesirable because they increase both Type I and Type II error rates. Consequently, the current disaggregation may require some modification. ➤ It is equally important to avoid combining submetrics in ways that allow masking discrimination, which can happen if BellSouth provides discriminatory service for some product(s) but parity or better service for other product(s) combined into the same submetrics ➤ Paragraph 6 of the BST Reasoning, which refers to recent testing of the truncated z methodology, contains several mischaracterizations of that effort. First, the work was joint with BellSouth, with only BellSouth and its consultants having access to the raw data. Second, the analysis found numerous instances of systematic heterogeneity, i.e., cases where the performance received by CLECs (relative to parity) was significantly better for one group of cells (e.g., dispatch) than for another (e.g., non-dispatch). Third, the analysis used data from Louisiana, where volumes were generally low, so it may not have uncovered problems that exist in Florida. In particular, there was almost no opportunity to look for heterogeneity among products ➤ Disaggregation should allow for like-to-like comparisons. The current set of submetrics facilitates accurate comparisons of results to expected performance. However, BellSouth's proposal does not. For example, BellSouth proposes UNE Loops be combined in the Order Completion Interval Measure, despite differences in the standard offered interval based on type of loop and volume ordered. (See Attachment B) And BellSouth's own performance reports confirm significant differences in intervals between dispatch and non-dispatch orders. (For example, the Florida

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
8	Degree of Escalation	> Tier 1 fee amounts would only escalate in month 2 > Tier 1 fees were designed to be liquidated damages – no reason to conclude that damages continue to escalate each month. > CLECs would continue to receive payments at the increased Month 2 level if the condition persists. > Tier 2 penalties, which were designed to be punitive, apply beginning in month 3 > More fully utilizes the Tier 2 mechanism, which was designed to address cases of persistent metric failures	MSS Report for September for the OCI measure for 2 wire analog lop design reports an interval of 9.92 days for dispatch and 4.6 days for non-dispatch) Clearly dispatch orders use difference processes and different personnel and so should be evaluated separately. > Referring to disaggregation for penalty assessment, this Commission has previously concluded, "We find that this product reaggregation is inappropriate for penalty determination. We find BellSouth product disaggregation for compliance purposes shall match what we have approved for product reporting purposes." (See page 102 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP dated September 10, 2001.) > CLECs DISAGREE. > Escalation for repeated violations serves to focus remedies on submetrics most in need of attention. > Tier 1 fees were not designed by the Commission to be liquidated damages. (See response in Row 5 above) > The current SEEM fee schedule includes six months of escalation, with penalties for a sixth violation reaching approximately three times the base amount. > Despite that provision, chronic violations continue to occur for various submetrics. > Consequently, it would be a mistake to dilute the period or magnitude of escalation from the current levels. The CLEC's proposed escalation factors maintain this incentive. > <i>See Attachment A</i> for magnitude of escalation in other states.

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
9	To pay or not to pay for only 1 failed month Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1.7 Tier-1 Enforcement mechanisms - for any two consecutive months as calculated by BellSouth. Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology Section 4.3.1: Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms will be triggered . . . in a given month for two (2) consecutive months	Situation more likely problematic when volumes are low - Currently, due to excessive disaggregation - Still to some extent in Tier 1 for proposed plan Does not represent discriminatory practice Some failures are anomalies: - No systemic changes required to address failures - Random occurrences: - temporary random system malfunction - random human error - No corrective action can be taken - Neither predictable nor preventable - Penalty clearly inconsistent with objectives of SEEM Assessing penalties based on a single-month failure equates statistical significance with materiality - Only deals in probabilities and not certainties - Depends on inputs for certain materiality parameters such as Delta, Psi and Epsilon - Only identify statistically significance - Cannot determine actual materiality - Virtually removes likelihood of assessing remedies for random occurrences. Proposed for each Domain, where such timeliness and accuracy are measured: 1 measure of timeliness 1 measure of accuracy Measures of some intermediate processes were removed - Little, if any, customer effect - Any significant customer effect would likely be reflected in other measures	CLECs DISAGREE. Requiring two consecutive months of violations before any remedy payments occur destroys the concept of balancing error probabilities. Doing so increases the probability that no remedy payment will occur given that a material difference exists, while decreasing the probability that a payment will occur given that the processes are in parity. See Action Item 3 of CLEC filing dated October 11, 2004.
10	Measured to be included in SEEM		CLECs DISAGREE. - Please see CLEC response to rows 45 – 66 of non-technical matrix for each specific metric Additionally, CLECs note that this Commission has previously found that both directly customer affecting measures e.g. missed appointments, as well as process metrics such as FOCs and rejections which are “critical to ALECs in providing quality service in a timely manner” are appropriate for the enforcement mechanisms. (See page 94 of Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP dated September 10, 2001.

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
11	Delta Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1.6: Delta - ... For individual CLECs submeteries the Delta value shall be <u>determined using Ford's Delta Function as ordered by the Florida Public Service Commission</u>. 1.0 and for the CLEC aggregate the Delta value shall be 0.5.	> Single delta value - o Tier 1 of 1.0 - o Tier 2 of 0.5 > Current delta function: - o Initially proposed by Z-Tel's economist Dr Ford - o To address adjustment to the statistical balancing methodology - o Dr. Ford introduced some confusion about several key hypothesis testing issues (1) statistical hypothesis test's significance level (2) interpretation of a "balanced" hypothesis test (3) reasons for using "balancing" in SEEM plan > No need for "fix" of Dr. Ford's delta function - o No reason to conclude serious flaws are in the balancing methodology - o No indication of problem initially alleged by Dr. Ford in all 7 of BST's states with single delta value > Use of delta function introduces additional variables - o Requiring subjective exercise in determining values - o Probably creates more problems than it solves.	> CLECs DISAGREE. > Dr. George Ford introduced the delta function in order to simultaneously address two problems associated with using a fixed delta value for balancing high Type I and Type II error probabilities for submetrics with low CLEC volumes and exorbitant balancing critical values for submetrics with high CLEC volumes. The delta function mitigates both problems. > While addressing the low volume problem, BellSouth's proposal to use a fixed critical value of 1.0 makes the high volume problem much worse > If a fixed value of delta is chosen, it should be set to correspond to the minimum disparity producing a "material" obstacle to competition In his testimony during Florida's 2001 performance measurement hearings, Dr. Robert Bell illustrated that a delta value of 1.0 corresponded with extreme disparities going far beyond any notion of a minimal material obstacle. For example, if BellSouth misses 5 percent of appointments for its own customers, a delta value of 1.0 corresponds to a material disparity occurring when 44 percent of appointments are missed for CLEC customers (See Direct Testimony of Robert M Bell, Ph.D., Docket 000121-TP, March 1, 2001).

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
<u>12</u>	Appendix C: Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.5: Trimming	- Originated in Louisiana Workshop in 1999 - CLEC volumes and distributions were much smaller than they are now - Distributional differences no longer a factor - Requires each observation to be discarded be examined to determine if true business reason exists for discarding this real data - Defeats Self Effectuating aspect of SEEM plan.	CLECs DISAGREE. - The CLECs recognize that the current algorithm for trimming may result in deleting an inappropriately large fraction of ILEC observations in some instances - However, extreme ILEC observations, whether erroneous or valid, can have undue influence on the modified Z statistic. - The current trimming procedure was designed to provide an automated method for protecting against outliers. - CLECs disagree with unilateral elimination of trimming but welcome the opportunity to jointly develop a simple, self effectuating procedure that protects all parties.
<u>13</u>	Appendix D: Statistical Formulas and Technical Descriptions Beginning on page 101 Revised Section D to incorporate the change from measurement-based plan to a transaction based plan and to change from the floating delta approach, based on the Ford delta function, a fixed delta of 1.0 for Tier 1 and 0.5 for Tier 2. See Exhibit B, Appendix D.	Section D has been substantially revised to reflect the change from a per-measurement based SEEM plan to a per-transaction based SEEM plan. Therefore, the entire section is shown in red	CLECs DISAGREE. - See previous rows.
<u>14</u>	Appendix C: Statistical Properties and Definitions Section C: The statistical process for testing whether BellSouth's (BST) wholesale customers (alternative local exchange carriers or <u>CLEC-ALECs</u>) are being treated equally with BST's retail customers involves more than a simple mathematical formula. Three key elements need to be considered before an appropriate decision process can be developed. These are the type of: - data - comparison - performance This section describes the properties of a test methodology and the truncated Z statistic for four two types of measures.	This change reflects the fact that BellSouth's proposal does not include rate or ratio measures and to correct ALEC to read CLEC.	CLECs DISAGREE - CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix).
<u>15</u>	Appendix C: Statistical Properties and Definitions Section C 1 Necessary Properties for a Test Methodology Once the key elements are determined, a test methodology should be developed that complies with the following properties:	Changed to reflect the removal of the trimming of data in the process. See rationale below for Appendix C, section C 1.5.	CLECs DISAGREE. - See Row 12.

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response		
	• Like-to-Like Comparisons • Aggregate Level Test Statistic • Production Mode Process • Balancing • Timing				
<u>16</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.1 Like-to-Like Comparisons When possible, data should be compared at appropriate levels, e.g. wire center, time of month, dispatched residential, new orders. The testing process should: • Identify variables that may affect the performance measure • Record these important confounding covariates • Adjust for the observed covariates in order to remove potential biases and to make the <u>CLEC ALEC</u> and the ILEC units as comparable as possible.	Correction	> CLECs AGREE.		
<u>17</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.2 Aggregate Level Test Statistic Each performance measure of interest should be summarized by one overall test statistic giving the decision maker a rule that determines whether a statistically significant difference exists. The test statistic should have the following properties: • The method should provide a single overall index on a standard scale. • If entries in comparison cells are exactly proportional over a covariate, the aggregated index should be very nearly the same as if comparisons on the covariate had not been done. • The contribution of each comparison cell should depend on the number of observations in the cell • Cancellation between comparison cells should be limited. • The index should be a continuous function of the observations	Correction	> CLECs AGREE.		
<u>18</u>	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.1.6 Measurement Types The performance measurements that will undergo testing are of four two types: mean, ratio, and proportion, and rate. All four Both have similar characteristics. Different types of data are used to calculate them. Table C-1 shows the type of data that is used to derive each measurement type Table C-1: Measurements Types and Data <table><tr><th>Measurement</th><th>Data Used to</th></tr></table>	Measurement	Data Used to	These changes reflect the fact that there are no rate or ratio measures in BellSouth's proposed SEEM plan. There are no ratio measures in the existing SEEM plan either	> CLECs DISAGREE > CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix)
Measurement	Data Used to				

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change				BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Type		Derive Measure			
	Mean	Interval	Interval	measurements		
	Ratio	Counts	Counts			
	Proportion	Rate	Rate			
19	Appendix C: Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2 Testing Methodology—The Truncated Z: The calculation of the Truncated Z statistic is described in Appendix A of the "Louisiana Statistician's Report." The methodology described in this document is the same as that described in the "Statistician's Report," however, this document contains extra technical details to avoid undefined situations when programming the technique. In summary, many covariates are chosen in order to provide meaningful comparison levels below the sub-metric level chosen for the parity comparison. This includes such factors as wire center and time of month, as well as order type for provisioning measures. In each comparison cell, a Z statistic is calculated. The form of the Z statistic may vary depending on the performance measure, but it should be distributed approximately as a standard normal, with mean zero and variance equal to one. Assuming that the test statistic is derived so that it is negative when the performance for the CLEC ALEC is worse than for the ILEC, a positive truncation is done - i.e. if the result is negative it is left alone, if the result is positive it is changed to zero. A weighted average of the truncated statistics is calculated where a cell's weight depends on the volume of BST and CLEC ALEC orders in the cell. The weighted average is standardized by the subtracting the theoretical mean of the truncated distribution, and this is divided by the standard error of the weighted sum. Summaries based on measurement type are given for the calculation of the cell Z statistic.				These changes are added to make minor corrections and to delete the discussion concerning the Louisiana study, which is not necessary for an understanding of the statistical methodology.	> CLECs AGREE, BASED ON AGREEMENT AT NOVEMBER 8-9, 2004 WORKSHOP TO CHANGE THE FINAL INSTANCE OF "WEIGHTED SUM" TO "WEIGHTED AVERAGE."
20	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C 2 1 Mean Measures For mean measures, an adjusted, asymmetric t statistic is calculated for each like-to-like cell that has at least seven BST and seven CLEC ALEC transactions. This statistic is an adjustment to the modified z statistic in order to make the				These changes are added for clarification purposes and to delete the discussion concerning the Louisiana study, which is not necessary for the understanding of the statistical methodology	> CLECs AGREE.

