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September 8, 2004

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Hon. Pat Miller, Chairman
Tennessee Regulatory Authority
460 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37238

Re: *Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and NuVox Communications, Inc.*
Docket No. 04-00133

Dear Chairman Miller:

Enclosed are the original and fourteen copies of BellSouth's *Opposition to NuVox's Motion to Adopt Procedural Order*. Copies of the enclosed are being provided to counsel of record

Very truly yours,

Guy M. Hicks

GMH:ch

BEFORE THE TENNESSEE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Nashville, Tennessee

In Re: *Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and NuVox Communications, Inc.*

Docket No. 04-00133

OPPOSITION OF BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. TO NUVOX'S MOTION TO ADOPT PROCEDURAL ORDER

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth") hereby opposes NuVox Communications, Inc.'s ("NuVox") *Motion to Adopt Procedural Order ("Motion")* in the matter of BellSouth's Complaint to enforce the audit provisions in Attachment 2, Section 10.5.4 of the parties' interconnection agreement.

INTRODUCTION

NuVox casts the instant *Motion* in "procedural" terms, and claims that it is "merely trying to foil BellSouth's attempt to litigate it into submission." *Motion* at 3. The *Motion* is far more than procedural, and its intent is anything but mere "prudence, economy and fairness." *See id.* n. 5. The so-called "procedural motion", in fact, is an attempt to convince the Tennessee Regulatory Authority ("TRA" or "Authority") to defer to the findings and conclusions made by another state commission – ***even though the TRA has already made its own contrary findings in an EELs audit case right here in Tennessee***. *See Report and Recommendation of Pre-Hearing Officer,* February 13, 2004, *("Order")* (Exhibit A), *Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and ITC^DeltaCom Communications, Inc. and Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth*

Telecommunications, Inc. and XO Tennessee, Inc., Docket No. 02-01203 ("DeltaCom/XO case" or "Docket No. 02-01203"). In an attempt to avoid the same outcome here as in the earlier EELs audit case, NuVox attempts to use a "procedural" device to distract the TRA form its own precedent, which is squarely on point, and draw the TRA down the wrong path taken in Georgia.

NuVox's *Motion* should be treated in accordance with what it actually seeks, not as it is conveniently labeled. It should be denied because it is an attempt to disregard the TRA's authority to make decisions in Tennessee and supplant Tennessee's well-reasoned precedent with a contrary decision from Georgia..

BACKGROUND

BellSouth and NuVox entered into an interconnection agreement to govern their contractual relationship in all nine states in BellSouth's region. The interconnection agreement was separately submitted to, and approved by, each state's public service commission pursuant to authority bestowed by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Thus, the interconnection agreements are unique to each state, albeit with many similar, but not always identical terms.

Under the Act, each state commission is empowered to interpret and enforce the agreements it approves. No state commission has the power to interpret or enforce the agreements approved by the other commissions. Nor can any state bind, or be bound by, the decisions of the other states' commissions in disputes arising out of the agreements those state commissions approved. In short, Tennessee interconnection agreements are to be construed in Tennessee by the TRA. The interconnection agreement out of which this dispute arises, is the interconnection agreement that the

TRA approved ("Agreement" or "Tennessee Agreement") and it is the TRA's job, not the Georgia Public Service Commission's ("GPSC") job, to construe it to resolve this dispute

The Tennessee Agreement permits NuVox to convert special access circuits to enhanced extended loops ("EELs") under certain terms and conditions. Pursuant to the Tennessee Agreement, NuVox converted several hundred circuits to EELs in Tennessee.[1] In accordance with the Agreement's express terms, BellSouth provisioned the requested conversions based solely upon NuVox's self-certification that the circuits qualified for conversion under the Agreement.

The Agreement permits BellSouth to audit NuVox's EELs to verify compliance with NuVox's certification upon 30 days' notice to NuVox. In March 2002, BellSouth provided notice to NuVox that it desired to audit the converted circuits, after analyses of NuVox's Tennessee and Florida traffic raised questions about NuVox's certifications. BellSouth's assertion of its audit rights and notice of its intent to audit NuVox's Tennessee circuits fully complied with the express terms of the Agreement.

NuVox, however, has taken the position that much more is required under the Agreement. In NuVox's view, BellSouth may not audit NuVox's Tennessee EELs unless: (1) BellSouth "demonstrates a concern" (synonymous, apparently, with "litigate to establish a concern") as to (2) specific circuits (in Tennessee), whereupon (3) BellSouth may audit only those circuits for which concern is "demonstrated", (4) but only so long as the audit is conducted by an independent auditor (which means, "acceptable to NuVox") under AICPA standards (*i.e.*, approved by NuVox) and (5) at BellSouth's

sole expense. These requirements do not appear in the parties' Agreement, with the technical exception of the audit expenses (but not on the terms and conditions upon which NuVox insists)

NuVox's stance is the same as that offered unsuccessfully by the CLECs in the earlier Tennessee EELs audit case. Just as those CLECs did in the earlier case, NuVox has unlawfully refused to permit BellSouth to audit its Tennessee EELs (as elsewhere). NuVox's position is impossible to reconcile with the TRA's decision in the earlier EELs audit case in which, construing similar language, the TRA determined that BellSouth was entitled to conduct EELs audits without first demonstrating cause, as NuVox demands. *Order* at 9. NuVox's refusal to permit these same types of audits has left BellSouth no alternative but to seek enforcement – in each state – of its audit rights under the agreements approved and ordered in each state. To date, BellSouth has filed complaints in Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina and, of course, Tennessee.

As a practical matter, NuVox's position in Tennessee is difficult to understand. Given the ruling in the DeltaCom/XO EELs audit case, the precedent in Tennessee is clear. NuVox's interpretation of the argument simply cannot be squared with that precedent. NuVox's attempt to have the TRA "adopt" the findings from a Georgia case is an obvious ploy to avoid the application of the TRA's precedent in this case.

NuVox's refusal to permit the audit of its EELs is a region-wide policy not based on reasons germane to any particular state. Thus, BellSouth's various enforcement complaints have necessarily articulated similar allegations. This does not mean, however, as a legal matter that, under the Act's enforcement scheme, each complaint

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[1] Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the other states' agreements, NuVox converted over two thousand circuits in six of the nine states (Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,

and issues therein are "identical" and, therefore, subject to the decision reached in another state by another commission.

A. The Tennessee DeltaCom/XO EELs Audit Case.

In February, 2004, the Hearing Officer in Docket No. 02-01203 entered a *Report and Recommendation* (Exhibit A) which was later adopted by the TRA. In that case, the Hearing Officer construed similar language in the interconnection agreements of those CLECs addressing the issue of EELs audits. It is clear from review of the Hearing Officer's *Order* that the very same arguments advanced by NuVox in this case have been rejected in a similar case by the TRA. In light of this applicable precedent, the attempt of NuVox to obtain the TRA's agreement to defer to findings and conclusions from a Georgia proceeding is non-sensical. In the earlier Tennessee EELs audit case, the TRA correctly found that the contract governed and that the contract did not require the type of threshold articulation of cause demanded by NuVox in this case. There is no reason to expect that the TRA considering the similar NuVox agreement would not reach a decision similar and consistent with its earlier decision in Docket No. 02-01203. NuVox simply raises the Georgia case in an attempt to divert the TRA from its own precedent and to obtain a decision on its case that is inconsistent with the TRA's decision in Docket No. 02-01203.

Even a cursory review of the *Order* attached as Exhibit A demonstrates that NuVox is attempting, by its procedural motion, to obtain relief in this case that would be squarely inconsistent with the TRA's earlier decision.

Florida and Kentucky)

B. The Georgia Proceedings.

The first of BellSouth's EELs audit enforcement actions was filed in Georgia, on May 13, 2002, pursuant to the agreement approved by the GPSC for Georgia. On June 29, 2004, after two years of litigation, the GPSC issued its order and opinion. *See In Re: Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement Between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and NuVox Communications, Inc.*, Dkt. No. 12778-U, *Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order* (June 29, 2004) (Exhibit B). The results in Georgia are best described as mixed.

The GPSC ruled that BellSouth was entitled to audit NuVox's Georgia EELs. Obviously, this is the ultimate result that BellSouth sought. In reaching that decision, however, the GPSC agreed with NuVox that the parties' agreement in Georgia required BellSouth to "demonstrate a concern" prior to conducting the audit. The GPSC found, contrary to NuVox's contentions, that BellSouth demonstrated such a concern and ordered the audit.[2]

The parties were advised of the likely contents of the GPSC's decision several days prior to its release. Indeed, NuVox was confident enough in its forecast of the order's contents that it argued in its Answer to the TRA, filed June 21, 2004, that, "based upon statements made and votes cast by Georgia Commissioners at the Georgia Commission meeting on May 18, 2004," the GPSC "*already has found* in reviewing these same issues and the same relevant Agreement provisions, [that] BellSouth must demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit of particular converted circuits. . ." NuVox's Answer at 1-2, n. 3 (emphasis added).

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[2] The GPSC also agreed that the agreement in Georgia required BellSouth to select a third party independent auditor, who should conduct the audit in accordance with AICPA standards

ARGUMENT

A. NuVox's *Motion* Is Nothing More Than An Attempt To Divert The TRA From Its Own Precedent On EELs Audits.

As noted above, and as review of the *Order* attached as Exhibit A demonstrates, the TRA has considered issues like those presented in this case in a prior case. That prior case provides important precedent for its decision in this case. Ignoring the TRA's own precedent in favor of adoption of another state commission's contrary conclusions is simply nonsensical. NuVox may certainly attempt to argue that its case could, in some way, be distinguished from the earlier TRA precedent, but NuVox must actually make that argument Instead of trying to distinguish the earlier Tennessee EELs audit case, NuVox acts as if that case never occurred and encourages the TRA to look blindly to a Georgia case and ignore its own Tennessee precedent

The TRA has a history of taking care to observe its own precedent in all matters. Granting NuVox's *Motion* would be a stark departure from that course.

B. NuVox's *Motion* Improperly Asserts Collateral Estoppel.

When NuVox asks the TRA to "adopt the same legal conclusions [as] reached by the Georgia Commission" and to conduct a "limited evidentiary hearing" on the "Tennessee-specific" factual issues, NuVox is seeking to bar litigation of those issues in this proceeding. The two principal issues targeted by NuVox, of course, are whether BellSouth is required to demonstrate a concern regarding the circuits' compliance[3] with NuVox's self-certification, and whether BellSouth's auditor selection complies with the terms of the Agreement Thus, NuVox is asking the TRA to find in its favor on those

[3] NuVox states in its motion that BellSouth seeks to audit "forty-four (44) converted EELs." This is apparently a typographical error BellSouth's Complaint speaks of *443 EELs* conversions, not 44 Complaint at 13

issues on the grounds that they were litigated before, and decided by, the GPSC in NuVox's favor.[4] This is the essence of collateral estoppel.

As discussed below, each state has jurisdiction over the interconnection agreements for its state. Thus, collateral estoppel is unavailable in state-by-state disputes involving different state commission-approved agreements because the issues in question, by definition under the Act, are not identical by virtue of the different state commission approvals themselves. Under the Act, collateral estoppel would appear to apply only in matters litigated before the same commission in disputes arising out of interconnection agreements approved by that commission.

To the extent that NuVox has cast its *Motion* as a way in which to expedite handling of this case, BellSouth recognizes that summary judgment may, in fact, be a proper fashion for resolution of this case. In fact, in Docket No. 02-01203, the dispute regarding audits of EELs pursuant to the XO and DeltaCom interconnection agreements were handled by cross motions for summary judgment. This process provided an expedited and reasonable resolution of the legal issues driving the case, that is, the proper construction of the interconnection agreements between the parties and the interplay between those agreements and FCC orders. BellSouth does not object to resolution of the case through such a process.

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[4] Conversely, NuVox is not willing to acknowledge that such a concern has been demonstrated regarding the Tennessee EELs, even though, as NuVox knows, the evidence that supported the GPSC's finding that cause was shown would adequately show cause in this matter were it required Nor does NuVox even acknowledge that BellSouth's choice of auditor for the Georgia EELs is acceptable for Tennessee as well Thus, what NuVox "merely" wants is self-serving –the fastest path to a favorable decision – however improper It does not want a fair, expeditious and economical resolution of the issues raised in this proceeding, as it claims

C. The TRA Is Not Bound By The GPSC's Determinations.

NuVox's *Motion* reflects a flawed understanding of the role that Congress assigned to the state commissions under the Act regarding interconnection agreements. Federal law therefore does not support NuVox's attempt to short-circuit ***Tennessee's*** handling of ***Tennessee's*** precedent.

State commission authority to approve or reject interconnection agreements "carries with it the authority to interpret agreements that have already been approved," and to enforce them. *BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Services, Inc.*, 317 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). *See also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC*, 208 F.3d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000); *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C.*, 120 F 3d 753, 804 (8th Cir. 1997), *rev'd in part on other grounds by AT&T Corp v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366, 385, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999) ("state commissions retain primary authority to enforce the substantive terms of the agreements made pursuant to sections 251 and 252").[5] Thus, the Act charges state commissions to "determin[e] what the parties intended under their agreements" when resolving interconnection disputes arising out of state-approved agreements. *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C.*, 120 F.3d at 804.

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has recognized that, "*due to its role in the approval process*, a state commission is well-suited to address disputes arising from interconnection agreements." *In re Starpower*, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 11277, 11280 (emphasis added). *See MCIMetro Access Transmission Services, Inc.*, 317 F.3d at 1276. The linchpin of state commission authority to interpret and enforce

[5] Section 252(e) provides the standards for approval or rejection of interconnection agreements by state public service commissions *See* 47 U S C § 252(e)

interconnection agreements – a power that is not expressly articulated in the Act – is the state commissions' approval or rejection authority, which *is* expressly provided.

As the Eleventh Circuit opined in *MCIMetro Access Transmission Services, Inc.*, "the language of § 252 persuades us that in granting to the public service commissions the power to approve or reject interconnection agreements, Congress intended to include the power to interpret and enforce in the first instance. . . ." *MCIMetro Access Transmission Services, Inc* , 317 F.3d at 1277. The logic of Congress' approach, as the 11th Circuit observed, is clear:

> A state commission's authority to approve or reject an interconnection agreement would itself be undermined if it lacked authority to determine in the first instance the meaning of an agreement that it has approved. *A court might ascribe to the agreement a meaning that differs from what the state commission believed it was approving* – indeed, the agreement as interpreted by the court *may be one the state commission would never have approved in the first place*. To deprive the state commission of authority to interpret the agreement that it has approved would thus subvert the role that Congress prescribed for state commissions.

Id. at 1278 n.9 (emphases added).

The parties' Agreement was submitted for approval before commissions in each of the nine states in BellSouth's region Under Section 252(e) of the Act, each state commission was authorized to approve or reject the agreements pursuant to the Act's standards Upon approval, each state interconnection agreement became the law governing the parties' interconnection relationship *in that state and that state only*.

As the cited authorities illustrate, the TRA's role, authority and responsibility under the Act did not end when it approved the parties' Agreement for Tennessee. The TRA now has a duty to interpret and enforce the Agreement *it approved*.

It is possible (though BellSouth would consider it unlikely) that the TRA may find the GPSC's reasoning to be persuasive, and NuVox is free to argue that. However, it is certainly also possible that the TRA will find, consistent with its findings in the DeltaCom/XO EELs case, that the GPSC ascribed meanings to the agreement there that differ, perhaps substantially, from what the TRA believes it approved for Tennessee. The Act safeguards this room for disagreement.

Obviously, as the authorities make clear, state commissions cannot bind, or be bound by, the decisions of other state commissions in disputes arising out of their respective state-approved interconnection agreements, regardless of how similar the terms, conditions and issues in a given set of disputes may be.

In addition, it would be imprudent for a commission to "adopt" the conclusions of other commissions in such disputes, especially when its own earlier decisions are contrary to such conclusions.

D. The GPSC's Demonstration Of Concern And Auditor Findings Were Incorrect.

In its *Motion*, NuVox makes much of BellSouth's decision not to ask the GPSC to reconsider its conclusions regarding the concern and auditor independence issues. *Motion* at 3, 4. It should not read too much into that As BellSouth has demonstrated in its Reply to NuVox's Answer in these proceedings, the Agreement clearly *does not* require any demonstration of concern and does not limit BellSouth in the selection of an auditor. These issues, thus, are squarely presented in this matter.

It should not be surprising that BellSouth would choose to avail itself of the results in Georgia – *i.e.*, *that BellSouth may commence the audit of NuVox's Georgia EELs* – even if BellSouth disagrees with how the GPSC arrived at its result and the

impact of the result on the mechanics of the audit to be conducted. After two years of litigating in Georgia, BellSouth wants to audit the EELs, not continue to argue before the GPSC. Make no mistake, however: BellSouth could not disagree more with the "demonstration of concern" and independent auditor portions of the GPSC's decision.

To reiterate BellSouth's position: there is no provision, term or language in the Agreement that requires BellSouth to demonstrate a concern about NuVox's EEL circuits at any time, let alone prior to an audit. Regardless of what the FCC's *Supplemental Order Clarification* actually requires (on which the parties also disagree), the parties *never* incorporated the *Supplemental Order Clarification* into the Agreement. Moreover, even if they had (which they did not), there is no requirement in the *Supplemental Order Clarification* that an ILEC *must* demonstrate or even state a concern prior to the conduct of an audit.

Finally, there is no "independent third party auditor" requirement in the Agreement, express or implied. BellSouth may choose whomever it wishes to conduct the audit. Indeed, under the Agreement, BellSouth has the right to conduct the audit itself. BellSouth's selection, however, is tempered not only by common business sense, but also by what the Agreement actually *does* require; that is, that for any circuits found not to be compliant, BellSouth's remedy can only come through the filing of a complaint with the TRA. Agreement, Attachment 2, § 10.5.4. This adequately protects NuVox's interests.

CONCLUSION

The TRA has considered an EELs audit case much like this one before now. NuVox's *Motion* is nothing more than an attempt to divert the TRA from its own

precedent. Clearly, NuVox knows that if the TRA follows its own precedent, NuVox cannot prevail in this matter. Desperate to avoid that result, NuVox attempts, through a "procedural" device, to supplant the TRA's own precedent with a decision from another state commission.

Although it has permitted BellSouth to audit NuVox's Georgia EELs, the GPSC, unfortunately, employed a flawed rationale that the TRA should not adopt. NuVox complains that BellSouth is attempting to "litigate it into submission." *Motion* at 3, n.5. BellSouth simply wants, after two years of delay by NuVox, to proceed with the audit pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement. Instead, it is NuVox that stubbornly refuses to heed the precedent in Tennessee It is NuVox that insists on raising the same flawed arguments the TRA rejected in the DeltaCom/XO EELs audit case. For all these reasons, NuVox's *Motion* should be denied

Respectfully submitted,

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.