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
21	assumption that the statistic is approximately normally distributed more reasonable even for fairly small sample sizes. The adjusted, asymmetric t statistic is part of the methodology described in the "Statistician's Report," and it has been documented for the statistical community in the August 2001 issue of The American Statistician, a peer review statistics journal. The statistic was created for mean performance measure parity tests in order to reduce the number of permutation tests needed for calculating cell statistics. Several sets of BST/CLEC mean measure data from Louisiana were examined in order to determine when the adjustment results give approximately the same results as a permutation test. The result is that a permutation test is used when one or both of the BST and CLEC ALEC sample sizes is less than seven. The adjusted, asymmetric t statistic and the permutation calculation are described below in Appendix D, Statistical Formulas and Technical Description Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2.2 Proportion Measures For performance measures that are calculated as a proportion, in each adjustment cell, the cell Z and the moments for the truncated cell Z can be calculated in a direct manner. In adjustment cells where proportions are not close to zero or one, and where the sample sizes are reasonably large ($n_{ij}(1-p_{ij}) > 9$), a normal approximation can be used. In this case, the moments for the truncated Z come directly from properties of the standard normal distribution. If the normal approximation is not appropriate, then the Z statistic is calculated from the hypergeometric distribution. <u>Is the exact permutation distribution</u>—In this case, the moments of the truncated Z are calculated exactly using the hypergeometric probabilities.	These changes are added for clarification purposes.	> CLECs AGREE.
22	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C.2.3 Rate Measures The truncated Z methodology for rate measures has the same general structure for calculating the Z in each cell as proportion measures. For the rate measure customer trouble report rate there are a fixed number of access lines in service for the ALEC, b2j, and a fixed number for BST, b1j. The modeling assumption is that the occurrence of a trouble is independent between access lines, and the number of troubles in b access	This proposed deletion of the existing language reflects the fact that there are no rate measures in BellSouth's proposed SEEM plan.	> CLECs DISAGREE > CLECs do not agree with the deletion of all rate measures from SEEM (e.g., see Row 62 of the non-technical matrix).

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SEEM Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	lines follows a Poisson distribution with mean b where is the probability of a trouble per 1 access line and $b (= b_1j + b_2j)$ is the total number of access lines in service. The exact permutation distribution for this situation is the binomial distribution (the limit for the hypergeometric distribution) that is based on the total number of BST and ALEC troubles, n , and the proportion of BST access lines in service, $qj = b_1j/b$.		
	In an adjustment cell, if the number of ALEC troubles is greater than 15 and the number of BST troubles is greater than 15, and $njqj(1-qj) > 9$, then a normal approximation can be used. In this case, the moments of the truncated Z come directly from properties of the standard normal distribution. Otherwise, if there are very few troubles, the number of ALEC troubles can be modeled using a binomial distribution with n equal to the total number of troubles (ALEC plus BST troubles.) In this case, the moments for the truncated Z are calculated explicitly using the binomial distribution.		
23	Appendix C Statistical Properties and Definitions C 2.4 Ratio Measures The current plan contains no measures that call for the use of a Z -parity statistic.	This change reflects the fact that there are no ratio measures in either the existing or the proposed SEEM plan.	> CLECs AGREE.

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 1 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed ¹ Month 1	GA - Month 1	TX ² – Month 1	NJ ³ – Month 1	MI ⁴ – Month 1
Pre-Ordering	\$10	\$20	\$25 (Low)	Per Measure	\$75
Ordering	\$20	\$40	\$25 (Low)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$80	\$25 (Low)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – Resale	\$45	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – UNE	\$95	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning – UNE-P	\$40	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$95 (from UNE)	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair – Resale	\$45	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair UNE	\$35	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Maintenance and Repair UNEP	\$25	\$400	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
LNP	\$95	\$150	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Billing – BIA	\$.02 of adjusted amount	\$1 00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$5	\$1.00	\$25 (Low)	Per Measure	\$75
IC Trunks	\$25	\$100	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75
Collocation	\$3,640	\$5,000	Escalates based on # of days late.	\$75 (Moderate)	Escalates based on # of days late.
Service Order Accuracy	\$20	\$50	\$150 (High)	\$75 (Moderate)	\$75

¹ Month 1 “Per Affected Item” would not apply unless the same measure was also missed in Month 2.

² The Texas transaction based plan categorizes each measurement as Low, Medium or High.

³ The New Jersey plan assesses a transaction amount based on the severity of the miss. The severity amounts are deemed Minor, Moderate or Major

⁴ The Michigan plan is largely based on the Texas plan, however, all transactions were set at the Medium level

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 2 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 2	GA - Month 2	TX – Month 2	NJ – Month 2	MI – Month 2
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$30	\$50 (Low)	Per Measure	\$150
Ordering	\$25	\$50	\$50 (Low)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$90	\$50 (Low)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning – Resale	\$56	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$450	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
LNP	\$95	\$250	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Billing – BIA	\$ 025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$50 (Low)	Per Measure	\$150
IC Trunks	\$25	\$125	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$150 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$250 (High)	\$150 (Moderate)	\$150

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 3 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 3	GA - Month 3	TX – Month 3	NJ – Month 3	MI – Month 3
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$40	\$100 (Low)	Per Measure	\$300
Ordering	\$25	\$60	\$100 (Low)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$100	\$100 (Low)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning – Resale	\$56	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
LNP	\$95	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Billing – BIA	\$ 025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$100 (Low)	Per Measure	\$300
IC Trunks	\$25	\$175	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$225 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$500 (High)	\$225 (Moderate)	\$300

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 4 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 4	GA - Month 4	TX – Month 4	NJ – Month 4	MI – Month 4
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$50	\$200 (Low)	Per Measure	\$400
Ordering	\$25	\$70	\$200 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$110	\$200 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning – Resale	\$56	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$550	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
LNP	\$95	\$600	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1 00	\$200 (Low)	Per Measure	\$400
IC Trunks	\$25	\$250	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$600 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$400

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 5 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 5	GA - Month 5	TX – Month 5	NJ – Month 5	MI – Month 5
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$60	\$300 (Low)	Per Measure	\$500
Ordering	\$25	\$80	\$300 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$120	\$300 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$650	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
LNP	\$95	\$700	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1 00	\$300 (Low)	Per Measure	\$500
IC Trunks	\$25	\$325	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$700 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$500

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Month 6 – Tier 1

Performance Measurement (Based on GA / BST proposed plan)	BellSouth Proposed Month 6	GA - Month 6	TX – Month 6	NJ – Month 6	MI – Month 6
Pre-Ordering	\$13	\$70	\$400 (Low)	Per Measure	\$600
Ordering	\$25	\$90	\$400 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Ordering - Flow Through	NA	\$130	\$400 (Low)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning –Resale	\$56	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning – UNE	\$119	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning - UNEP	\$50	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Provisioning UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$119 (from UNE)	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$56	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - UNE	\$44	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Maintenance and Repair - UNEP	\$31	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
LNP	\$95	\$800	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Billing – BIA	\$.025 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	Per Measure	NA
Billing - BIT	\$7	\$1.00	\$400 (Low)	Per Measure	\$600
IC Trunks	\$25	\$500	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600
Collocation	\$4,550	\$5,000	See Month 1 rate	\$300 (Moderate)	See Month 1 rate
Service Order Accuracy	\$25	\$50	\$800 (High)	\$300 (Moderate)	\$600

Transaction Based Plan Comparison

Tier 2 Measures

Performance Measurement	BellSouth Proposed Tier 2	Georgia Tier 2	Texas Tier 2	Michigan Tier 2
OSS/Pre-Ordering	\$15	\$20	\$300 (Medium)	\$300
Ordering	\$30	\$60	\$300 (Medium)	\$300
Ordering - Flow Through	\$30	\$100	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - Resale	\$68	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - UNE	\$143	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning - UNE-P	\$60	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Provisioning-UNE (Coordinated Customer Conversions)	\$143 (from UNE)	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair - Resale	\$68	\$300	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair-UNE	\$53	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Maintenance and Repair-UNEP	\$38	\$875	\$500 (High)	\$300
Billing - BIA	\$.03 of adjusted amount	\$1.00	NA	\$300
Billing - BIT	\$8	\$1.00	NA	\$300
LNP	\$143	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$300
IC Trunks	\$38	\$500	\$500 (High)	\$300
Collocation	\$5,460	\$15,000	Escalates Based on the # of days late.	Escalates Based on the # of days late
Change Management	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$200 (Low) / \$75,000 (High per Measure)	\$300
Service Order Accuracy	\$30	\$50	\$200 (Low)	\$300

BELLSOUTH
Local Ordering Handbook

Section 8
Interval Guide

LSOG6 / ELMS6

Release 16.0 / Version 16.0C
Posting Date September 17, 2004

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Docket 000121A
CLEC Response to Technical Matrix
November 15, 2004
Attachment B

DDD Calculation

1. For LSRs submitted electronically and qualifying for flow-through/electronic processing, the CLEC should reflect the standard interval as the desired due date (DDD).
2. The LCSC will apply the standard interval as follows:
 - (a) When DDD is less than the standard interval, BellSouth® will apply the standard interval.
 - (b) When the DDD is equal to or greater than the standard interval, BellSouth® will apply the DDD as shown on the LSR.
3. In all cases, a later due date than the standard interval may be requested by the CLEC and indicated in the DDD field of the LSR.
4. When a targeted LSR processing interval is listed on the interval chart, it should be added to the standard interval when calculating the DDD. (See UNE interval table.)
5. Intervals are based on business days, excluding Saturdays for business lines and Sunday and holidays for all lines.

Unbundled Network Element (UNE) Interval Table

Line Type	Loop Range	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Interval	Targeted DDD
Unbundled Loops				
2 Wire analog voice grade loop non-designed (SL1) CHC Does Not = Y	1 - 9	3 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	5 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire analog voice grade loop non-designed (SL1) CHC = Y	1 - 9	4 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	6 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire analog voice grade loop designed (SL2)	1 - 9	4 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	6 business days	3 business days	---
---	15-30	8 business days	3 business days	Y
---	31+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

BellSouth Local Ordering Handbook
Section 8 – Interval Guide

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
4 Wire analog voice grade loop	1 - 9	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 - 14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
2 Wire ISDN digital loop	1-5	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	12 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Universal Digital Channel (UDC)	1-5	10 business days	See Assumption #5	---
---	6-14	12 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
4 Wire 2.4, 4.8, 9.6, 19.2, 56 or 64 Kbps digital loop	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1 Loop	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS3 /STS1* Loop	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Dark Fiber	1-14	30 business days	2 days	N
	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Share without loop modification	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Share with loop modification	1 - 4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	Y
---	5 - 9 TNs	16 business days	Negotiated	Y
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Line Share with Loop Modification answered with: Pair Change, Pair Change with Line Station Transfer (LST)	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Splitting	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Line Splitting without loop modification	1-4 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Share DLEC Owned & BellSouth Owned Splitter	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Share DLEC Owned & BellSouth Owned Splitter with Loop modification	1-4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	16 business days	See assumption #5	See assumption #5
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Splitting DLEC Owned & BellSouth Owned Splitter	1-9 TNs	2 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	10+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
RS (Remote Site) HFS Unbundled Line Splitting DLEC Owned & BellSouth Owned Splitter with Loop modification	1-4 TNs	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5-9 TNs	16 business days	See assumption #5	See assumption #5

BellSouth Local Ordering Handbook
Section 8 – Interval Guide

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
ADSL-2 Wire asymmetrical digital subscriber line loop without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
ADSL-2 Wire asymmetrical digital subscriber line loop with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
HDSL-2 Wire & 4 Wire high bit rate digital subscriber line loop without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
HDSL-2 Wire & 4 Wire high bit rate digital subscriber line loop with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Designed without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Designed with modification*	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Loop - Non-Designed without modification*	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y



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November 15, 2004

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms Blanca Bayó, Director
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Room 110, Easley Building
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re Docket No 000121A-TP

Dear Ms Bayó

Attached please find the CLEC Coalition's Response to Staff's "Technical" matrix in the above-referenced docket Pursuant to the Commission's Electronic Filing Requirements, this version should be considered the official copy for purposes of the docket file Copies of this document will be served on all parties via electronic and U S Mail

Thank you for your assistance with this filing

Sincerely yours,

s/ Tracy W Hatch

Tracy W Hatch

TWH/scd
Attachment
cc Parties of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the CLEC's Reply was served by

U S Mail this 15th day of November 2004 to the following

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*BellSouth Local Ordering Handbook
Section 8 – Interval Guide*

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Unbundled Copper Loop - Non-Designed with modification	1-5	11 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	16 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Set-up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Set-up (LCSC)	1+	1 business day	See Assumption #5	---
Unbundled Network Terminating Wire* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1+	1 business day	See Assumption #5	---
Loop Concentration (inside plant)				
Unbundled Loop Concentration (ULC) System*	1	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Sub Loops (outside plant)				
Unbundled Sub Loop Feeder	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Copper Sub Loop	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-loop Distribution* Set-up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-Loop Distribution* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1 - 5	3 business days	See Assumption 5	---
---	6 - 14	5 business days	3 Business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	---
Unbundled Sub-loop - INC* Set-Up (Outside Plant)	1+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Sub-Loop INC* Activation of Pairs (LCSC)	1 - 5	3 business days	See Assumption 5	---
---	6 - 14	5 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	---
Network Interface Device (NID)				
NID	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---