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EXHIBIT A

BEFORE THE TENNESSEE REGULATORY AUTHORITY

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

February 13, 2004

IN RE:	)	
	)	
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND ITC^DELTACOM COMMUNICATIONS, INC.	)	**DOCKET NO. 02-01203**
	)	
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND XO TENNESSEE, INC.	)	

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF PRE-HEARING OFFICER

This matter came before the Pre-Hearing Officer on January 22, 2004 for the purpose of hearing oral arguments on the cross motions for summary judgment of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc ("BellSouth") and ITC^DeltaCom Communications, Inc ("DeltaCom") jointly with XO Tennessee, Inc ("XO" – together with DeltaCom referred to as the "CLECs") filed with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority (the "TRA") on December 22, 2003 For the reasons stated herein, the Pre-Hearing Officer recommends that summary judgment in favor of the CLECs be granted in part

Background

An Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth and DeltaCom was approved by the TRA on August 10, 2001 Included in this agreement is a section entitled "Special Access Service Conversions" with the following relevant subsections

> 8 3 5 1 [DeltaCom] may not convert special access services to combinations of loop and transport network elements, whether or not [DeltaCom] self-provides its entrance facilities (or obtains entrance facilities from a third party) , unless [DeltaCom] uses the combination to provide a significant amount of local exchange service, in addition to exchange access service, to a particular customer To the extent [DeltaCom] requests to convert any special access services to combinations of loop and transport network elements at UNE prices, [DeltaCom] shall provide to BellSouth a letter certifying that [DeltaCom] is providing a significant amount of local exchange service (as described in this section) over such combinations The certification letter shall also indicate under what local usage options [DeltaCom] seeks to qualify for conversion of special access circuits
>
> 8 3 5 3 BellSouth may audit [DeltaCom] records to the extent reasonably necessary in order to verify the type of traffic being transmitted over combinations of loop and transport network elements The audit shall be conducted by a third party independent auditor, and [DeltaCom] shall be given thirty days written notice of scheduled audit Such audit shall occur no more than one time in a calendar year, unless results of an audit find noncompliance with the significant amount of local exchange service requirement In the event of noncompliance, [DeltaCom] shall reimburse BellSouth for the cost of the audit. If, based on its audits, BellSouth concludes that [DeltaCom] is not providing a significant amount of local exchange traffic over the combinations of loop and transport network elements, BellSouth may file a complaint with the appropriate Commission, pursuant to the dispute resolution process as set forth in the Interconnection Agreement In the event that BellSouth prevails, BellSouth may convert such combinations of loop and transport network elements to special access services and may seek appropriate retroactive reimbursement from [DeltaCom]

The Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth and XO,[1] approved by the TRA on August 29, 2000, contains the following language also found in a section entitled "Special Access Service Conversions"

> 1 4 [XO] may not convert special access services to combinations of loop and transport network elements, whether or not [XO] self-provides its entrance facilities (or obtains entrance facilities from a third party), unless [XO] uses the combination to provide a "significant amount of local exchange service," to a particular customer, as defined in 1 4.1 below. To the extent [XO] converts its special access services to combinations of loop and transport network elements at UNE prices, [XO], hereby, certifies that it is providing a significant amount of local exchange service over such

[1] The Interconnection Agreement was originally between BellSouth and Nextlink Tennessee, Inc, which changed its name to XO Tennessee, Inc pursuant to a September 26, 2000 Order of the TRA entered in Docket No 00-00842

> combinations, as set forth in 1 4 1 below If, based on audits performed as set forth in this section, BellSouth concludes that [XO] is not providing a significant amount of local exchange traffic over the combinations of loop and transport network elements, BellSouth may file a complaint with the appropriate Commission, pursuant to the dispute resolution process as set forth in the Interconnection Agreement In the event that BellSouth prevails, BellSouth may convert such combinations of loop and transport network elements to special access services and may seek appropriate retroactive reimbursement from [XO] Notwithstanding any provision in the Parties interconnection agreement to the contrary, BellSouth may only conduct such audits as reasonably necessary to determine whether [XO] is providing a significant amount of local exchange service over facilities provided as combinations of loop and transport network elements, and, except where noncompliance has been found, BellSouth shall perform such audits no more than once each calendar year BellSouth shall provide [XO] and the FCC at least thirty days notice of any such audit, shall hire an independent auditor to perform such audit, and shall be responsible for all costs of said independent audit, unless noncompliance is found, in which case [XO] shall be responsible for reimbursement to BellSouth for the reasonable costs of such audit. [XO] shall cooperate with said auditor, and shall provide appropriate records from which said auditor can verify [XO]'s local usage certification as set forth in 1 4 1 below In no event, however, shall BellSouth or its hired auditor require records other than those kept by [XO] in the ordinary course of business

Pursuant to these provisions, BellSouth provided a thirty-day notice to DeltaCom and XO on May 23, 2002, and April 26, 2002, respectively, of its intent to conduct an audit [2] The CLECs have refused to allow BellSouth to proceed with an audit under the terms proposed by BellSouth.[3]

On November 5, 2002, BellSouth filed a complaint against DeltaCom in TRA Docket No. 02-01203 and an identical complaint against XO in TRA Docket No 02-01204, alleging a violation of the respective audit provisions DeltaCom and XO both filed an answer and counter-complaint on December 5, 2002, essentially alleging that BellSouth's request to conduct an audit was inconsistent with both the language of the interconnection agreement

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[2] *Complaint of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc to Enforce Interconnection Agreement Against DeltaCom*, p 4 (November 5, 2002), *Complaint of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc to Enforce Interconnection Agreement Against XO*, p 5 (November 5, 2002)

[3] *Id, Answer and Counter-Complaint of DeltaCom*, p 5 (December 5, 2002), *Answer and Counter-Complaint of XO*, p 4 (December 5, 2002)

and the requirements of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") Because these two dockets raised identical issues, the Chairman of the Authority consolidated the dockets into Docket No 02-01203 at the regularly scheduled Authority Conference held on November 18, 2002

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

In its third order pertaining to implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC concluded that all requesting carriers are entitled to convert special access services to a combination of loop and transport, or extended enhanced loop ("EEL"), at unbundled network element prices [4] In a subsequent order, the FCC clarified that this conversion is not available to long-distance telecommunications service providers ("IXCs") unless the IXC is providing a "significant amount" of local exchange service [5] Accordingly, in order to justify a conversion, a requesting carrier must certify that the EEL will be used for a "significant amount" of local traffic [6] To confirm compliance with this local service requirement, the FCC authorized limited audits of the requesting carrier by the provisioning incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") [7]

BellSouth's *Motion for Summary Judgment Order Requiring Audit*

In its *Motion for Summary Judgment Order Requiring Audit*, BellSouth seeks the following relief

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[4] *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, FCC 99-238 (*Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*) 15 F C C R 3696, ¶ 486 (November 5, 1999)

[5] *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, FCC 99-370 (*Supplemental Order*) 15 F C C R 1760, ¶¶ 4-5 (November 24, 1999)

[6] *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, FCC 00-183 (*Supplemental Order Clarification*) 15 F C C R 9587, ¶ 29 (June 2, 2000) (hereinafter "*Clarification*")

[7] *Id*

1 A finding that the issues presented in the Complaints and Answers in the above styled docket are issues of law, regarding which there is no dispute as to relevant facts,

2 A finding that the Parties' Interconnection Agreements require the defendants to submit to an audit as sought by BellSouth,

3 An order requiring the defendants to submit to and cooperate with an audit conducted by American Consultants Alliance ("ACA") of all extended enhanced loops, such audit to commence as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 30 days from the issuance of such order, and

4. Any other such relief the Pre-Hearing Officer deems just and reasonable

In pursuance of the requested relief, BellSouth essentially contends that the Interconnection Agreements contain the totality of its authority to audit the CLECS to determine compliance with the "significant amount of local exchange service" requirement [8] BellSouth further contends that, although the FCC has authorized and provided guidelines for such audits, the Commission has also sanctioned deviation from these guidelines by private agreement, pursuant to the perimeters established under 47 U S C A § 252(a)(1) for the voluntary negotiation of interconnection agreements [9] For this reason, BellSouth suggests that any dispute regarding its audit authority must be resolved by the language of each Interconnection Agreement [10]

On this premise, BellSouth concludes that it has appropriately exercised its audit authority Contrary to the position espoused by the CLECs, BellSouth argues that neither Interconnection Agreement requires BellSouth to "articulate a particular concern" as a

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[8] BellSouth's *Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Order Requiring Audit*, p 5 (December 22, 2003) (hereinafter "BellSouth's *Memo*")

[9] BellSouth's *Memo*, at 5-12 *See also, Clarification*, at ¶ 32 (allowing parties to rely on audit provisions contained in negotiated interconnection agreements)

[10] BellSouth's *Memo*, at 5-12

prerequisite to an audit [11] BellSouth suggests that the CLECs are obligated to permit any audit requested with the requisite thirty-day notice [12] BellSouth further argues that nowhere does either Interconnection Agreement exclude new EELS from its audit authority [13] Finally, BellSouth contends that its choice of American Consultants Alliance complies with the ordinary meaning of "independent" as defined by Webster's Dictionary,[14] an acceptable standard since no particular meaning for "independent" was specified in either agreement [15] BellSouth also contends that the scope of the audit is appropriately determined by the auditor and that a sampling of data from each EEL, rather than a sampling of EELS, is appropriate and necessary to make an assessment of compliance.[16]

Joint Motion of DeltaCom and XO for Summary Judgment

In the *Joint Motion of DeltaCom and XO for Summary Judgment*, the CLECs contend that, notwithstanding relevant provisions of the Interconnection Agreements, BellSouth's audits must be conducted in compliance with federal guidelines and suggest that BellSouth's audit requests conflict with these guidelines in the following respects [17]

1 BellSouth's audit request must be "based upon cause;"

2 An audit can include only EEL conversions, and

3. The auditor must conduct the evaluation in accordance with the standards of the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") and must also meet the AICPA standards for determining independence

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[11] *Id* at 12
[12] *Id* at 13-14
[13] BellSouth's *Response to the Joint Motion of XO and DeltaCom for Summary Judgment*, p 6 (January 13, 2004) (hereinafter "BellSouth's *Response*")
[14] (Defining "independent" as "not subject to control by others" and "not affiliated with a larger controlling unit")
[15] BellSouth's *Memo*, at 14-15
[16] BellSouth's *Response*, at 7
[17] *Joint Motion of DeltaCom and XO for Summary Judgment*, p 6 (December 22, 2003) (hereinafter "*Joint Motion*)

The CLECs contend that BellSouth's audit requests violate federal requirements because they failed to articulate a concern that is arguably required by the FCC before an audit may be commenced [18] The CLECs also contend that federal audit provisions, as well as the audit provisions in the interconnection agreements, apply to only converted, but not to new, EELs [19] Finally, the CLECs request that BellSouth be required to select a "truly independent auditor" and that such auditor examine only a "representative sampling of EELs" rather than every EEL employed by the CLECs.[20]

Standard for Summary Judgment

The procedural standards governing review of motions for summary judgment are well settled [21] Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 04 provides that summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine issues with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion remain to be tried and (2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts [22] The moving party bears the burden of proving that its motion satisfies these requirements [23] To properly support its motion, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.[24]

After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is asserted, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to respond with evidence establishing the existence of specific,

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[18] *Joint Motion*, at 3, *See also, Clarification*, at ¶ 31, n 86
[19] *Joint Motion*, at 4-6, *See also, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers*, FCC 03-36 (*Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*) 18 F C C R 19,020, ¶ 623 (August 21, 2003) (hereinafter "*Report and Order*")
[20] *Joint Motion*, at 5, 6
[21] *See* Tenn R Civ P 56, *Hunter v Brown*, 955 S W 2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn 1997)
[22] *See Byrd v Hall*, 847 S W 2d 208, 210 (Tenn 1993), *Anderson v Standard Register Co* , 857 S W 2d 555, 559 (Tenn 1993)
[23] *See Downen v Allstate Ins Co* , 811 S W 2d 523, 524 (Tenn 1991)
[24] *See McCarley v West Quality Food Serv* , 960 S W 2d 585, 588 (Tenn 1998), *Robinson v Omer*, 952 S W 2d 423, 426 (Tenn 1997)

disputed, material facts which must be resolved by the trier of fact [25] Thus, if the moving party successfully negates a claimed basis for the action, the nonmovant may not simply rest upon the pleadings, but must offer proof to establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim If the moving party fails to negate a claim, the nonmovant's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial is not triggered and the motion for summary judgment must fail [26]

The standards governing the assessment of evidence in the summary judgment context are also well established The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor [27] Summary judgment is appropriate only when both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion [28]

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

According to 47 U S C A § 252(a)(1), a voluntarily negotiated interconnection agreement need not comply with the requirements of 47 U S C A § 251 (b) or (c). Because the interconnection agreements at issue in this Docket were voluntarily negotiated, the Parties were at liberty to include terms materially different from their federal counterparts [29]

Notwithstanding this freedom to negotiate, the audit provisions of both interconnection agreements are largely consistent with federal requirements, *i e*, audits are justified to the extent "reasonably necessary" to determine compliance with the local usage requirements, the CLECs are entitled to a thirty-day notice prior to any audit, absent a

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[25] *See Byrd*, 847 S W 2d at 215
[26] See *McCarley*, 960 S W 2d at 588, *Robinson*, 952 S W 2d at 426
[27] *See Robinson*, 952 S W 2d at 426, *Byrd*, 847 S W 2d at 210-11
[28] *See McCall v Wilder*, 913 S W 2d 150, 153 (Tenn 1995), *Carvell v Bottoms*, 900 S W 2d 23, 26 (Tenn 1995)
[29] *See AT&T Corp v Iowa Utilities Bd*, 525 U S 366, 373, 119 S Ct 721, 726, 142 L Ed 2d 835 (1999)

finding of non-compliance, only one audit per year is permitted, absent a finding of non-compliance, the ILEC pays for the cost of the audit, and the audit must be conducted by an independent auditor [30] However, neither agreement, as pertaining to audit requirements, references federal law or in any way suggests an intent to defer to federal law for any inconsistent or absent provision, strongly suggesting that the interconnection agreements are meant to govern in this respect Accordingly, the cross motions for summary judgment should be decided in reference to the language of the interconnection agreements, rather than federal law. In doing so, the intent of the parties should be determined from the four corners of the interconnection agreements [31]

On this premise, there is no readily apparent reason that an audit request from BellSouth must be "based upon cause" as suggested by the CLECs The interconnection agreements do provide for audits as "reasonably necessary" to determine or verify compliance with the local traffic requirement, but "reasonably necessary" may just as rationally apply to the breadth of the audit as well as to the justification for the audit However, neither interconnection agreement provides a process whereby BellSouth actually articulates cause to the CLEC prior to commencement of the audit Accordingly, it is rational to place the decision to conduct an audit initially within the discretion of BellSouth, the party bearing the cost of the audit should there be no findings of noncompliance

Also based on the language of the interconnection agreements, audits should be limited to converted, rather than new, EELs While it may be true, as suggested by BellSouth, that the concerns are the same with new and converted EELs, the interconnection agreements do not provide for the audit of new EELs As mentioned above, the relevant audit language is found in both interconnection agreements in a section entitled "Special

[30] *Clarification*, at ¶¶ 29, 31
[31] *See Simonton v Huff*, 60 S W 3d 820, 825 (Tenn Ct App 2000)

Access Service Conversions "[32] Each section refers multiple times to converted EELs and not at all to the acquisition of new EELs In the absence of any reference to new EELs, it is reasonable to conclude that the audit provisions are meant to apply to converted EELs only

Matters not specifically addressed in the interconnection agreements are left for resolution by the TRA For instance, each agreement requires an audit to be conducted by an independent auditor, but neither agreement provides a method for ascertaining the independence of the auditor The FCC has expressly stated that this issue is most appropriately decided by the relevant state commission[33] In this instance, additional information is needed from the Parties in order for the TRA to make this determination Additional information is also necessary in order for the TRA to determine an appropriate audit methodology, *e g* , whether the audit should utilize a sampling of EELs or a sampling of data from each and every EEL

Recommendation

For the reasons specified above, it is recommended that the Panel decide the cross-motions for summary judgment as follows

1 Deny BellSouth's *Motion for Summary Judgment Order Requiring Audit* in its entirety

2 Grant the *Joint Motion of DeltaCom and XO for Summary Judgment* to the extent that it seeks to limit an audit by BellSouth to converted EELs

3. Deny the *Joint Motion of DeltaCom and XO for Summary Judgment* in all other respects.

[32] Interconnection Agreement with DeltaCom, Section 8 3 5, Interconnection Agreement with XO, Section 4 1

[33] *Report and Order*, at ¶ 625 (August 21, 2003)

It is also recommended that the Panel make the following express pronouncements:

1. BellSouth is not required to articulate a justification prior to the commencement of an audit conducted pursuant to the terms of the interconnection agreements;

2 The interconnection agreements allow for an audit of only converted EELs;

3 BellSouth shall submit for TRA approval the letter of engagement between itself and its independent auditor, and

4 BellSouth shall submit for TRA approval a proposed methodology/procedure for conducting each audit of converted EELs

Respectfully submitted,

DK Beals

Kim Beals, Counsel
as Pre-Hearing Officer

EXHIBIT B

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Docket No. 12778-U : 12778

: 73946

In Re: Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement Between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and NuVox Communications, Inc.

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART THE HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDED ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

This matter arises from the May 13, 2002 Complaint by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc ("BellSouth") filed with the Georgia Public Service Commission ("Commission") against NuVox Communications, Inc. ("NuVox") to enforce the parties' interconnection agreement ("Agreement") BellSouth asserts that it has the right under the parties' interconnection agreement to audit NuVox's records in order to confirm that NuVox is complying with its certification that it is the exclusive provider of local exchange service to its end users. The facilities that BellSouth wishes to audit were initially purchased as special access facilities but were subsequently converted to enhanced extended loops ("EELs") based on NuVox's self-certification that the facilities were used to provide a significant amount of local exchange service

In construing the interconnection agreement, it is necessary to consider the June 2, 2000 order of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 00-183 ("*Supplemental Order Clarification*"). The parties disagree both with respect to the meaning of the FCC order, and the extent to which the order was incorporated into the Agreement

I. STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS

On May 13, 2002, BellSouth filed its Complaint to enforce the parties' Commission-approved interconnection agreement The specific relief requested by BellSouth was that the Commission resolve the Complaint on an expedited basis, declare that NuVox breached the interconnection agreement by refusing to allow BellSouth to audit the facilities NuVox self-certified as providing "a significant amount of local exchange service," require NuVox to allow such an audit as soon as BellSouth's auditors are available and order NuVox to cooperate with the auditors selected by BellSouth. (BellSouth Complaint, pp. 5-6) NuVox filed with the Commission its Answer to the Complaint on May 21, 2002. NuVox supplemented its Answer on June 4, 2002

A. Initial Assignment to Hearing Officer

In an effort to accommodate BellSouth's request for expedited treatment, the Commission assigned the matter to a Hearing Officer for oral argument. Oral argument took place before the Hearing Officer on August 13, 2002. BellSouth and NuVox filed their briefs on October 4 and October 7, 2002 respectively. Regarding whether an audit should be allowed to proceed, the relevant questions were whether BellSouth was required to demonstrate a concern that NuVox had not satisfied the criteria of its self-certification, and whether, if required, BellSouth had demonstrated such a concern. In the event that BellSouth was permitted to proceed with the audit, NuVox objected to the auditor BellSouth intended to use charging that the auditor was not independent.