*BellSouth Local Ordering Handbook
Section 8 – Interval Guide*

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted ESR Processing Interval	Project Managed
---	6-10	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	11+	10 business days	5 business days	---
Non-Channelized Transport				
Local Channel DS1*	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
Local Channel DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Dedicated interoffice 2 wire/4 wire voice grade	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Dedicated interoffice DS0	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Dedicated interoffice DS1	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
Dedicated interoffice DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Channelized Transport				
Unbundled Channelization (MUX) DS1*	1-5	20 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	22 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y

BellSouth Local Ordering Handbook
Section 8 – Interval Guide

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Unbundled Channelization (MUX) DS3 / STS1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Local Switching (Port)				
2 Wire analog line port (Reqtyp F)	1-10	3 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	11-25	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	25+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Enhanced Extended Links (EELs)				
Voice Grade 2 Wire/4 Wire EELs	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DSO EELs	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1 EELs	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
DS1 EELs Georgia and Kentucky	1-14 circuits	7 business days	See assumption #5	---
DS3/STS-1 EELs*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Conversion of existing UNE-L to UNE-E (Bulk)				
EELS (Voice)	2-99	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Conversion of existing tariffed services to UNE services, including EELs				
A Spreadsheet DS1 & below, no mixed bandwidth	15 +	37 business days		Y
Verification		7 business days		
Order Issuance		30 business	30 business days	

Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSP Processing Interval	Project Manager
		days	Assumes a verified spreadsheet	
B Spreadsheet DS3 & above or mixed bandwidth	15+	Negotiable	Negotiable	Y
C Non-spreadsheet	1-14	12 business days		N
Verification		7 business days		
Order Issuance		5 business days	5 business days	
Non Switch Combinations (NSCs)				
Voice Grade 2 wire/4 wire	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DSO	1-5	5 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	7 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
DS1	1-4	10 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	5+	14 business days + 1 business day for each additional circuit above 5	3 business days	---
DS3/STS-1*	1-5	25 business days	See assumption #5	---
---	6-14	27 business days	3 business days	---
---	15 +	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Dedicated Transport (UDI)				
Open AIN (OAIN)				
OAIN tool kit*	1	45 calendar days	10 calendar days	---
OAIN service management system*	1	45 calendar days	10 calendar days	---
CCS7 Signaling Transport Service				
A-Link signaling	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
D-Link signaling	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
STP-signaling transfer point	1	60 business days	12 business days	---
O/S and D/A UNEs				

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Product	Quantity	Standard Interval	Targeted LSR Processing Interval	Project Managed
Directory assistance transport	1	30 calendar days	7 calendar days	---
Customized Call Routing (selective routing-LCC)				
1-5 LCC	1-5	30 calendar days	7 calendar days	---
6-25 LCC	6-25	60 calendar days	15 calendar days	---
>25 LCC	25+	Negotiated	Negotiated	Y
Unbundled Access to OSS				
Pre-order*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Order / Provisioning*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Maintenance / Repair*	1	30 calendar days	N/A	---
Access to Databases				
800 database	1	10 calendar days	3 calendar days	---
Line information database (LIDB)	1	60 calendar days	7 calendar days	---

Local Number Portability (LNP)

The Number Portability Interval Guide is used for porting telephone number(s) only. If the porting request includes loops see Unbundled Network Elements (UNE) interval table and use the interval in this table, or the UNE table, whichever is longer. If existing service rearrangement is needed see complex services interval table

The Number Portability interval table consists of the following terms and definitions:

Terms and Definitions

Term	Definition
Product	BellSouth® Product
Quantity	Numbers, or number blocks
Standard Interval	The number of days required for provisioning of the requested service type. This is the number of days from the time the service order is entered into the service order processing system until the order is completed
Targeted LSR Processing Interval	The number of days from receipt of request to processing Local Service Request (LSR)
Full Migration	Port all telephone numbers on end user account
Partial Migration	Port some telephone numbers, leave some telephone numbers, and/or disconnect some telephone numbers

CCA Official Filing

8/27/2004 2:35 PM*****

ORIGINAL**Matilda Sanders***1

Matilda Sanders

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 Sent: Friday, August 27, 2004 2:31 PM
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 Musselwhite, Brian J - LGCRP; Ross-Bain, Martha M - LGCRP
 Subject: RE: 000121A -- CLEC Coalition Comments on BellSouth SQM



000121A

Rsp re SQM I

> Docket No. 000121A-TP -- In re: Investigation into the Establishment
 > of Operations Support system Permanent Performance Measures for
 > Incumbent Local Exchange Telecommunications Companies (BellSouth
 > track)

> Attached please find for electronic filing the CLEC Coalition's Comments into the
 matrix concerning proposed modifications to BellSouth's Performance Assessment Plan in the
 above-referenced docket. The cover letter, certificate of service and the CLEC
 Coalition's Comments are a total of 49 pages. The attached document should be considered
 the official version for purposes of the docket file.

> As indicated in the cover letter, copies of the CLEC Coalition's Comments are being
 distributed to parties via electronic (in cases where e-mail addresses are available) and
 U.S. Mail. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

<<000121A CLECs Rsp re SQM Issues Matrix__8.27.04_v6.pdf>>

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DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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August 18, 2004

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms. Blanca Bayó, Director
The Commission Clerk and Administrative Services
Room 110, Easley Building
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re Docket No 000121A-TP

Dear Ms Bayó

Pursuant to Staff's memorandum dated August 16, 2004, attached please find the CLEC Coalition's Comments into the matrix addressing proposed modifications to BellSouth's Performance Assessment Plan in the above-referenced docket Pursuant to the Commission's Electronic Filing Requirements, this version should be considered the official copy for purposes of the docket file Copies of this document will be served on all parties via electronic and U.S Mail

Thank you for your assistance with this filing

Sincerely yours,

s/ Tracy W. Hatch

Tracy W. Hatch

TWH/las
Attachment
cc. Parties of Record

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE
09415 AUG 27 5
FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

CLEC COALITION RESPONSE

August 27, 2004

BellSouth and CLEC-Proposed Florida SQM Modifications

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
SQM Introduction/Report Publication Date/Report Delivery Methods			
Introduction (BST Matrix, p 1-2)	1) Revise to update documentation references 2) Revise to more accurately define the nature of the SQM and include references to the FCC and Courts of Law 3) Add a section to address implementation schedule after a Commission order		1) CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose referring to wholesale services only (although this should not relieve BST from reporting retail performance to determine parity CLECs do not object to referring to all FL-specific orders that created the SQM and SEEM plans and revisions 2) CLECs DISAGREE. The deletions are unnecessary and in fact, not helpful, in that they eliminate useful background information regarding the nature of the SQM. The proposed additions, in addition to the deletions, do not "more accurately define the nature of the SQM", because the SQM does reflect previous FPSC Orders and is not based on a future FPSC order. Furthermore, references to the FCC and Courts of Law are not necessary, because any changes would derive from FPSC orders, as stated in the existing language 3) CLECs DISAGREE. The proposed language of the second sentence, pertaining to change of law provisions, is inaccurate and unnecessary, in that it suggests that BellSouth may cease reporting data or paying remedies if BellSouth is no longer required "to provide any UNE or UNE combination pursuant to Section 251 of the Act". This Commission's jurisdiction over the SEEM plan is based on Florida statutes designed to ensure "the development of fair and effective competition" (F S A §364 01(3)) and to preclude anticompetitive behavior (F S A §364 01(4)(g)). Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP, FPSC Docket No. 000121-TP, issued September 10, 2001, at p. 8. In addition to discouraging anti-

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			competitive behavior and encouraging fair and effective competition, in BellSouth's own words, "the purpose of the enforcement provisions of the [SEEM] plan is to prevent 'backsliding' after BellSouth obtains authority to provide interLATA service." BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Brief of the Evidence, FPSC Docket 000121-TP, filed May 31, 2001, p. 1. The FCC Order granting 271 authority in Georgia and Louisiana expressly states that the performance plan is intended to ensure that a BOC meets its 271 obligations. "In prior Orders, the [Federal Communications] Commission has explained that one factor it may consider as part of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would have adequate incentive to continue to satisfy the <u>requirements of Section 271</u> after entering the long distance market. Although it is not a requirement for Section 271 Authority that a BOC be subject to such performance assurance mechanisms, the Commission previously has found that the existence of the satisfactory performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is probative evidence that the BOC will continue to meet its <u>271 obligations</u> after grant of such authority." <i>In the Matter of Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. And BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Georgia and Louisiana</i>, CC Docket No. 02-35, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Red 9018, 9181082, ¶ 291 (2002) (emphasis added). Because the SEM Plan is intended to enforce BellSouth's <u>271 obligations</u> following the grant of 271 authority, continuing obligations under 271 should be included in the Plan until the FCC forbears from enforcing the specific obligation under 47 U.S.C. § 160.

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SDUM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
Report Publication Dates (BST Matrix p. 2)	1) Clarify existing process 2) Remove SEEM requirements 3) Reference SEEM Admin Plan		1) CLEC's AGREE. CLECs do not oppose adding next business day language 2) CLEC's DISAGREE. CLECs want to ensure that language on when reports are late and when remedies are paid is retained. This should not be subject to change unless CLECs agree and Commission orders consensus. Therefore, any change to location of this information should not be in document where BST's unilateral changes may be missed in compliance filings. CLECs agree that language should not conflict with administrative plan 3) CLEC's AGREE. So long as all raw data used for metrics, including excluded data, are contained on Supporting Data Files and SDUM is complete information to interpret the files
Report Delivery Methods (BST Matrix p. 2)	Updated and word clarification		CLEC's AGREE. CLECs do not oppose changes
SQM – ALL Measures			
SQM Disagg (BST Matrix p. 1)	Delete line sharing in SQM/SEEM disagg		CLEC's DISAGREE. Line sharing is a checklist item 4 loop transmission facility, which BellSouth is obligated to provide pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 271 et seq. The Commission's jurisdiction over the SEEM Plan is based on Florida statutes designed to ensure "the development of fair and effective competition" (F.S.A. § 364.01(3)) and to preclude anticompetitive behavior (F.S.A. § 364.01(4)(g)). Order No. PSC-01-1819-FOF-TP, FPSC Docket No. 000121-TP, issued September 10, 2001, at p. 8. In addition to discouraging anti-competitive behavior and encouraging fair and effective competition, <u>in BellSouth's own words</u>, "the purpose of the enforcement provisions of the [SEEM] plan is to prevent backsliding after BellSouth obtains authority to provide interLATA service." BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Brief of the Evidence,

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			FPSC Docket 000121-TP, filed May 31, 2001, p.1 The FCC Order granting 271 authority in Georgia and Louisiana expressly states that the performance plan is intended to ensure that a BOC meets its 271 obligations In prior Orders, the [Federal Communications] Commission has explained that one factor it may consider as part of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would have adequate incentive to continue to satisfy the <u>requirements of Section 271</u> after entering the long distance market. Although it is not a requirement for Section 271 Authority that a BOC be subject to such performance assurance mechanisms, the Commission previously has found that the existence of the satisfactory performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is probative evidence that the BOC will continue to meet its <u>271 obligations</u> after grant of such authority <i>In the Matter of Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. And BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Georgia and Louisiana</i>, CC Docket No. 02-35, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 9018, 9181082, ¶ 291 (2002) (emphasis added) Because the SEEM Plan is intended to enforce BellSouth's 271 obligations following grant of 271 authority, continuing obligations under 271 (like line sharing) should be included in the Plan until the FCC forbears from enforcing the specific obligation under 47 U.S.C. § 160
Data Retained (BST Matrix p. 1)	Delete Data Retained section -replace with sentence in the SQM referring to SDUM		CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose so long as SDUM attached to files is current and up to date as promised.
SEEM Disagg (BST Matrix p. 1)	Delete entire SEEM Disagg section -replace with "note" in the introduction reference to the SEEM plan		CLECs DISAGREE. It is easier to understand metric results when you are able to make side-by-side comparisons of the SQM and SEEM

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			Align measure for each measure. If SQM and SEEM disaggregations are the same, then they only need to be listed once. If the disaggregations are different, then they should be listed separately.
Title	Change title to every measure - add acronym to every measure - delete existing numbering scheme	New Comment	CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. While CLECs do not oppose the addition of acronyms to the titles, we strongly DISAGREE with the arbitrary removal of the numbering scheme in the current SQM.
P-11	Move measure from Provisioning to Ordering section of SQM	New Comment	Customer-affecting problems from SOA errors are more in line with the provisioning errors. Thus, CLECs cannot support moving this measure from Provisioning to Ordering.
Pre-Ordering			
OSS-1 (BST matrix, p 3)	-Delete Measure -Modified OSS-2 to monitor degraded service that would have been captured in this measure		CLECs DISAGREE. This is not a redundant measure. All other Bell Operating Company plans have both a measure of system availability and of query response times. CLECs are due parity in query response times. OSS-1 would not pick up if CSR retrieval is consistently slower for CLEC than for BST and this is the normal function, not some special degradation from an interface malfunction. CLECs rely heavily on efficient query responses, since many of these queries are done while the customer is waiting on the line. Slow response times can anger customers when several multi-second transactions are combined.
OSS-2 (BST matrix, p 3-5) (CLEC Response Appendix B)	-Title: Modified Title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) Remove exclusions for degraded service, 2) Remove exclusion for Scheduled OSS Maintenance -Business Rules. 1) Wording clarifications,	-Disagg: Modify Appendix C to include Batch Scheduler, EXACT, SOEG, LMU, and LQS as OSS Interface types	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section. Definition: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree with the caveat that scheduled availability only excludes set maintenance window. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART. Agree not to exclude degraded service but would like to keep scheduled maintenance as only time of day exclusion.