On November 5, 2002, the Hearing Officer issued an Order Denying Request to Dismiss, Deny or Stay Consideration, Denying Request to Enter an Order that the Interconnection Agreement has been Breached and Granting Request to Audit. The Hearing Officer determined that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether BellSouth was required to demonstrate a concern because BellSouth did show that it had a concern. (November 5, 2002 Order, p. 5). The Hearing Officer based this conclusion upon BellSouth's allegations that records from Florida and Tennessee indicated that in those states an inordinate amount of the traffic from NuVox was not local. *Id.* at 8. BellSouth had asserted that, because most customers generate more local than toll calls, if NuVox were the exclusive provider, it would be expected that a significant percentage of the carrier's traffic would be local. (BellSouth October 4, Brief, p. 10). Yet, according to BellSouth, its records reflected that local traffic constituted only 25% of its traffic in one state. *Id.* at 11. An additional issue raised by NuVox was whether the auditor BellSouth intended to use, American Consultants Alliance ("ACA"), was independent. The Hearing Officer rejected NuVox's charges that ACA was not independent. (Hearing Officer's November 5, 2002 Order, pp. 8-10)

On November 26, 2002, NuVox applied to the Commission for review of the Hearing Officer's decision NuVox challenged both the Hearing Officer's conclusions that BellSouth demonstrated a concern and that the auditor was independent. (NuVox Application, p. 2). Finding that questions remained essential to the resolution of the issues, the Commission remanded the matter to a Hearing Officer for an evidentiary hearing on "whether BellSouth was obligated to demonstrate a concern prior to being entitled to conduct the requested audit of NuVox, whether BellSouth demonstrated a concern and whether the proposed auditor is independent." (Remand Order, p. 2).

B Second Assignment o a Hearing Officer

As a preliminary matter, the Hearing Officer denied NuVox's request for discovery and request that the dates for this proceeding be based upon the date on which the FCC releases the Triennial Review Order. (Procedural and Scheduling Order, p. 2) On October 17, 2003, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Hearing Officer. Nuvox and BellSouth filed briefs on December 23, 2003 and December 29, 2003 respectively. On February 11, 2004, the Hearing Officer issued his Recommended Order on Complaint ("Recommended Order")

The Hearing Officer first determined that BellSouth was obligated to demonstrate a concern. The Hearing Officer based this conclusion upon evidence that in negotiating the interconnection agreement the parties were cognizant of the *Supplemental Order Clarification* and that the language of the interconnection agreement does not make it exempt from the requirements of this order to show a concern. (Recommended Order, pp. 8-9).

The Hearing Officer next determined that BellSouth demonstrated a concern that NuVox is not the exclusive provider of local exchange service. Id. at 9-10. This conclusion was based on BellSouth's identification of forty-four EELs in Georgia that NuVox is using to provide local exchange service to end users who the Hearing Officer found also receive local exchange service from BellSouth. Id. at 9.

The Hearing Officer then found that BellSouth's proposed auditor is an independent third party auditor as required by the *Supplemental Order Clarification* and the Agreement. The Hearing Officer concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that ACA was subject to the control or influence of, associated with or dependent upon BellSouth. Id. at 11. The Hearing Officer determined that neither the interconnection agreement nor the *Supplemental Order Clarification* requires that the auditor comply with American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") standards, therefore to the extent NuVox insists upon the proposed auditor's adherence to those standards, NuVox should bear the additional costs. Id.

C. Petitions for Review of the Recommended Order

On March 12, 2004, NuVox filed its Objections to and Application for Commission Review of Recommended Order on Complaint On this same date, BellSouth filed its Petition for Review of Recommended Order.

NuVox raised numerous grounds of disagreement with the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order First, NuVox argued that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that BellSouth demonstrated a concern As a preliminary matter, NuVox argued that BellSouth's notice was deficient because BellSouth didn't have a concern at the time it notified NuVox of its intent to audit. (Objections, p. 2). NuVox also contended that BellSouth did not include any evidence to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that NuVox does not provide a significant amount of local exchange service to a number of customers NuVox serves via EELs. *Id.* at 5. NuVox charged that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that BellSouth supplied evidence demonstrating BellSouth provides local exchange services to thirty or so NuVox customers served by forty-four converted EELs in Georgia. *Id* at 6.

The second component of the Recommended Order that NuVox takes issue with is the conclusion that BellSouth is entitled to audit all of Nuvox's EELs in Georgia. NuVox stated that the scope of the audit, if approved, should be limited to those circuits for which BellSouth has demonstrated a concern. (Objections, p. 16). NuVox argued that BellSouth's alleged concern is customer and circuit specific *Id* at 17. NuVox also relied upon the *Supplemental Order Clarification* to support a narrower scope for any audit The *Supplemental Order Clarification* permits only limited audits that will not be routine. (Objections, p. 17, citing to *Supplemental Order Clarification*, ¶¶ 29, 31-32).

NuVox also argued that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the proposed auditor is independent. The standard used by the Hearing Officer for independence was that the auditor could not be subject to the control or influence of, associated with or dependent upon BellSouth (Recommended Order, p. 11). While NuVox did not find fault with this standard, it argued that the Hearing Officer misapplied the standard in this instance. NuVox contended that admissions by BellSouth's witness of discussions with the proposed auditor concerning matters such as the *Supplemental Order Clarification* and other audits reveal that ACA is subject to the influence of BellSouth (Objections, p. 19). NuVox also claimed that ACA received training from BellSouth, and consulted with BellSouth during audits. *Id.* at 20.

Finally, NuVox requested that the Commission stay the order should it be determined that BellSouth may proceed with the audit. NuVox asserts that it will be irreparably harmed by such a Commission order (Objections, p. 22).

BellSouth raised two points in its Petition for Review of Recommended Order. First, BellSouth requested that the Commission clarify that BellSouth is authorized to provide the auditor with records in BellSouth's possession that contain proprietary information of another carrier. BellSouth argued that review of this information is likely to uncover additional violations by NuVox. (Petition, p. 3). BellSouth argued that such records include information that may not be subject to disclosure absent an order from a regulatory agency. *Id*

The second argument raised by BellSouth in its Petition is that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that BellSouth is required to demonstrate a concern before conducting an audit. BellSouth asserted that the *Supplemental Order Clarification* only requires that incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") have a concern, not that such a concern be stated or demonstrated In addition, the parties' interconnection agreement does not include this requirement that BellSouth demonstrate a concern, and differs from the federal law on other aspects of the audit. (Petition, pp. 11-12).

II. JURISDICTION

The Commission has general jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to O.C.G.A §§ 46-2-20(a) and (b), which vests the Commission with authority over all telecommunications carriers in Georgia. O.C G A. § 46-5-168 vests the Commission with jurisdiction in specific cases in order to implement and administer the provisions of the Georgia's Telecommunications and Competition Development Act of 1995 ("State Act"). The Commission also has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 252 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Federal Act"). Since the Interconnection Agreement between the parties was approved by Order of the Commission, a Complaint that a party is in violation of the Agreement equates to a claim that a party is out of compliance with a Commission Order. The Commission is authorized to enforce and to ensure compliance with its orders pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 46-2-20(b), 46-2-91 and 46-5-169 The Commission has enforcement power and has an interest in ensuring that its Orders are upheld and enforced Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia v. Georgia Power Company, 174 Ga. App. 263, 264, 329 S.E.2d 570 (1985).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. BellSouth is required to demonstrate a concern.

The first issue to address is whether BellSouth was required to demonstrate a concern that NuVox is not satisfying the terms of its self-certification. If the Commission were to determine that BellSouth need not demonstrate a concern, then it becomes a moot question as to whether BellSouth did, in fact, present evidence adequate to show that it has a concern. If the Commission determines that BellSouth must make such a showing, then the Commission must turn its attention to the evidence in the record.

There are two questions that must be answered in determining whether BellSouth must show a concern. The first question is whether the *Supplemental Order Clarification* requires that an ILEC demonstrate a concern prior to conducting this type of audit. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the next question is whether the parties' interconnection agreement opts out of this requirement.

The Commission Staff ("Staff") recommended that the Commission determine that BellSouth was required to demonstrate a concern. The *Supplemental Order Clarification* requires that the ILEC demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit. The *Supplemental Order Clarification* states that audits should only take place when the ILECs have a concern (*Supplemental Order Clarification*, ¶ 31, n.86). This reading of the Supplemental Clarification Order is reinforced by the *Triennial Review Order*, which states as follows:

> Although the bases and criteria for the service tests we impose in this order differ from those of the Supplemental Order Clarification, we conclude that they share the basic principles of entitling requesting carriers unimpeded UNE access based upon self-certification, subject to later verification based upon cause, are equally applicable.