Measure/ Reference	BeilSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	2) Added language to define degraded service. 3) Delete note on hours of schedule maintenance -Calculation: 1) Clarify full outage calculation. 2) Added total outage calculation -Report Structure: Wording modifications -Disagg: 1) Added Total Outage. 2) Modified Appendix D -Standard: Added Total Outage as a diagnostic measure -SEEM: No changes.		exclusion Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs believe full outages and degraded service impairments should be part of remedied metric Total outages should be the remedied calculation CLECs want to keep language and have a say on when maintenance should be scheduled to keep from impeding their business plans. CLECs would not oppose a definition, agreed to in change control, of what degraded service is to merit inclusion. Calculation: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agreement is contingent upon Total Outages being the remedied calculation Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. So long as all interfaces used by CLECs continue to be covered, the change is acceptable. Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. 1) CLECs AGREE. BST may disaggregate full outages separately from total outages 2) CLECs DISAGREE. PSIMS should be included or alternatively, BST should confirm what system replaced PSIMS. Are COG and DOM still functioning or has SGG replaced these systems? Appendix C should be modified to include Batch Scheduler, EXACT, SOEG, LMU, and LQS as OSS interface types. Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. 99.5% standard should apply to total outage, not full outages only. SEEM: No Changes
OSS-3 (BST matrix, p. 5-8)	-Title: Modified Title -Definition: Wording clarification. -Exclusions: Remove exclusion for degraded service -Business Rules: 1) Wording clarifications.		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section. Definition: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree so long as scheduled availability only excludes set maintenance window. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE.

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	2) Added language to define degraded service -Calculation: 1) Clarify full outage calculation. 2) Added total outage calculation -Report Structure: Wording modifications -Disagg: 1) Added Total Outage. 2) Modified Appendix D -Standard: Added Total Outage as a diagnostic measure -SEEM: No changes		Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs believe full outages and degraded service impairments should be part of remedied metric Total outages should be part of the remedied calculation. CLECs want to keep language and have a say on when maintenance should be scheduled to keep from impeding their business plans. CLECs would not oppose a definition, agreed to in change control, of what degraded service is to merit inclusion. CLECs request further discussions with BST on definition of "degraded service." CLECs are not quite sure about the origin of BST's definition of "degraded service." Calculation: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agreement is contingent on total outages being the remedied calculation. Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. So long as all interfaces used by CLECs continue to be covered, the change is acceptable Disagg: CLECs AGREE. BST may disaggregate full outages separately from total outages Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. 99.5% standard should apply to total outages not full outages only SEEM: No Changes
OSS-4 (BST matrix, p.9)	-Delete Measure. -Modified OSS-3 to monitor degraded service that would have been captured in this measure		CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs need to monitor whether responses are slower than BST's, thus requiring more personnel, resources and time to handle maintenance transactions. Degraded service does not indicate whether parity in response times does not exist. Other Bell Operating Company plans contain both a query response time and system availability metric
PO-1 (BST matrix, p.9)	-Delete Measure (low volume and low impact)		CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs need to have manual loop validation handled quickly. Low volumes are due to the uncertain future of certain data access products. CLECs need to analyze BST's data regarding volume. CLECs request that BST confirm

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
PO-2 (BST matrix, p 9-11)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Remove capturing of average interval. It's a redundant way of stating performance—percent of response returned is used for monitoring performance -Exclusions: Added exclusions for Scheduled OSS Maintenance and Test Transactions/Records -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculations: Delete calculation for average interval -Report Structure: 1) Delete regional report, 2) Delete irrelevant report buckets -Disagg: Wording Clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes.		under what conditions a CLEC must request manual loop makeup Title: CLEC's DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section. Definition: CLEC's AGREE. CLEC's accept deletion of average interval. BST should, however, be able to produce data on averages and dispersions to review the benchmark for this measure as may be requested in six-month reviews Exclusions: CLEC's AGREE. New exclusions are acceptable so long as test transactions do not include orders for live customers even if they are the first transactions for a new product. Business Rules: CLEC's AGREE. CLEC's accept use of generic terms as long as all types of interfaces/gateways used by CLEC's for this activity are covered Calculation: CLEC's AGREE. CLEC's do not oppose eliminating average interval metric. But BST must be willing to provide data needed to evaluate benchmarks in future six-month review Report Structure: CLEC's AGREE. CLEC's do not oppose elimination of disaggregations Disagg: CLEC's AGREE Standard: No Change SEEM: No Change
Bulk Migration Response Time (BST matrix, p 11-12)	-New Measure -Captures response time for bulk migration orders -Not proposed to be added as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 measure		CLEC's AGREE. CLEC's support adding a metric that measures bulk migration response times. The details of metric need to be reviewed and compared to CLEC proposals for bulk hot cuts in collaborative meetings. CLEC's DISAGREE. CLEC's oppose omitting a benchmark and inclusion in the SEEM plan. CLEC NOTE: The timing and need for this measure should be discussed at the Sep. 2 workshop

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/29/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/29/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			<<Sharon Norris w/ AT&T>>
Ordering			
O-1 (BST matrix, p 13)	-Delete Measure. -This measure is of minimal use to evaluate performance. An acknowledgment is simply an electronic signal that tells a CLEC's computer that a transaction was successfully received		CLECs DISAGREE. This is the first warning that orders are not being processed MCI, for one, had lots of orders lost in system in September 2003 after BST made some software changes. The remedies generated caused BST to promptly fix the problems so MCI was not stalled into the next month in getting orders through the system. This metric is critical to catching systems' problems before they lead to thousands of angry customers that may switch back to BST
O-2 (BST matrix, p 13-14)	-Title Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: Added exclusion for Test Transactions/Records -Business Rules: Wording clarification and deletion of irrelevant note -Calculation: Wording clarification -Report Structure Deletion of irrelevant note -Disagg: Combined interfaces types (EDI and TAG) -Standard: Revised benchmark from 99.99% to 99.5% -SEEM. Remove from Tier 1		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition. CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree to exclusions so long as test transactions are never defined as those involving live customers Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose use of general interface language so long as all systems used are covered. Removal of note is accepted Calculation: CLECs AGREE. Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE. So long as CLEC's gateway is covered in metric. Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose weakening of benchmark on this metric. System likely will start missing many when it begins to fail, making slight change proposed by BST irrelevant SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs see no reason to eliminate Tier 1 remedies as the loss of orders at this initial state creates burdens for CLECs and potential problems meeting customer requirements for service delivery

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response: (Agree/Disagree)
O-3 (BST matrix, p 14-17) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for Scheduled OSS Maintenance, 2) Add exclusions for Test Transactions/Records and LSRs that receive a Z status -Business Rules: 1) Wording clarifications, 2) Removed categories for manual fallout and make categories available on PMAP website, 3) Remove flow-through matrix and provided PMAP website where it can be found -Calculation: Remove Achieved Flow-through calculation Not used to measure performance -Report Structure: Add CLEC Specific report (0-4 combined into this measure) -Disagg: 1) Roll-up Res and Bus into Resale, 2) Roll-up UNE-L and UNE-P into UNE -Standard: 1) Delete Res benchmark of 95% and Business benchmark of 90% Both rolled-up into Resale with 90% benchmark, 2) Delete UNE-L benchmark of 85% and UNE-P benchmark of 90% Both rolled-up into UNE with a benchmark of 85% -SEEM: No changes -MISC: Note provided to explain availability of flow-through error analysis and CLEC LSR information.	-Disagg: Add UNE-L with LNP as a level of disagg Standard: 1) Increase benchmark for UNE-L from 85% to 95%, 2) Increase benchmark for LNP from 85% to 95%, 3) Add benchmark of 95% to UNE-L with LNP SEEM: Add UNE-L with LNP to SEEM Tier 2	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. CLECs believe these exclusions are acceptable so long as test orders are not defined as involving live customers and BST provides more information on how Z designation gets applied and how CLECs can verify proper use of this exclusion Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose clarifications and wording change and reference to web site CLECs expect list to expand and not retract from current flow through capabilities, so list is not to be shortened from levels defined currently in metric Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs believe view of total ordering that flows through is critical It is not enough only to see percentage rates for orders designed to flow through CLECs and the PSC need to monitor whether BST is being responsive to adding products and features CLECs most order to flow through eligibility list Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose adding CLEC-specific and aggregate results in the same metric so long as achieved disaggregation is retained CLECs request that BST provide examples of how the reports will differ, if at all, before we close this issue Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose collapsing disaggregations and urge adoption of their proposed addition to better monitor UNE-L with LNP flow through UNE-P flow-through could mask problems with UNE-L flow-through if combined, because of current volume differences Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not believe existing standards are appropriate, particularly under BST's proposal to collapse disaggregations.

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE . CLECs oppose losing the deleted disaggregations in SEEM as problems with flow through for certain problems would go hidden and un-remedied if combined with a large-volume product with high flow- through rates
O-4 (BST matrix, p 17)	-Delete Measure. -Data will be captured in proposed modifications to O-3		CLECs AGREE . CLECs do not oppose deleting this measure, so long as information captured here becomes part of O-3 with no change in SEEM classifications
Flow-Through Error Analysis (BST matrix, p 17)	-Delete Measure (not a measure) -Will post error analysis with the flow-through report and add information for obtaining error analysis in a footnote to O-3		CLECs AGREE . CLECs do not oppose this being a web posting instead of being part of the SQM
O-6 (BST matrix, p 17)	-Delete Measure. -BST will provide website where CLEC LSR info can be found for CLECs who elect to subscribe for info Add footnote to O-3 describing how to obtain CLEC LSR info		CLECs AGREE . CLECs do not oppose having to subscribe to this information so long as notice is given before PMAF reporting ends and subscription must start and all data remains identical to prior format
O-7 (BST matrix, p 17) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Delete Measure. -Info can be ascertained by reviewing data from Reject Interval	Exclusions: Modify project exclusion so batch hot cuts will not be excluded	CLECs DISAGREE . This measure allows CLECs the ability to measure reject intervals It is imperative that CLECs are able to see how many of their orders are being rejected by BST CLECs have also proposed an additional disaggregation to see if batch hot cut orders get rejected BST rejection errors have been a problem for at least one CLEC in the coalition Specifically, ITC/DeltaCom has been receiving invalid rejects and clarifications These are costly and require re-processing and delay customer service delivery A list of these invalid rejects/clarifications has been sent to BellSouth for investigation and a call is scheduled weekly or as needed CLECs need this measure to remain until this situation is resolved
O-8 (BST matrix, p 18-22)	-Title: Modified title. -Definition: Wording clarification	Exclusions: Modify project exclusion so batch hot cuts will not be excluded	Title: CLECs DISAGREE . See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE . CLECs do not oppose

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(CLEC Response, Appendix B)	Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for Center specific hours. 2) Modified project exclusion so that valid project IDs for LSRs that are identified as Bulk Migrations will not be excluded. 3) Add exclusions for Scheduled OSS/Maintenance and Test Transactions/Records -Business Rules: 1) Wording Clarifications. 2) Provided web address for hours of operations. 3) Added note to reflect the Bulk Migration process -Calculation: Delete Average Reject Interval Calculation, not used to state performance -Report Structure: Delete interval buckets not relevant to standard---can be obtained from raw data -Disagg: Delete product disagg ---little to no volume for many products Product level can be obtained from raw data. Standard: 1) Revise Partially Mech benchmark from 95%<= 10 hours to 90%<= 10 hours. 2) Revise Non-Mech benchmark from 95%<= 24 hours to 85%<= 18 hours. 3) Revise L11 from 95%<= 36 hours to 85%<= 4 days -Benchmarks revised in attempt to regionalize benchmarks for all BST states. -SEEM: Remove from Tier 1 and Tier 2		discussing issues removed from definition in business rules Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree this measure should cover batch hot cuts. CLECs will also accept additional exclusions so long as test orders are not defined as those involving live customers. CLECs are unclear on how BST intends to account for non-business hours. This requires further discussion In the Exclusion that begins "LSRs identified as "Projects", the wording needs to be changed from "UNE-P" to "UNE-L" only Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose changes except for indication that business hours apply to fully-mechanized orders. Only schedule system down time should be applied here. Any web posting should not expand scheduled down time from current hours without CLEC acceptance Calculation: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose eliminating average interval so long as BST will provide interval information at six month reviews as needed to evaluate benchmarks Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose elimination of dispersion buckets so long as BST will provide interval information at six month reviews as needed to evaluate benchmarks Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs may agree to combine some products, (e.g. INP and LNP), but not to eliminate all disaggregations as doing so would mask differences in performance Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not see reason to lessen benchmarks particularly since BST's were less stringent than many other Bell companies. SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs see no reason why long reject intervals that can lead to delays in getting an order accepted and moved toward timely provisioning should be eliminated

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
O-9 (BST matrix, p 22-28) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarifications -Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for Center specific hours; 2) Modified project exclusion so that valid project IDs for LSRs that are identified as Bulk Migrations will not be excluded; 3) Add exclusions for Scheduled OSS/Maintenance and Test Transactions/Records -Business Rules: 1) Wording Clarifications, 2) Provided web address for hours of operations, 3) Added note to reflect the Bulk Migration process -Calculation: Delete of Average FOC Interval calculation, not used to state performance -Report Structure: Delete interval buckets--can be obtained from raw data -Disagg: Delete product disagg ---little to no volume for many products Product level can be obtained from raw data. -Standard: 1) Revise Partially Mech benchmark from 95%<= 10 hours to 90%<= 10 hours; 2) Revise Non-Mech benchmark from 95%<=24 hours to 90%<=24 hours, 3) Revise LIT from 95%<=48 hours to 95%<= 10 days -Benchmarks revised in attempt to regionalize benchmarks for all BST states -SEEM: Remove from Tier 1 and Tier 2	Exclusions: Modify project exclusion so that LNP (standalone) and batch hot cuts will not be excluded Disagg: Add LNP Standalone (Projects) as a level of disagg Standard: Add benchmarks for LNP Standalone (Projects) -- 95% within 24 hours (1-10 numbers), 95% within 48 hours (11-999 numbers) SEEM: Include new LNP Standalone disagg in SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2	from the remedy plan Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose taking out facilities check provision. BST has not provided any reason to overturn this part of the PSC's original order and reconsideration decision to retain it. CLECs were even open to considering impact on intervals in past but no evidence was provided by BST. The facilities check ensures that meeting FOC timeliness does not mean that BST may provide any due date on the first FOC whether it knows if it can live up to it or not Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART. CLECs agree this measure should cover batch hot cuts. CLECs also accept additional exclusions so long as test orders are not defined as those involving live customers. CLECs are unclear on how BST intends to account for non-business hours. This requires further discussion In the Exclusion that begins "LSRs identified as 'Projects', the wording needs to be changed from 'UNE- P' to 'UNE-L' only Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose changes except for indication that business hours apply to fully mechanized orders. Only schedule system down time should be applied here. Any web posting should not expand scheduled down time from current hours without CLEC acceptance Calculation: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose eliminating average interval so long as BST will provide interval information at six month reviews as needed to evaluate benchmarks Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose elimination of dispersion buckets so long as BST will provide interval information at six month reviews as needed to evaluate benchmarks Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs may agree to collapsing some but not all product categories as

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			doing so would mask differences in performance Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not see reason to lessen benchmarks particularly since BST's were less stringent than many other Bell companies SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs see no reason why long FOC intervals that can keep CLEC from informing customers of due dates should be eliminated from the remedy plan.
O-10 (BST matrix, p 29)	-Delete Measure This measure captures an extremely small number of orders and the interval for this measure is captured in O-9		CLECs AGREE
O-11 (BST matrix, p 29-31) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: 1) Modified project exclusion so that valid project IDs for LSRs that are identified as Bulk Migrations will not be excluded. 2) Add exclusion for Test Transactions/Records -Business Rules: 1) Wording Clarifications, 2) Added note to reflect the Bulk Migration process -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: 1) Wording clarifications, 2) Delete regional report -Disagg: Delete product disag ---little to no volume for many products Product level can be obtained from raw data -Standard: No changes -SEEM: Remove from Tier 1	Exclusions: Modify project exclusion so batch hot cuts will not be excluded.	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: CLECs AGREE Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose changes or additions for bulk hot cuts, but would like explanation of assignment to disaggregation category Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs may agree to combine some categories but not all as doing so would mask differences in performance. Standard: No Changes SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose removal of Tier I remedies. BST has not explained why missing FOCs and Rejects do not harm their individual relationships with customers.
O-12	-Delete Measure		CLECs DISAGREE . CLECs do not believe this

Measure/ Reference	BallSouth Proposed SQM Change (7/28/14)	Client Proposed SQM Change (7/28/14)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(BST matrix, p 32)	Timeliness of answer in the LCSC is not directly affecting CLECs ability to provide service. Orders are not placed by phone; CLEC is calling to get info		metric is unnecessary. Long hold times can burden staff serving customers and delay resolution of customer-affecting problems
P-11 (BST matrix, p 32-35)	-Title: Modified title (Move measure from Provisioning to Ordering) -Definition: Wording clarifications -Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for CLEC LSRs submitted manually, 2) Add exclusion for LSRs identified as projects -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculation: Wording Clarification -Disagg: No changes -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. This measure should remain in the Provisioning section of the SQM. See also CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Customer-affecting problems from SOA errors are more in line with the provisioning errors Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs disagree on the exclusion of project orders, as these are typically large and very customer-impacting CLECs also disagree to excluding LCSC/System workarounds. All elements should be compared to the CLEC's requested service order. LSRs coded as projects, particularly those for batch hot cuts should not be excluded from determining if the order was provisioned as requested by the CLEC. CLECs want to ensure that listing orders are part of what is being measured. CLECs request that BST confirm that test orders are not defined as orders involving live customers Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs want to add "considered" to read "workarounds which will not be "considered" service affecting." in the first sentence of 2nd paragraph under BST LSR Fields Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs may agree if deletion of the word applicable does not expand the denominator of LSRs beyond those subject to the automatic checking of accuracy Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: No changes Standard: No changes SEEM: No changes

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
Provisioning			
P-1 (BST matrix, p 36)	-Delete Measure -Orders captured in this measure would be included in the proposed FOCI and proposed PIAM measures -Transaction volumes are too small to be useful to evaluate performance	Retain Existing SQM Tool to evaluate services which are experiencing delays CLECs order tracking systems are better equipped to monitor and validate this measure as opposed to the FOCI & PIAM	CLECs DISAGREE. This measure should remain in the SQM. It serves as a tool to evaluate services that are experiencing delays. BST's order tracking systems for CLECs are better equipped to monitor and validate this measure as opposed to the FOCI and PIAM measures.
P-2A (BST matrix, p 36)	-Delete Measure -Performance for Jeopardy has not been a problem. -The interval captured in this measure is included in the proposed FOCI		CLECs DISAGREE. Having orders placed in jeopardy is a critical concern to CLECs for many reasons, not the least of which is that it directly impacts customer satisfaction. During the 6-month review in LA, Staff pointed out that just because BST does not provide jeopardy notices to its retail end users, does not mean that they should not give jeopardy notices to its wholesale customers. Since BST provides jeopardy notices to itself, it must provide jeopardy notices to the CLECs. So whether BST gives jeopardy notices to its retail customers has no bearing on their obligation to provide wholesale customers with jeopardy notices. In addition, as facilities-based competition increases, the number of jeopardies may also increase. It should cause BellSouth no harm to continue reporting this measure since the mechanisms are already in place to track and capture this data. The CLECs cannot support the deletion of this measure.
P-2B (BST matrix, p 37)	-Delete Measure -Minimal impact on CLECs		CLECs DISAGREE. Clearly, the % of orders given jeopardy notices, when compared to retail, is very important to CLECs. BST is attempting to make changes that are burdensome to the CLECs and that prohibit CLECs from having a clear comparison of service.
P-3 (BST matrix, p 37-40)	-Title: Modified title (from % missed to % met) -Definition: Changed to reflect percent of installation appointments met.		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. Modifying the title of this measure from "missed", which clearly points out the intent of the measure, to "met" is not a fair

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	-Exclusions: Removed Exclusion for End User Misses -Business Rules: Changed to reflect percent of installation appointments met -Calculation: Changed to reflect percent of installation appointments met -Report Structure: 1) Changed to eliminate categories with little to no volume. 2) Delete regional report -Disagg: Remove products with low volume -Standard: parity (see disagg changes) -SEEM: No changes		representation of the real issue at hand -- the number of installation appts BST misses. The CLECs' tracking systems were established for the purpose of tracking misses from the customer's point of view. BST's reasons for missing the appt should be clearly noted. Also, see CLEC comment under SQM -- All Measures Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not support changing the measure from missed to met Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. Currently, technicians remove inside wire/jacks or report misses when their allotted time cannot be met. Excluding test orders is questionable since the determination of these orders is not defined BST is attempting to re-define "Cancelled Service Orders." Previously, only service orders cancelled before the due date were allowed to be excluded, but now BST wants to exclude ALL cancelled service orders regardless of when they were cancelled Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. BellSouth has limited this measure to capture only the first missed appointment reason code entered on a service order. This limits the measure's effectiveness because missed appointment codes are used every time a service order's due date is changed. So for example, if CLECs supplement an order for a new due date, BST will apply a subscriber-missed appointment code and that service order will be excluded from this measurement. CLECs believe that ANY BellSouth missed appointment code should be counted as a BellSouth miss - regardless of whether the order had a previous subscriber-missed appointment. Just because a due date was missed shouldn't give BellSouth carte blanche to miss future install dates. SBC's Missed Appointment measure counts any SBC missed reason and so should BST's Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE Report Structure: CLECs DISAGREE. BST appears to be removing categories where there

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			performance has typically been problematic Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. BST appears to be removing product disaggregations where there performance has typically been problematic Standard: CLECs DISAGREE SEEM: No Changes
FOCI- FOC Average Completion Interval (BST matrix, p 40-44)	-New measure -Combines intervals to return a FOC and to complete a service order into a single interval measure -Added to SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2		CLECs DISAGREE While CLECs requested a measure of this type, this measure, as constructed, is absolutely inappropriate and completely and unequivocally rejected by the CLECs. The artificial padding of intervals that include ILEC "FOC" times render this measure completely useless for monitoring for discrimination. Further, the information reported by this measure is misleading, because it reports service intervals for ILEC customers that never occurred. This measure, although in place in Georgia, at least has no SEEM impact in that state and so the effect of its harmful data is somewhat mitigated. However, BST has the audacity to propose that this farce of a metric be the basis for its penalty payments for both FOC and OCI in Florida
P-4 (BST matrix, p 44) (CLEC Response, Appendix E)	-Delete Measure -This info is now included in the proposed FOCI measure	Disagg: Add disagg for batch hot cuts Standard: Batch Hot Cuts 98% in 5 days	CLECs DISAGREE. This is a key measure and one where CLECs currently track BST's performance. BST's proposed changes will mask the party comparison
P-5 (BST matrix, p 45)	-Delete Measure -CLECs can check order status in CSOTS. This is party measure, but actually better service than that provided to retail because retail does not get a notification that a service order is complete		CLECs DISAGREE. Real-time CSOTS does not exist. BST's current systems clearly status the life of an order, as well as, clearly indicate completion and error status following completion of the order
P-6 (BST matrix, p 45)	-Delete Measure -Another measure of FOC Timeliness which is already measured in FOCI and proposed FOCI		CLECs DISAGREE. A CLEC's credibility to its customer depends on its accuracy in scheduling appointments. If CLECs are unable to notify their customers and arrange for access to a customer's