(*Triennial Review Order*, ¶ 622)

This language eliminates any ambiguity over whether the above-cited footnote in the *Supplemental Order Clarification* was intended to make the demonstration of a concern a mandatory pre-condition of these audits. Not only does the *Triennial Review Order* provide that ILECs must base audits on cause, but it states that this principle is shared by the *Supplemental Order Clarification*. At the time the parties negotiated their interconnection agreement, federal law required that BellSouth demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit.

BellSouth's argument that at most ILECs only have to "have" a concern, rather than an obligation to state or demonstrate the required concern has no merit. Such a construction would render meaningless the FCC's requirement. A construction that would allow BellSouth to meet the concern requirement, without so much as stating what that concern is, sets the bar unacceptably low.

Having concluded that the *Supplemental Order Clarification* requires that BellSouth demonstrate a concern, it is necessary to examine the parties' interconnection agreement No one disputed that BellSouth and NuVox were free to contract to terms and conditions that were different than what is set forth in the *Supplemental Order Clarification.* The parties disagree over whether that was what they did

Under Georgia law, parties are presumed to enter into agreements with regard to existing law. *Van Dyck v. Van Dyck*, 263 Ga. 161, 163 (1993). If parties intend to stipulate that their contract not be governed by existing law, then the other legal principles to govern the contract must be expressly stated therein. *Jenkins v. Morgan*, 100 Ga. App. 561, 562 (1959). The parties' interconnection agreement does not expressly state that the parties stipulated that the contract would be governed by principles other than existing law. To the contrary, the parties agreed to contract with regard to applicable law:

> Each Party shall comply at its own expense with all applicable federal, state, and local statutes, laws, rules, regulations, codes, effective orders, decisions, injunctions, judgments, awards and decrees that relate to its obligations under this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring or permitting either Party to contravene any mandatory requirement of Applicable Law, and nothing herein shall be deemed to prevent either Party from recovering its cost or otherwise billing the other party for compliance with the Order to the extent required or permitted by the term of such Order.

(Agreement, General Terms and Conditions, § 35.1).

As stated above, the federal law provides that BellSouth must demonstrate a concern prior to proceeding with an audit. With respect to audits, the Agreement included the following provision:

> BellSouth may, at its sole expense, and upon thirty (30) days notice to [NuVox], audit [NuVox's] records not more than on[c]e in any twelve month period, unless an audit finds non-compliance with the local usage options referenced in the June 2, 2000 Order, in order to verify the type of traffic being transmitted over combinations of loop and transport network elements. If, based on its audits, BellSouth concludes that [NuVox] is not providing a significant amount of local exchange traffic over the combination of loop and transport network elements, BellSouth may file a complaint with the appropriate Commission, pursuant to the dispute resolution process as set forth in this Agreement. In the event that BellSouth prevails, BellSouth may convert such combinations of loop and transport network elements to special access services and may seek appropriate retroactive reimbursement from [NuVox].

(Agreement, Att. 2, § 10.5 4).

BellSouth emphasized that parties may voluntarily agree to terms and conditions that would not otherwise comply with the law. (BellSouth Petition, p. 6). BellSouth argued that the parties negotiated specific terms and conditions for audits, and that pursuant to federal law, these are the terms and conditions that should govern their audit rights. *Id.* Specifically, BellSouth attacked NuVox's reliance on the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in *Van Dyck,* which involved the "automatic proration" of alimony or child support. The Court in *Van Dyck* concluded, *inter alia,* that because some sections of the parties' contract provided for "automatic proration" based on contingent events, the parties' failure to include the same language in the section under dispute meant that no such "automatic proration" was intended in relation to that section. *Van Dyck,* 263 Ga at 164 BellSouth points out that NuVox and BellSouth expressly reference the *Supplemental Order Clarification* at times in the Agreement, but not with respect to the audit rights (BellSouth Petition, p 11) BellSouth reasons that *Van Dyck* therefore supports its position *Id*

BellSouth's analysis overlooks a key distinction between this case and *Van Dyck.* In *Van Dyck,* the applicable law prohibited "automatic proration," except as specifically provided for in the decree. *Van Dyck,* 263 Ga. at 163. The provision in dispute in that case did not specifically provide for "automatic proration," and the Court did not construe the provision to allow for such a proration *Id* Therefore, the Court found that the agreement did not reflect the intent to differ from applicable law. In contrast, BellSouth asks this Commission to conclude that the relevant law does not apply to this section of the Agreement. It is one thing to say an agreement that specifies a variance from existing law in one section reflects intent to follow existing law in a different section where no such specification is made; it is quite another to conclude that an agreement that specifies compliance with existing law in one section reflects intent to vary from existing law where no such specification is made.

BellSouth also argues that the *Jenkins* decision favors its position because the Agreement sets forth the "legal principles to govern" the terms of the audit. (BellSouth Petition, p. 12). BellSouth states that the parties agreed that the Agreement "contains language making the giving of 30 days' notice the only precondition that must be satisfied before BellSouth can conduct an audit." *Id* The Agreement, however, does not state that the notice is the only precondition. The Agreement does not address the requirement to demonstrate a concern, and that is the specific issue in dispute Without language evidencing intent to vary from the requirement to show a concern, it is unreasonable to conclude that NuVox intended to waive its protection under federal law

Unless a contract is ambiguous, the finder of fact need not look any further than the language in the agreement to determine the intent of the parties. *Undercofler v Whiteway Neon Ad, Inc* , 114 Ga. 644 (1966). An agreement cannot be deemed ambiguous until "application of the pertinent rules of interpretation leaves it uncertain as to which of two or more possible meanings represents the true intention of the parties" *Crooks v. Crim,* 159 Ga. App. 745, 748 (1981) Construing the contractual provision in question in accordance with well-established rules of construction results in the conclusion that BellSouth is obligated to demonstrate a concern Even if the Commission were to find the contract ambiguous, the evidence of intent

presented at the hearing supports NuVox's arguments that the parties intended for BellSouth to be obligated to show a concern prior to conducting an audit.

NuVox sponsored the testimony of Hamilton Russell, one of the NuVox employees personally responsible for negotiating the interconnection agreement. Mr. Russell testified that, during the negotiation process, the parties discussed the "concern" requirement, and that the parties agreed that BellSouth must state a valid concern prior to initiating an audit. (Tr. 278). Mr Russell testified further that the parties agreed to strike the language proposed by BellSouth that would have allowed BellSouth to conduct the audit at its "sole discretion." (Tr 278) The interconnection agreement does not provide that BellSouth may conduct an audit at its sole discretion, but remains silent on the "concern" requirement. Had language allowing BellSouth to conduct the audit at its sole discretion been incorporated into the final Agreement, then it may have withstood the presumption that the parties intended to contract with reference to existing law. That such language was proposed, and that NuVox balked at its inclusion, supports a finding that the parties agreed to follow the existing law as set forth in the *Supplemental Order Clarification.*

The Commission adopts the Staff's recommendation that the Agreement requires BellSouth to demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit. Such a concern was required under relevant law at the time the parties negotiated the Agreement, and it does not contain any language indicating that the parties did not intend to contract with reference to existing law. Even if the Agreement were found to be ambiguous, which it is not, the evidence in the record demonstrates that the parties intended for BellSouth to have to demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit.

B BellSouth demonstrated a concern.

The Hearing Officer correctly explained that a concern "cannot be so speculative as to render the FCC's requirement meaningless, nor can the standard for determining whether a concern exists be so high as to require an audit to determine if such a concern exists." (Recommended Order, p. 9). Neither party disputed this standard.

In its effort to demonstrate a concern, BellSouth presented evidence of forty-four EELs in Georgia that NuVox is using to provide local exchange service to end users who also receive local exchange service from BellSouth. (Tr. 96-98, BellSouth Exhibit 2 (proprietary)) BellSouth compared the name and location of each NuVox end user customer served by EEL circuits with BellSouth end user records and discovered forty-four EELs in Georgia that NuVox is using to provide local exchange service to end users that are also receiving local exchange service from BellSouth[1] (Tr. 98). BellSouth argued that NuVox cannot be the exclusive provider of local exchange service to an end user that also receives this service from BellSouth. (Tr 98)

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[1] In her prefiled direct testimony, Ms. Padgett stated that BellSouth had identified at least forty-five circuits. This number was subsequently amended to forty-four. (*See* BellSouth's Post-Hearing Brief, p. 21).

NuVox argued that BellSouth's evidence does not show that BellSouth provides local exchange service to customers of NuVox served via converted EELs. (NuVox Post-Hearing Brief, p 36). Through cross-examination of BellSouth's witness, NuVox explored several reasons that the customers alleged to be receiving local exchange service from BellSouth were not, in fact, receiving such service NuVox asserted that (1) the numbers for the customers identified as BellSouth end users generated a "not active" or "this number has been disconnected" recording when called; (2) the name of the BellSouth's customer was different than the name of the customer served by NuVox; (3) the address of BellSouth's end user was different than the address for NuVox's customer; and (4) certain numbers when dialed "ring to a computer or modem," which, according to NuVox, means the customer is receiving DSL and not local exchange service. Tr. at 164, 167-168, 173, 180-183.