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
P-7 (BST matrix, p 45-47) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification to include time to notify CLEC after hot cut is complete -Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for Unbundled Loops where there is no existing subscriber loop, 2) Add exclusion for non-coordinated conversions, 3) Add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders, 4) Add exclusion for listing orders -Business Rules: Revised to reflect start and stop times which includes CLEC notification time Calculation: Revised to include CLEC notification time -Report Structure: 1) Delete unnecessary interval buckets 2) Delete regional report -Disagg: Roll-up INP and LNP loops into one disagg category CCC (loops) -Standard: Revise benchmark of 95%≤15 minutes to 95%≤20 minutes to account for adding CLEC notification time to the interval -SEEM: No changes	Title: Include Non-Coordinated Conversions in this measure. Business Rules: Stop time is notification to the CLEC that the cut is complete Calculation: Include Non-Coordinated Conversions Disagg: Add additional migration types (See CLEC Comments p. 5) Standard: Revise benchmark of 95% ≤ 15 minutes to 95% ≤ 10 minutes	premises, the customer may be lost to a win-back Title: CLECs DISAGREE Non-Coordinated Conversions should be included in this measure. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE Non-Coordinated Conversions should be included in this measure Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE The Start Time should be when the loop is actually disconnected The Stop Time is notification to CLECs that the cut is complete Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE Include Non-Coordinated Conversions Report Structure: CLECs DISAGREE Interval breaks out points to those areas for concern Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE Add additional migration types (See CLEC Comments p 5) Standard: CLECs DISAGREE Revise benchmark of 95% in less than or equal to 15 minutes to 95% in less than or equal to 10 minutes SEEM: No changes.
P-7A (BST matrix, p.47-50) (CLEC Response p 5 and Appendix B)	-Title: Delete reference to average interval in title Average interval not used to evaluate performance -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: 1) Remove exclusion for test orders, 2) Add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders, 3) Add exclusion for listing orders -Business Rules: Modified to identify intervals for IDLC and non-IDLC loops -Calculation: Delete calculations for interval and average interval, not	Disagg: Add additional migration types Business Rules: define criteria for test order exclusions	Title: CLECs DISAGREE See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE.. Need to define criteria for test order exclusions Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE Calculation: CLECs AGREE. Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. Need to add additional

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	used to evaluate performance -Report Structure: 1) Remove requirement to report results in three separate distributions; 2) Delete regional report, 3) Delete unnecessary interval buckets -Disagg: 1) Delete SL1 and SL2 time and non-time specific 2) New disagg of Non-IDLC and IDLC -Standard: Benchmark for IDLC 95% within + or -2 hours of scheduled start time -SEEM: No changes		migration types, e.g. EELS, and hot cuts away from loops and EELS to UNE-P and resale CLECs will support collapsing SL1 and SL2 Standard: CLECs AGREE. SEEM: No Change
P-7B (BST matrix, p 50-51) (CLEC Response p 5 and Appendix B)	-Title: Modified Title -Definition: Wording clarification (simplified) -Exclusions: 1) Wording Clarification, 2) Remove exclusion for test orders, 3) Add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders, 4) Add exclusion for listing orders -Business Rules. 1) Wording clarification, 2) Add language to capture the overall percentage of orders -Calculation. 1) Wording clarification, 2) Add calculation for overall percentage -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: Roll-up INP and LNP loops to CCC (loops). -Standard: Remove benchmark of <=5 hours and make diagnostic for CCC (loops) -SEEM: No changes	-Title: Include Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions in this measure -Definition: Include Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions -Exclusions: Add exclusion for test orders -Business Rules: Include Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions -Disagg: Add additional migration types - Standard: Revise benchmark of <= 5 hours to <= 2 hours -SEEM: Add to SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Add non-coordinated Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. Add back with CLEC agreement Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. These changes require further discussion at Sep 2 workshop between CLECs and BST Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. These changes require further discussion at Sep 2 workshop between CLECs and BST Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. EELS should be added as a separate disaggregation Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. Performance should improve rather than ask CLECs to accept a lower standard SEEM: No Changes
P-7C	-Title: Changed from 7 days to 5 days	-Definition: Include Non-Coordinated Customer	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Leave days "as

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(BST matrix, p. 52-53) (CLEC Response p. 5 and Appendix B)	-Definition: Wording clarifications and change from 7 days to 5 days -Exclusions: 1) Wording clarifications. 2) Add exclusion for listing orders. 3) add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders. 4) Add exclusion for troubles outside of BellSouth's control. 5) Add exclusion for disconnect orders -Business Rules: Wording clarification and change from 7 days to 5 days -Calculation: Wording clarification and change from 7 days to 5 days. -Report Structure: 1) Delete dispatch/non-dispatch reports 2) Delete regional report -Disagg: Roll-up UNE loops design and non-design into UNE loops -Standard: Revise benchmark of <= 3% to <=5% -SEEM: Remove from SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2	Conversions -Exclusions: Add exclusion for test orders. Define troubles outside BST control -Business Rules: Include Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions Disagg: Add additional migration types Calculation: Include Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions Standard: No Change Seem No Change	is Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Leave days "as is." Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. This issue requires further discussion at Sep. 2 workshop Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE IN PART. CLECs accept other changes, but do not support change from 7 days to 5 days Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not support change from 7 days to 5 days Report Structure: CLECs DISAGREE. Regional reports and those separately dispatch from non-dispatch are meaningful Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. Loop type is a meaningful difference. Add disaggregation for EELs Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. Performance should improve rather than ask CLECs to accept a lower standard (i.e., from <= 3% to <= 5%) SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE.
CNDD Non-CCC Percent Completed and Notified Due Date (BST matrix, p. 53-54.)	-New measure Measures the percentage of non-coordinated conversions that BellSouth completed and provided notification to the CLECs on the due date		CLECs AGREE.
P-7D Coordinated/Non-coordinated Customer Conversions-Percent Without Service Disruption (CLEC Response, Appendix A, p. 5-6)		-New Measure Measures the percentage of hot cuts that are completed without a loss of service due to BellSouth-caused service interruptions outside of the initial customer cutover	
P-8 (BST matrix, p. 54)	-Delete Measure -represents a small number of orders and the customer impacting event (trouble) is captured in Worst Disconnecting Troubles		CLECs DISAGREE. This measure is a key indicator of support for xDSL testing and should not be deleted. It is imperative that CLECs receive

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	(trouble) is captured in Percent Provisioning Troubles		trouble-loops at installation. Further, as facilities-based competition increases, so may the number of orders requiring cooperative testing. It should cause BellSouth no harm to continue reporting this measure since the mechanisms are already in place to track and capture this data. The CLECs cannot support the deletion of this measure.
P-9 (BST matrix, p. 54-56)	-Title: Changed from 30 days to 5 days -Definition: Wording clarification and change from 30 days to 5 days -Exclusions: Add exclusion for troubles outside of BellSouth's control -Business Rules: 1) Wording clarifications, 2) Removed reference to D&F orders, 3) Removed reference to Standalone LNP -Calculations: Wording clarification and change in conversion interval from 30 days to 5 days -Report Structure: 1) Delete separate volume reports (< 10 circuits and >= 10 circuits), 2) Delete dispatch/non dispatch reports, 3) Delete regional report -Disagg: 1) Remove products with low volume 2) Modified product categories so that each product is only reported once -Standard: Party (see disagg changes) -SEEM: No changes	Define exclusion, how coded for outside BST control. 30 days reflects a more complete picture of service quality. Retain Disagg as the CLEC auditing systems would require changes of products for which volumes may increase in the future	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. 5 days is not a sufficient period of time. CLECs must be able to schedule and complete their portion of the provisioning process. 30 days reflects a more complete picture of service quality. CLECs might agree to 20 days since it is a more accurate reflection of provisioning troubles. Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. This exclusion is inappropriate and hard to define. It also gives technicians too much discretion in the manner in which they code these troubles. Further, BST is not harmed by the current process which allows a parity determination to be made. Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs require further discussion of changes to calculation at Sep 2 workshop Report Structure: CLECs DISAGREE. BST has paid penalties on these disaggregations before. If these categories are lumped together, it will mask BST's actual performance results. Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. Disaggregations should be retained, as CLEC auditing systems would require changes of products for which volumes are likely to increase in the near future. Standard: CLECs AGREE. Parity standard is okay, however disaggregation changes are not

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			SEEM: No Changes
P-11 (BST matrix, p 57)	Revised and moved to Ordering Section		CLECs DISAGREE. Please see CLEC comments for this measure in the Ordering section (above)
P-13B (BST matrix, p 57-58)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders, 2) Add exclusion for listing orders, 3) Add exclusion for Scheduled OSS Maintenance -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculations: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: No changes -Standard: Revise benchmark from 96.5% to 95% -SEEM: Remove from SEEM Tier 1		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. The proposed changes to the business rules require further discussion and clarification Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. The proposed changes to the calculations require further discussion and clarification Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: No Changes Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. Performance should improve rather than ask CLECs to accept a lower standard (i.e., from 96.5% to 95%) SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE.
P-13C (BST matrix, p 58-59)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) Add exclusion for Remote Call Forwarding, DIDs, and ISDN Data TNs, 2) Add exclusion for BellSouth or CLEC internal or administrative orders, 3) Add exclusion for zero due dated expedited orders requested by the CLEC, 4) Add exclusion for listing orders, Maintenance -Business Rules: Wording clarifications. -Calculations: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Delete regional report	LNP changed to LAT?? RCF, DID, and ISDN should not be excluded	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. It is more accurate to measure the number of activations vs orders Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. It is more accurate to measure the number of activations vs orders Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. It is more accurate to measure the number of activations vs orders Report Structure: CLECs AGREE.

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	-Disagg: Remove Standalone -Standard: insert >= sign -SEEM: Remove from SEEM Tier 1		Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. Changes to the levels of disaggregation require further discussion Standard: CLECs AGREE. SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE.
P-13D (BST matrix, p 59-60)	-Title: Wording clarification-measure is not an interval rather a percent within interval -Definition Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) Wording clarifications, 2) Remove exclusion for orders which are candidates for 10 digit triggers -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculations. 1) Revise calculation to be based on number of non-triggerable orders 2) Delete interval calculation, performance is based on percentage -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: Roll-up LNP Working Hours and LNP Unscheduled After hours into LNP -Standard: Revise benchmark from 95% <= 4 hours to 95% <= 12 hours -SEEM: Remove from SEEM Tier 1		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section BellSouth is attempting to hamper the usefulness of this important measure in several ways, including, but not limited to • Changing standard from 4 hours to 12 (while at the same time retaining a non-business hour exclusion) • Changing the calculation from telephone number to service order • Removing it from Tier 1 SEEM Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. See above comment Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. Standard: CLECs DISAGREE. See above comment SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE. See above comment

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
P-14 Percent of Customer Trouble Tickets Closed Electronically (CLEC Response, Appendix A, p 3-4)		-New Measure Measures the percent of customer trouble tickets during the reporting period that are closed electronically by a BellSouth technician	
P-14 Percent of Batch Hot Cuts Started On Time (CLEC Response, Appendix A pps 7-8)		-New Measure Measures the percentage of time that BellSouth begins performing batch hot cuts within 15 minutes of the committed start time Add to SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2	
Maintenance and Repair			
M&R-1 (BST matrix, p 61-62)	-Title: Changed title (from % missed to % met) -Definition: Changed to reflect percent of repair appointments met -Exclusions: 1) Add exclusion for Informational Tickets, 2) Add exclusion for Troubles Outside BellSouth's Control -Business Rules: 1) Worded clarification, 2) Remove note -Calculations: Revise calculation to reflect percent met. -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: 1) Roll-up products with low volume into another category, 2) Modify product categories so that each category is reported only once -Standard: Parity (see disagg -changes) -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. This measurement is used throughout the industry as "Missed Repair Appointments" and the BST change does not change the results, it only changes the reported values which makes comparisons to historical performance more difficult. This requested change does not seem to provide any value and would only cost BST to implement. Also, see CLEC comment under SQM- All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Same reason as above Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. 1) CLECs AGREE. However, scenarios for which Informational Tickets are created should be discussed to ensure troubles (like service order errors) are not being excluded by the use of Informational Tickets 2) CLECs DISAGREE. The language of this exclusion is overly broad. Presumably, troubles outside of BST's control would affect CLEC lines in

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			the same manner as BST retail lines CLEC lines should still be repair at parity with BST lines Also, this exclusion may already be covered by General Terms and Conditions of the individual interconnection agreements (force majeure clauses) Business Rules: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. The clarification changes made up to the words "No Access" are acceptable However, the proposed change to "No Access" is not acceptable BST proposed change moves "No Access" tickets from an Exclusion (not counted in the measurement) to counted as a commitment met for the measurement Possible counter offer: As done in the SBC region, if a ticket is marked as "No Access" before the commit time, it is counted as a commitment met. If the ticket is marked as "No Access" after the commit time, it is counted as a commitment missed Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. See reasons above Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. CLECs agree to ensure each product is only reported in one disaggregation CLECs disagree with aggregating any products that are not repaired in the same manner/priority and that certain disaggregations are moved to diagnostic CLECs specifically oppose removing disaggregations for Line Sharing and Interoffice Transport as BST continues to be obligated to offer these items as UNEs under Section 271 of the Act Standard: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See Disagg above SEEM: No Changes
M&R-2 (BST matrix, p 62-64)	-Title: Modify title -Definition: Wordng clarification		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree with

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SCM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SCM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	-Exclusions 1) Add exclusion for Informational Tickets 2) Add exclusion for Troubles Outside BellSouth's Control -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculations: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: 1) Roll-up products with low volume into another category. 2) Modify product categories so that each category is reported <u>only once</u> -Standard: Panty (see disagg. changes) -SEEM: Remove from SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2.		clarification question: Does the change from the word "reported" to the word "closed" change how BST reports results today or does this have an impact on the results? Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. 1) CLECs AGREE. However, scenarios for which Informational Tickets are created should be discussed to ensure troubles (like service order errors) are not being excluded by the use of Informational Tickets 2) CLECs DISAGREE. The language of this exclusion is overly broad. Presumably, troubles outside of BST's control would affect CLEC lines in the same manner as BST retail lines. CLEC lines should still be repair at parity with BST lines. Also, this exclusion may already be covered by General Terms and Conditions of the individual interconnection agreements (force majeure clauses). Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. BST seems to be limiting this report to only "customer direct reports". This change is troublesome for a couple of reasons: 1) CLECs report troubles to BST on our customer's behalf, so technically all CLEC trouble reports are not "customer direct reports". 2) Performance should be measured for all troubles that are worked by BST regardless if the tickets are "customer direct" or initiated by BST internally. Calculations: CLECs AGREE. Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See comments from previous measurement (M&R-1) Standard: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See Disagg above SEEM: CLECs DISAGREE

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
M&R-3 (BST matrix, p 64-66)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) Add exclusion for Informational Tickets, 2) Add exclusion for Troubles Outside BellSouth's Control -Business Rules: 1) Wording clarification, 2) Add note clarifying time that has already been excluded -Calculations: No changes -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: 1) Roll-up products with low volume into another category, 2) Modify product categories so that each category is reported only once -Standard: Parity (see disagg changes) -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section. Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART 1) CLECs AGREE. However, scenarios for which Informational Tickets are created should be discussed to ensure troubles (like service order errors) are not being excluded by the use of Informational Tickets 2) CLECs DISAGREE. The language of this exclusion is overly broad. Presumably, troubles outside of BST's control would affect CLEC lines in the same manner as BST retail lines. CLEC lines should still be repair at parity with BST lines. Also, this exclusion may already be covered by General Terms and Conditions of the individual interconnection agreements (force majeure clauses) Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. It seems that BST is attempting to change the stop timestamp for closing tickets (from the time ticket cleared in system to time trouble repaired). The current language suggests a system timestamp that can not be altered by users and the proposed language suggests a timestamp that can be entered/alttered by end users. CLECs would prefer the system-generated timestamp whenever possible. Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See comments from previous measurement (M&R-1).
			Standard: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See Disagg above SEEM: No Changes

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLECs Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
M&R-4 (BST matrix, p 66-68)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition Wording clarification -Exclusions 1) Add exclusion for Informational Tickets, 2) Add exclusion for Troubles Outside BellSouth's Control -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculations: 1) Wording clarification to specify repeat troubles, 2) Replaced cleared date with closed date -Report Structure: Delete regional report -Disagg: 1) Roll-up products with low volume into another category; 2) Modify product categories so that each category is reported only once -Standard: Parity (see disagg changes) -SEEM: No changes.		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE WITH MODIFICATION. "This report measures the percentage of customer trouble reports received within thirty days of a previous <u>trouble</u> report " Exclusions: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. 1) CLECs AGREE. However, scenarios for which Informational Tickets are created should be discussed to ensure troubles (like service order errors) are not being excluded by the use of Informational Tickets 2) CLECs DISAGREE. The language of this exclusion is overly broad Presumably, troubles outside of BST's control would affect CLEC lines in the same manner as BST retail lines CLEC lines should still be repair at parity with BST lines. Also, this exclusion may already be covered by General Terms and Conditions of the individual interconnection agreements (force majeure clauses) Business Rules. CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs would like some clarification as to why different timestamps are used for LMOS and WFA Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. See above response for Business Rules regarding "cleared" vs "closed" timestamps Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See comments from previous measurement (M&R-1) Standard: CLECs AGREE IN PART AND DISAGREE IN PART. See Disagg above SEEM: No Changes
M&R-5	-Delete Measure		CLECs DISAGREE . This measure is an important measure used throughout the industry This

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(BST matrix, p 68)	Duplicative measure. Information captured in M&R-3, since maintenance durations greater than 24 hours normally involve an out service condition		measurement is not duplicative of the MAD (M&R 3) measure as this measurement provides a firm benchmark to measure performance against. The MAD (M&R 3) measure captures averaged results, which can vary significantly from benchmarked results
M&R-6 (BST matrix, p. 69)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition: No changes -Exclusions: Clarify that abandoned calls represents the "volume" of abandoned calls -Business Rules: Wording clarification noting that abandoned calls are not counted in volume but the time is included -Calculation: Wording clarification -Report Structure: No changes -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes-parity -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: No Changes Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. Calculation: CLECs AGREE WITH MODIFICATION. The total abandoned call duration needs to be added into the Average Answer Time "c" = Sum of all answer times + total abandoned calls duration" and "d = Total Number of Answered Calls in the reporting period". Report Structure: No Changes Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs would like to understand the proposed change and the effects to reported results. The changes seem to be more than "Wording Clarification" Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
M&R-7 (BST matrix, p. 70)	-Delete Measure -Few CLECs want this process anymore. BellSouth will continue to offer this service to any customer who asks for their name to be put on the E-Mail list, but the measurement of this process is not necessary		DISAGREE: This measurement has some interplay with some of the other BST proposed changes. Specifically, BST is trying to add an exclusion to every measurement for "Troubles outside BST's control." BST includes examples of cable cuts as rationale for this added exclusion for which BST should not be held responsible. In this measurement (and contrary to BST's previously mentioned rationale), BST claims that network outages (like cable cuts) would still be covered by other measurements

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
3-1 BST matrix, p 70-71)	-Title: Wording clarification -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: Wording clarification -Business Rules: Wording clarification. -Calculation: Delete calculation for Measure of Adjustments (not a meaningful measurement) -Report Structure: 1) Delete Regional Report, 2) Delete Number of Adjustments report -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes- parity -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. The clarifications BST proposes delete the reporting interval (i.e., "the current month") and render the definition too vague. The original definition in the SQM should be retained but add, "by BellSouth to wholesale and retail customers" Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. Adjustments are as a result of billing inaccuracy. Most bill dispute resolutions could be called settlements. Also, BST must be held accountable for all regulatory mandated or contract rates as backbilling by BST must be verified as accurate Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. The business rules should be left "as is". The current rules provide detailed information on how calculation relates to the business and how the result is reported (percentage) are important to define the measure in a complete manner Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. The word clarification changing "current" month to "reporting" month would impact the measure by having to submit billing disputes within the report month. CLEC must verify the billing accuracy and often cannot get that done in the report period Report Structure: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs oppose deleting the number of adjustments, but regional report elimination is acceptable Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
B-2 (BST matrix, p 71-73	-Title: Wording Clarification -Definition: Wording Clarification		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	-Business Rules: 1) Wordng clarification, 2) Add language noting that CLEC bills and BellSouth bills transmitted in less than or equal to one day difference will be considered parity -Calculation: Wordng clarification -Report Structure: Delete Regional report -Disagg: Wordng clarification -Standard: No changes-parity -SEEM: No changes		Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Critical to measure days to receipt as delays in the bill impact the CLECs' ability to pay the bill on time CLECs do not agree with language that 1 days' difference is parity Statistical tests will be the judge of what is parity Exclusions: No Change Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE The changes result in BST not being accountable for bill delivery The changes reflect a change in the measure the mean time to billing transmission /mailing It changes the entire meaning of the measure from "receipt of bill" to transmission of bill -- transmission or USPS does not equal delivery in a reasonable time Calculation: CLECs AGREE. Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE. CLECs do not oppose change if no UNEs get billed out of CABs. Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
B-3 (BST matrix, p 73)	-Delete Measure Not a key measurement since it captures the accuracy of the packs, not the content of the packs		CLECs DISAGREE. This measure provides CLECs with an accounting of BST's ability to transmit data reliably CLECs cannot read packs if not formatted correctly. This metric is needed to determine accuracy
B-4 (BST matrix, p 73)	-Delete Measure Measurement is similar to B-5 Both measure usage data delivery, but at different points B-4 at 30 days and B-5 at 6 days		CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs need this measure to protect against back-billing of usage charges on their monthly invoices Although B-5 may be capturing if the usage that gets billed appropriately makes its on-time benchmark, it does not pick up when BST goes back and finds it did not render a back-bill for some usage charges sent on DUFs and ADUFs to the CLEC

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
B-5 (BST matrix, p. 73-74) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	Title: Wording clarification -Definition: Wording clarification and removal of last sentence which refers to a retail comparison which is not appropriate given that this measurement uses a benchmark -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Wording clarification -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: No changes -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: Wording clarification -SEEM: No changes	Exclusion: Add exclusion for non-completed calls Business Rules: Add language to make clear the type of billable usage, particularly third party, that should be covered in this metric	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. CLECs accept change only if BST provides retail performance at 6 months review to reset benchmarks Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs believe the information on how soon after recording this data is expected to be sent out, even with the long interval for this metric, is important Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: No Changes Disagg: CLECs AGREE. Standard: CLECs AGREE. SEEM: No Changes
B-6 (BST matrix, p. 74) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Delete Measure Measure is correlated to B-5 timeliness. B-6 is average days to deliver, but is not measuring anything additional that is meaningful	Exclusion: Add exclusion for non-completed calls Business Rules: Add language to make clear the type of billable usage, particularly third party, that should be covered in this metric	CLECs DISAGREE. But CLECs might agree if a tighter benchmark is set for B-5 metric after examining data in this six-month review. Also, such data for benchmark analysis of averages and dispersions of when the data is sent also must be provided in future reviews to evaluate whether the benchmark provides parity with BST's treatment of billing for its end users
B-7 (BST matrix, p. 74)	-Delete Measure BellSouth does not bill the CLEC end user and BellSouth's recurring and non-recurring charges have little impact on the CLECs billing to the end user		CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs would like to keep metrics that capture problems with back-billings. Aged charges from past months are difficult to validate and disruptive to business plans and associated pricing. Both late recurring and non-recurring charges need to be captured. Ideally, those charges would be billed to the CLEC within 30 days of when the activity occurred
B-8 (BST matrix, p. 74)	-Delete Measure BellSouth does not bill the CLEC end user and BellSouth's recurring and non-recurring charges have little impact on the CLECs billing to the end		CLECs DISAGREE. BST should be held responsible for accurate billing. This is not about CLECs billing end-user customers but the validation of bill completeness (Ex. Covad has recently been

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	user		back-billed non-recurring charges for almost 2000 Line Sharing customers due to BST's billing inaccuracies) CLECs would like to keep metrics that capture problems with back-billings Charges coming from far in the past are hard to check and disruptive to business plans Both late recurring and non- recurring charges need to be captured if not on a bill with 30 days of when the activity occurred for which the CLEC is being billed
B-9 (BST matrix, p 74)	-Delete Measure -Measure has had no activity in last 12 months		CLECs TENTATIVELY AGREE. CLECs may allow deletion but would like to discuss first whether this is designed appropriately to capture any issues that may be being brought to BST's attention but does not rely on the forms that are counted in the measure
B-10 (BST matrix, p 75	-Delete Measure Dollar value of most of volume for this measure is very small This measurement evaluates all disputes equally, regardless of the value BellSouth is willing to consider another dispute timeliness metric		CLECs DISAGREE. Dollar value is not the issue but the measure of BST's responsiveness to requirement of 45 day response to BAR – regardless of dollar value of claims Many CLECs file large claims for adjustment and do not want to lose a metric that provides an incentive to move those claims to quicker resolution Of course, CLECs would be open to discussing improvements in the metric and promote prompt resolution of both large and small claims CLECs also have a concern that BST is claiming it's measuring on a line-item basis but the denominator counts appear too small to be done on a line item basis consistently CLECs had expected the denominator would be the number of claims filed and not the line items on those claims
B-11 Billing Completion Notice Timeliness (CLEC response Appendix A, p. 1-2)		-New Measure Measures the percent of completed orders for which BellSouth sent a timely billing completion notice to the CLEC Add to SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2	

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SOM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC Proposed SOM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
Operator Services/Directory Assistance			
OS-1 (BST matrix, p. 75)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
OS-2 (BST matrix, p. 75)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
DA-1 (BST matrix, p. 75)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
DA-2 (BST matrix, p. 75)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
D-1 (BST matrix, p. 75)	-Delete Measure Process is essentially Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
D-2 (BST matrix, p. 76)	-Delete Measure Accuracy of databases is also being assessed by the mechanized service order accuracy measurement		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
D-3 (BST matrix, p. 76)	-Delete Measure Not a key measurement and BellSouth's performance has been excellent. If problems loading NXX and LRNs, problems would affect the M&R measurements		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
E-911			
E-1 (BST matrix, p. 76)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECs and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/25/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
E-2 (BST matrix, p 76)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECS and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECS and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
E-3 (BST matrix, p 76)	-Delete Measure Measure is Parity by Design		CLECs DISAGREE The fact that a measure is parity by design does not obviate the need for CLECS and the FPSC to monitor BellSouth's performance
Trunk Group Performance			
TGP-1 (BST matrix, p 76-78) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title to combine TGP-1 (aggregate) and TGP-2 (CLEC Specific) -Definition: Wording clarifications. -Exclusions: Wording clarifications -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Report Structure: Add CLEC specific report -Disagg: Add CLEC specific -Standard: wording clarifications -SEEM: Added to Tier 1	Business Rules: Add phrase to notification process that states, BellSouth should notify the CLEC's traffic planning group or representatives via email when such blocking meets this exclusion criteria	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs do not see where the description of how parity is compared is picked up in business rules CLECs want language describing the hour by hour comparison in the metric Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. CLECs accept the moving of the definition of "unanticipated significant traffic" and wording change for another exclusion Business Rules: CLECs AGREE CLECs do not oppose the deleted language but desire a clarification of how the metric compares blocking hours Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree to combine with each result reported separately, CLEC aggregate, CLEC specific, BST blocking Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. CLEC-aggregate and CLEC-specific results should be reported separately, once with and once without CLEC-caused exclusions. BST needs to explain "where applicable" language before CLECs can agree