BellSouth witness Ms. Padgett testified that there were explanations for each of NuVox's assertions. First, Ms. Padgett testified that NuVox may have gotten a "not active" or "this number has been disconnected" recording for certain BellSouth customers because it appeared NuVox was dialing the wrong number or was dialing the billing number, which is not a valid telephone number (Tr. 233-234). Ms. Padgett explained that differences in customer names may be the result of the same customer going by two different names. (Tr. 169-170). The same is true for differences in customer addresses, which can be explained by the customer's use of a "different naming convention" when establishing service. (Tr. 175-176) An alternative explanation for a difference in address may be that the customer receives service at one address but has bills sent to a different address. (Tr. 236). Ms. Padgett also testified that digital subscriber line ("DSL") service works on the high frequency portion of a loop, while telephone service works on the low frequency portion. (Tr. 236) If the telephone number of an end user who receives DSL service is dialed, the call would still be completed. (Tr. 236). The Hearing Officer concluded that Ms. Padgett's explanations were reasonable (Recommended Order, p. 10).

In its Objections to and Application for Review of the Recommended Order, NuVox states that BellSouth did not "prove" that it was providing local exchange service to the end use customers in question. (*See* Objections, p. 9 "does not constitute proof that BellSouth provides local service," p.10 "BellSouth Exhibit 2 cannot reasonably be found to constitute proof that BellSouth provides local service . ."). NuVox also states that "it has never been established" that BellSouth provides service to these customers. *Id.* at 7. In making these arguments, NuVox sets the "concern" standard unreasonably high The stated purpose of BellSouth's audit is to examine whether NuVox is complying with its certification as the exclusive provider of local exchange service If the "concern" requirement was construed to require BellSouth to prove that NuVox was not the exclusive provider of service in order to conduct such an audit, then no audit would be necessary in the event the concern was satisfied. To state that BellSouth cannot conduct an audit unless it proves its case prior to conducting an audit is effectively stripping BellSouth of any audit rights it has under the Agreement.

BellSouth presented the Commission with evidence that supported that it had a concern that NuVox was not the exclusive provider of local exchange service. NuVox questioned the evidence, and BellSouth provided credible explanations in response to those questions NuVox charges that these explanations were mere speculation, and that BellSouth's witness did not have

actual knowledge that these explanations were accurate. (Objections, pp. 12-13). Again, the issue is not whether BellSouth can demonstrate with certainty that NuVox is in violation of the safe harbor provision, but rather, that it has a legitimate concern. By providing credible explanations for the questions raised by NuVox, BellSouth satisfies this requirement. It is reasonable to conclude that BellSouth has stated the necessary concern.

The Commission concludes that BellSouth has submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate a concern that NuVox is not the exclusive provider of local exchange service to a number of customers served via converted EELs. The Commission emphasizes that the determination that the concern requirement was satisfied is fact-specific.

The Staff recommended that the Commission reject Nuvox's argument that BellSouth should have to re-file the notice of its intent to conduct an audit. The Agreement provides BellSouth may proceed with an audit upon thirty days notice. (Agreement, Att. 2, § 10.5.4). BellSouth initially relied upon data from Tennessee and Florida related to the division between local and toll calls. On remand, BellSouth raised a separate concern related to forty-four converted circuits in Georgia NuVox argued that, because the notice issued related to the initial concern, BellSouth failed to meet this requirement in the Agreement. (Objections, pp. 2-3).

NuVox received ample notice of the concern raised by BellSouth during the remanded proceeding to the Hearing Officer. It cross-examined BellSouth extensively on the alleged concern. It sponsored witnesses to rebut the allegations of BellSouth. It briefed the issues before the Commission. The apparent intent of the notice requirement in the Agreement is to protect NuVox from BellSouth commencing an audit without NuVox having any opportunity to challenge the concern, raise any objection or otherwise prepare in an effort to minimize the disruption to its business that an audit would cause. That this order is being released two years after BellSouth filed its Complaint in this docket indicates that NuVox has not lacked for preparation NuVox has not cited to anything that the Agreement requires as to the form of the notice As BellSouth points out, "no particular form of written notice is required." (BellSouth Response to NuVox Objections, p 2) Because NuVox has been on notice for more than thirty days that BellSouth intended to audit based on the concern raised with the forty-four converted circuits, allowing BellSouth to proceed with an audit without serving additional notice upon NuVox meets both the spirit and the letter of the Agreement Furthermore, NuVox's argument is based on the incorrect premise that BellSouth's initial concern was determined to be inadequate. That is not the case. The Commission remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing once it determined that there were significant questions of fact remaining without any evidentiary hearing.

The Commission adopts the Staff's recommendation that BellSouth satisfied the concern requirement in the Agreement. In relation to BellSouth's showing of a concern, the Staff recommended that to the extent the Recommended Order concludes that BellSouth was providing service to EELs for which NuVox has contended it is the exclusive provider, that finding should be modified to state that the Commission finds BellSouth has provided evidence indicating that it may be providing such service. The Commission does not need to reach the question of whether BellSouth is providing this service until BellSouth presents the results of ACA's audit The Commission adopts the Staff's recommendation on this issue

C. The scope of the audit should be limited to the forty-four EELs for which BellSouth demonstrated a concern.

The Recommended Order states that the audit should apply to all EELs. (Recommended Order, p. 10). The Staff recommended that the Commission limit the scope of the audit to converted EELs because such an order was consistent with the relief sought in BellSouth's complaint. In other words, the relief granted by the Hearing Officer on this issue surpassed the relief that BellSouth had requested.

NuVox argued that the scope of the audit should be limited to the circuits for which BellSouth has stated a concern. NuVox based this argument on both applicable facts and law. BellSouth's allegations related to the forty-four circuits do not apply to any other converted EEL circuits used by NuVox in Georgia. (NuVox Post-Hearing Brief, p. 44). In addition, the *Supplemental Order Clarification* permits only limited audits (Nuvox Brief, p 44, citing to *Supplemental Order Clarification* ¶¶ 29, 31-32). NuVox argued that permitting BellSouth to audit those circuits for which no concern has been raised would not constitute a limited audit. (NuVox Post-Hearing Brief, p. 44).

The Commission agrees with Nuvox that a limited audit should include only those circuits for which BellSouth has demonstrated a concern However, the Commission does not entirely adopt NuVox's position on the scope of the audit. The Commission finds that it is reasonable to limit the audit initially to the forty-four circuits Once the results of this limited audit are examined, the Commission may determine that it is appropriate to expand the scope of the audit to the other converted circuits

D The auditor's access to CPNI in BellSouth's possession should be limited to those instances in which BellSouth obtains the approval of the carriers to whom the information pertains

BellSouth requested that the Commission clarify that it is authorized to provide the auditor with records in BellSouth's possession that contain proprietary information of another carrier. BellSouth's concern was based on a comparison of NuVox records with its own records It is possible that a customer for which NuVox has certified that it is the exclusive provider of local exchange service is also receiving this service from another carrier. The policy reason behind BellSouth's request, therefore, is that examination of these records is necessary to uncover any additional violations. (BellSouth Petition, p.3) The legal basis BellSouth offers in support of its request is that 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) authorizes BellSouth to release customer proprietary network information ("CPNI") with the approval of other parties or if required by law. *Id.* at 3.

The determination of the scope of the audit disposes of BellSouth's policy argument because the Commission limited the audit to the forty-four converted circuits for which BellSouth stated a concern The Staff recommended that the Commission reject BellSouth's legal argument The federal statute prohibits the release of CPNI, with certain exceptions. The

exceptions in 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) provide that CPNI may be released with the approval of the customer or if required by law. BellSouth is not required by law to release this information to its auditor, but rather it is requesting authorization from the Commission to do so. It does not appear consistent with the intent of the law to authorize release of the information in this instance The Staff recommended that BellSouth only be permitted to release the CPNI with the customer's approval

The Commission adopts the Staff's recommendation with respect to the release of CPNI to BellSouth's auditor.

E. The auditor proposed by BellSouth must be compliant with with the standards and criteria established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

The *Supplemental Order Clarification* requires that audits must be conducted by independent third parties paid for by the incumbent local exchange provider (*Supplemental Order Clarification*, ¶ 1) The Agreement includes the following language on BellSouth's audit rights:

> BellSouth may, at its sole expense, and upon thirty (30) days notice to [NuVox], audit [NuVox's] record not more than on[c]e in any twelve month period, unless an audit finds non-compliance with the local usage options referenced in the June 2, 2000 Order, in order to verify the type of traffic being transmitted over combinations of loop and transport network elements.

(Agreement, Att 2, § 10 5.4)

This language does not specifically address the issue of the independence of the auditor. BellSouth maintained that it is not required to use a third party independent auditor It supported this position with the same argument that it used to support its position on the "concern" requirement That is, BellSouth argued that "the only audit requirement to which the parties agreed is that BellSouth give 30-days' notice." (BellSouth Post-Hearing Brief, p. 3). NuVox disagreed, and argued that the parties did not exempt BellSouth from its obligation to conduct an audit using an independent third party auditor. (Tr 253). This question of contract construction poses the same question as was addressed with the concern requirement. The Agreement does not expressly state either that BellSouth must show a concern or that BellSouth does not need to show a concern.