Measure Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
TGP-2 (BST matrix, p. 78) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Delete Measure Combined into TGP-1		Standard: CLECs AGREE. SEEM: CLECs AGREE. CLECs AGREE. As long as existing notification language on CLEC-caused blocking gets added to TGP-1
C-1 (BST matrix, p. 78-79)	Collocation -Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarifications -Exclusions: No changes. -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: Wording clarifications -Disagg: Wording clarifications -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. CLECs agree with the caveat that the method of measurement must be detailed (i.e., "average" "calendar days") in other sections Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE. Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
C-2 (BST matrix, p. 79-80)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarifications -Exclusions: Add exclusion for any bona fide firm order with a CLEC negotiated interval longer than the benchmark interval -Business Rules: 1) Wording clarifications, 2) Delete sentence referring to cable assignments -Calculations: No changes -Report Structure: Wording clarification		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs DISAGREE. Retain original definition. BST's clarifications make definition to vague Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs AGREE. Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
	-Disagg: Revise to conform to PPSC collocation order -Standard: See disagg changes -SEEM: No changes.		Standard: CLECs AGREE SEEM: No Changes
C-3 (BST matrix, p. 80-81)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarifications -Exclusions: No changes. -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Wording clarification -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. Retain last sentence "The arrangement is considered a missed due date " because it defines "due date" Calculation: CLECs AGREE Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
Change Management			
CM-1 (BST matrix, p. 81-82)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification (added definition of CCP) -Exclusions: Wording clarification -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: No changes -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs AGREE. Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. We need to keep the original business rules. We agree with the interval start and stop but retain the original business rules Calculation: CLECs AGREE Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: CLECs AGREE SEEM: CLECs AGREE
CM-2	-Delete Measure		

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(BST matrix, p. 82)	-CM-2 is not needed because it only measures those notices missed in the CM-1 measurement		CLECs AGREE
CM-3 (BST matrix, p 82-83)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification (add definition of CCP) -Exclusions: Wording clarification -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: Wording clarification -Report Structure: No changes -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. BST's changes make exclusions even vaguer thereby leaving the exclusions open to abuse. They take away specific exclusions which should be retained Business Rules: CLECs AGREE Calculation: CLECs AGREE Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: CLECs AGREE SEEM: CLECs AGREE
CM-4 (BST matrix, p 83)	-Delete Measure -CM-4 is not needed because it only measures those notices missed in the CM-3 measurement		CLECs AGREE
CM-5 (BST matrix, p 83)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: No changes -Disagg: No changes -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: CLECs AGREE Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: No Changes Disagg: No Changes CLEC Note: The list of systems in the disaggregation portion of this measure (notification of outages) should match the systems in the CCP document. See below for CCP list From CCP Document A Type 1 System Outage is a condition where the CLEC Pre-orders / Orders /

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			Queries / Maintenance Requests cannot be submitted or will not be accepted by BellSouth Interfaces or Gateways LENS - Local Exchange Navigation System EDI - Electronic Data Interchange TAG - Telecommunications Access Gateway TAFI - Trouble Administration Facilitation Interface EC-TA - Electronic Communications Trouble Administration Local CSOTS - CLEC Service Order Tracking System CCP Legacy Systems SOCS - Service Order Communications System LMOS - Loop Maintenance Operations System RSAG - Regional Street Address Guide ATLAS - Application for Telephone Number Load Administration & Selection LFACS - Loop Facilities Assignment & Control System CRIS - Customer Records Information System CABS - Carrier Access Billing System IBS - Integrated Billing Solutions WEA - Work Force Administration Linkages LEO - Local Exchange Ordering LESOG - Local Exchange Service Order Generator LNP Gateway - Local Number Portability Gateway LAUTO - Local Number Portability Automation SGG - ServiceGate Gateway SOG - Service Order Generator DOM - Delivery Order Manager Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes

Measure/ Reference	Ball's South Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/23/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
CM-6 (BST matrix, p 83-84)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: Wording clarifications -Calculation: Wording clarifications -Report Structure: Report scope changed to region. -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: CLECs DISAGREE. Levels of severity are included except for seventy 1. It should be included based on the way the CCP is established Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. Clarify the number of days to correct the problem. Critical to include in the calculation Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
CM-7 (BST matrix, p. 84-85)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification -Exclusions: Wording clarification -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: Wording clarification -Report Structure: Report scope changed to region -Disagg: Wording clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE Exclusions: CLECs AGREE Business Rules: CLECs AGREE Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. The calculation in the denominator is being changed to "responded to" from "submitted". This changes the possible number of entries for the denominator Report Structure: CLECs AGREE Disagg: CLECs AGREE Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
CM-8 (BST matrix, p 85-86)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording clarification. -Exclusions: Wording clarification -Business Rules: Wording clarification -Calculation: Wording clarification. -Report Structure: Report scope changed to region. -Disagg: Wording clarification. -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes.		Title: CLEC's DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLEC's AGREE Exclusions: CLEC's AGREE Business Rules: CLEC's AGREE Calculation: CLEC's AGREE Report Structure: CLEC's AGREE. Disagg: CLEC's AGREE. Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
CM-9 (BST matrix, p 86-87)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Wording changes to correct a mistake in labeling the severity defects -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: 1) Wording changes to correct severity level numbers, 2) Wording clarification of the CCP. -Calculation: Wording changes to correct severity level numbers -Report Structure: 1) Wording clarifications to correct severity level numbers ; 2) Report scope changed to region. -Disagg: Wording clarifications to correct severity level numbers -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes.		Title: CLEC's DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Exclusions: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Business Rules: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Calculation: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Report Structure: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Disagg: CLEC's DISAGREE. See note below Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes CLEC NOTE: CLEC's DISAGREE. The purpose of this measure is to determine defects in production releases. Excluding Severity level 1 defects from this measure impacts the validity of the overall measures. BST is attempting to have these Severity 1 'production' outages 'captured' in CM-5. Where this might be appropriate to complete the overall measure of outages, it also must be included in this measure to provide a truer picture of defects during productions. This data should be a part of both

Measure Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Response (Agree/Disagree) measures for accurate representation of the metrics
CM-10 (BST matrix, p 87)	-Title: Modified title -Definition: Worded clarification -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: No changes -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: Report scope changed to region -Disagg: Worded clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes		Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: No Changes Business Rules: No Changes Calculation: No Changes Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs AGREE. Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
CM-11 (BST matrix, p 88-89) (CLEC Response, Appendix B)	-Title: Modified title. -Definition: Worded clarification -Exclusions: No changes -Business Rules: No changes -Calculation: No changes -Report Structure: Report scope changed to region -Disagg: Worded clarification -Standard: No changes -SEEM: No changes.	Title: Modified Title (Delete within 60 weeks of prioritization and replace with "specified interval") Exclusions Delete 60 weeks and replace with specified interval Business Rules Add language stating that BellSouth will implement software related changes within 60 weeks and process related changes within 60 calendar days Calculation Delete 60 weeks/days from calculation	Title: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section Definition: CLECs AGREE. Exclusions: CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC proposal Business Rules: No Changes CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC proposal Calculation: CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs need clarification on "most recent" vs "first" release prioritization. BST appears to be substantially altering the calculations This warrants further discussion at the workshop Report Structure: CLECs AGREE. Disagg: CLECs DISAGREE. Disaggregation appears to be inconsistent with report structure Standard: No Changes SEEM: No Changes
Appendix A	Delete Appendix A		CLECs DISAGREE . CLECs propose that BST add the standard reporting levels with definition

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
(BST matrix, p 89)	-Reporting Scope		example Region State
Appendix B (BST matrix, p 89)	Title: Change from Appendix B to A -Updates and corrections		CLECs DISAGREE. CLECs propose that BST SEEM SME and CLECs' representative review each definition and provide joint recommendation on changes during review period In addition, CLECs propose to define test orders as those orders that do not involve "live" customers
Appendix C (BST matrix, p 90-91)	Title: Change from Appendix C to Appendix B C-1: -Delete info regarding BellSouth's internal audit policy C-2: 1) Wordings clarifications, 2) Insert language that states it is not necessary for BellSouth to undergo an audit of the SQM for every CLEC with which it has a contract, 3) Remove reference to undergo an audit each year for the next five years and replace with every other year for the next five years, 4) Remove reference to third party auditor being jointly selected by BellSouth and the CLEC 5) Insert language that states, "the costs shall be borne 50% by BellSouth and 50% by the CLEC. If no party is sharing the costs of this audit, BellSouth may utilize its internal auditing organization, 6) Revise language to state that independent third party auditor shall be selected by BellSouth, with input from PSC, and other parties bearing the cost of the audit 7) Delete referenced to BellSouth, PSC, and CLECs jointly determining scope of audit and add language that states, "Due to the regional nature of the processes used to generate performance metric data, BellSouth will agree to no more than one regional third party audit within its region per year 8) Remove the word SEEM from paragraph noting the intention of the audits		Title. CLECs DISAGREE. Keep as Appendix C Also, see CLEC comment under SQM-All Measures section C-1: CLECs DISAGREE. BST attempts to change the audit structure to audit the PMQAP as the external audit. CLECs agree to include the PMQAP in an external audit in addition to BST's own internal auditing process. It is important for the Commission and CLECs to know what internal process or audit are in place to monitor BST's adherence to proprietary processes C-2: 1) CLECs DISAGREE. BST's contractual obligations are between BellSouth and CLEC, therefore, not subject to change 2) CLECs DISAGREE. What BST agreed to in a contract with a CLEC is not a part of this BellSouth Audit policy. As BST undertook a separate agreement with the CLEC(s) in question and should comply with the IA unless both parties agree to amend that IA for removal 3) CLECs DISAGREE. While CLECs may agree to an audit every other year, CLECs do not agree to change the external 'comprehensive audit at the aggregate level reports' to the PMQAP 4) CLECs DISAGREE. An external audit or

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLECs' Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
			internal audit conducted by a third party should include a process for vendor selection to include the sponsors of the audit, i.e., BST, PSC, and CLECs regardless of who bears the cost of the audit 5) CLECs DISAGREE. BellSouth self-auditing will result in a prejudiced result 6) CLECs DISAGREE. An external audit or internal audit conducted by a third party should include a process for vendor selection to include the sponsors of the audit, i.e., BST, PSC, and CLECs regardless of who bears the cost of the audit 7) CLECs DISAGREE IN PART. CLECs do not disagree that a regional audit may be appropriate but language should be included that addresses the state differences between ordered PSC measures and the coordination of multiple PSC involved in the audit process 8) CLECs DISAGREE. See CLEC position on SEEM
Appendix D (BST matrix, p 91)	-Title: Change from Appendix D to Appendix C -Update interface tables -Remove OSS-1 and OSS-4 from Appendix—propose to delete measures		CLECs DISAGREE. This should remain the same with the exception of those systems interfaces added to the tables, i.e. TAG-XML, SGG
New Appendix (BST matrix, p 92)	-New Appendix D to add new Reposting Policy		CLECs AGREE.
New Appendix (BST matrix, p 92)	-New Appendix E to add Description of Raw Data and other Supporting Data Files.		CLECs DISAGREE. BST is making significant changes affecting CLECs' access to Raw Data and the usability of that data. In addition, it appears that BST is removing their obligation to provide certain raw data files (i.e., Pre-Ordering, Collocation, Database Updates...) that they are currently providing. These changes are not consistent with the current SDUM and require further discussion between BST and the CLEC Coalition.

Measure/ Reference	BellSouth Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	CLEC's Proposed SQM Changes (7/28/04)	Response (Agree/Disagree)
Flow Through Matrix (BST matrix, p 93)	-Remove Flow Through Matrix from SQM and make available through BellSouth website.		CLECs AGREE.
Performance Improvement Plan and Resolution Process			
Performance Plans to improve wholesale performance (CLEC Response, p 6-7)		Develop a process where performance that may be in parity, but of poor quality can be brought to BellSouth's attention with a request that such performance be improved	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. mail on this 27th day of August 2004 to

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