The Staff recommended that the Commission find that the *Supplemental Order Clarification* and the Agreement require that the audit be conducted by an independent third party auditor. For the reasons discussed in the analysis of the "concern" issue, the Commission adopts Staff's recommendation that the Agreement is unambiguous that the audit is required to be conducted by an independent third party

The next question is whether the auditor selected by BellSouth is independent NuVox vigorously objected to the Hearing Officer's conclusion that ACA satisfied this request. NuVox

argued that ACA is a small consulting shop that was dependent on ILECs for its business, and therefore could not be characterized as independent. (NuVox Post-Hearing Brief, p. 46). NuVox also claims that ACA marketing material characterizing as "highly successful" its audits that have recovered large sums for ILEC clients reflects a bias. *Id.* NuVox also complained that BellSouth's witness, Ms. Padgett admitted that she had private conversations with ACA regarding the requirements set forth in the *Supplemental Order Clarification*, before and during ongoing audits, with and without the audited party being present. (NuVox Objections, p. 19). NuVox reasons that this illustrates that ACA is subject to the influence of BellSouth. *Id.* NuVox requested that BellSouth conduct the audit using a nationally recognized accounting firm. (NuVox Post-Hearing Brief, p. 47) NuVox also contested the auditor's independence on the ground that ACA is not certified under the standards established by the AICPA. (Tr. 275).

BellSouth argues that none of these points demonstrate that ACA is not independent from BellSouth. (BellSouth Post-Hearing Brief, pp. 27-28). BellSouth counters NuVox's claims with evidence that ACA has competitive local exchange carrier clients and that BellSouth has not previously hired ACA *Id.* BellSouth also argues that neither the Agreement nor the *Supplemental Order Clarification* required the auditor to comply with AICPA standards. *Id.* at 28

The *Triennial Review Order*, which the FCC issued after the date of the Agreement, states that audits must be conducted pursuant to the standards established by the AICPA. (*Triennial Review Order*, ¶ 626) The question then is whether this compliance is required for audits conducted pursuant to agreements entered into prior to the issuance of the *Triennial Review Order*. NuVox's position that it should be required is based on a reading that, like with the "concern" requirement, the FCC was simply clarifying in the *Triennial Review Order* what was intended by the term "independent" in the *Supplemental Order Clarification*. (Tr. 276). BellSouth argues that the *Triennial Review Order* does not impact the parties' rights under the Agreement, and in fact, illustrates that the *Supplemental Order Clarification* did not contain this requirement (BellSouth Post-Hearing Brief, FN 7)

The Staff recommended that the Commission find that BellSouth's auditor met the standards of independence set forth in the *Supplemental Order Clarification*, but that the Commission should consider in its evaluation of the credibility of any audit results whether the audit was conducted pursuant to AICPA standards. The Commission does not adopt the Staff's recommendation NuVox raised serious concerns about the auditor's independence The FCC has stated clearly not only that auditors must be independent but that the independent auditor must conduct the audit in compliance with AICPA standards. It is true that this latter standard was not clarified until after the parties entered into the Agreement; however, the parties disputed the meaning of the independent requirement prior to the issuance of the *Triennial Review Order*. NuVox always maintained that for an auditor to be independent it must comply with AICPA standards. (Tr. 275) That the FCC later identified AICPA compliance as a prerequisite of an independent audit supports a conclusion that NuVox was correct. BellSouth's argument that the inclusion of the requirement in the latter FCC Order indicates that it was not present in the former is mistaken in this instance In the *Triennial Review Order*, the FCC gives no indication that it is reversing any portion of the *Supplemental Order Clarification* The most logical

construction of the *Triennial Review Order* is that it is clarifying the requirement that had been in place from the prior FCC order

In reaching this conclusion the Commission concedes that the *Supplemental Order Clarification* did not expressly state that AICPA compliance was a prerequisite for an auditor to be deemed "independent." In fact, the *Supplemental Order Clarification* does not expound on the criteria to be considered in determining whether a third party auditor is independent. This lack of detail should not be construed to render the "independent" requirement meaningless. Rather, it leaves to the discretion of the Commission what is required to comply with the standard of independence. For guidance in reaching this determination, it is reasonable to look at other orders of the FCC. The *Triennial Review Order* gives clear guidance that compliance with AICPA standards is necessary in order for a third party auditor to be independent. The Commission finds that any audit firm selected by BellSouth itself be compliant with AICPA standards and criteria.

The Commission remains cognizant that parties are capable of negotiating and agreeing to terms and conditions that are different than the specific requirements set forth in the law. The Commission has concluded that the parties did not do so with regard to this provision of the Agreement. Therefore, the issue is whether the federal law at the time the parties entered into the Agreement required third party audits to comply with AICPA standards in order to be deemed independent For the reasons discussed, the Commission concludes that it is a fair construction of the term "independent" to require AICPA compliance.

Regardless of whether BellSouth argues it has a contractual right to conduct an audit that does not comply with AICPA standards, as the finder of fact the Commission may decide the proper weight to afford the findings of any such audit. In light of the FCC's determination that audits should be conducted pursuant to AICPA standards, the Commission concludes that it would not afford any weight to findings from an audit that was not conducted in compliance with AICPA standards Given that BellSouth would not be able to convert loop and transport combinations to special access services until it prevailed before the Commission, it would not make any difference if the Commission were to permit BellSouth to conduct the audit with an auditor that was not AICPA compliant As discussed above, the Commission has concluded that BellSouth does not have this right under the Agreement, however, it is important to distinguish between the parties' arguments concerning their respective contractual rights and the Commission's discretion in evaluating the evidence.

The Staff recommended that NuVox should not have to pay the costs related to adherence to AICPA standards The Commission agrees. The Recommended Order appeared to base the conclusion that NuVox should pay for compliance with AICPA standards on the premise that such compliance was above and beyond what had been agreed to by the parties Given the conclusion that AICPA compliance is required by the Agreement, the basis for making NuVox pay no longer exists

F NuVox's Request for a Stay is denied

NuVox requested that, should the Commission permit BellSouth to proceed with the audit, that it stay the effect of the order under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(d) pending the outcome of any judicial review. NuVox argues that it would be irreparably harmed if BellSouth were to proceed, that it has a likelihood of success on the merits, and that BellSouth would not be harmed if a stay was granted because if NuVox did not prevail on appeal, the time during the stay of the order would not be precluded from the audit (NuVox Objections, p. 22) BellSouth responds that O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(d) is inapplicable as it only applies to final orders. (BellSouth Petition, p. 11) BellSouth also argues that NuVox has not shown either that it will be irreparably harmed if the audit is allowed to proceed or that it has a likelihood of success on the merits in an appeal.

The Staff recommended that the Commission deny the requested stay. The Commission adopts Staff's recommendation. The Commission agrees with BellSouth that NuVox has not shown that it will be irreparably harmed if the audit is allowed to proceed because it could recover its out of pocket expenses should it prevail. Moreover, BellSouth will have to come back before the Commission with the findings from its audit prior to converting combinations of loop and transport network elements to special access services. In addition, NuVox has not demonstrated that it has a likelihood of success on appeal The issue of whether BellSouth has demonstrated a concern is a question of fact, and the Commission's determination is entitled to deference on such an issue Finally, the limited scope of the approved audit reduces any harm that NuVox can claim as a result of the Commission's decision.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING PARAGRAPHS

The Commission finds and concludes that the issues presented to the Commission for decision should be resolved in accord with the terms and conditions as discussed in the preceding sections of this Order, pursuant to the terms of the parties' interconnection agreements, the Federal Act and the State Act.

WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, that BellSouth was obligated pursuant to the terms of the parties' Agreement to demonstrate a concern prior to conducting an audit of NuVox's records in order to confirm that NuVox is complying with its certification that it is the exclusive provider of local exchange service to its end users.

ORDERED FURTHER, that BellSouth demonstrated a concern that NuVox was not the exclusive provider of local exchange service to the end users served via the forty-four converted EELs at issue.

ORDERED FURTHER, that to the extent the Recommended Order concludes that BellSouth was providing service to EELs for which NuVox has contended it is the exclusive provider, that finding is modified to state that BellSouth has provided evidence indicating that it may be providing such service.

ORDERED FURTHER, that BellSouth provided adequate notice, pursuant to the Agreement, of its intent to audit.

ORDERED FURTHER, that the scope of BellSouth's audit shall be limited to the forty-four circuits for which BellSouth demonstrated a concern Once the results of this limited audit are examined, the Commission may determine that it is appropriate to expand the scope of the audit to the other converted circuits

ORDERED FURTHER, that the auditor's access to CPNI in BellSouth's possession should be limited to those instances in which BellSouth obtains the approval of the carriers to whom the information pertains.

ORDERED FURTHER, that any audit firm selected by BellSouth must be compliant with AICPA standards and criteria.

ORDERED FURTHER, that NuVox does not have to pay for any costs related to bringing an auditor into compliance with AICPA standards

ORDERED FURTHER, that NuVox's request for a stay is hereby denied.

ORDERED FURTHER, that except as otherwise stated the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer is adopted

ORDERED FURTHER, that all findings, conclusions and decisions contained within the preceding sections of this Order are adopted as findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decisions of regulatory policy of this Commission.

ORDERED FURTHER, that any motion for reconsideration, rehearing or oral argument shall not stay the effectiveness of this Order unless expressly so ordered by the Commission.

ORDERED FURTHER, that jurisdiction over this proceeding is expressly retained for the purpose of entering such further order or orders as this Commission may deem just and proper.

The above by action of the Commission in Administrative Session on the 18th day of May, 2004

Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary

Date 6-29-04

H. Doug Everett
Chairman

Date 06-29-04

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 8, 2004, a copy of the foregoing document was served on the following, via the method indicated:

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