## BEFORE THE TENNESSEE REGULATORY AUTHORITY

# NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

January 12, 2006

IN RE:		) .	
	FOR ARBITRATION OF CELLCO SHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS	) DOCKET NO ) 03-00585	•
MOBILITY COMMUN LIMITED CINGULA PETITION	FOR ARBITRATION OF BELLSOUTH  / LLC; BELLSOUTH PERSONAL ICATIONS, LLC; CHATTANOOGA MSA PARTNERSHIP; COLLECTIVELY D/B/A R WIRELESS  FOR ARBITRATION OF AT&T	)	
WIRELESS PCS, LLC D/B/A AT&T WIRELESS )  PETITION FOR ARBITRATION OF T-MOBILE USA, INC. )  PETITION FOR ARBITRATION OF SPRINT ) SPECTRUM L.P. D/B/A SPRINT PCS )		) ) ) ) )	
	ORDER OF ARBITRATION AWA	: :RD	
	TABLE OF CONTENTS	•	
FACTUAL A	ND PROCEDURAL HISTORY	: 	1
ARBITRATIO	ON HEARING	••••••	6
PRELIMINA	RY ISSUE	·	7
Issue 1:	ICO DUTY TO INTERCONNECT		13
ISSUE 2:	APPLICATION OF RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION R TO TRAFFIC EXCHANGED INDIRECTLY BETWEEN PROVIDER AND ICO	CMRS	15
Issue 2b:	APPLICATION OF RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION R TO LAND ORIGINATED INTRAMTA TRAFFIC		19

Issue 3:	LEGAL OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE THE TERMINATING  CARRIER	
ISSUE 4:	INCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY PROVIDER IN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN ORIGINATING AND TERMINATING CARRIERS	25
ISSUE 5:	OBLIGATION OF PARTY TO INDIRECT INTERCONNECTION ARRANGEMENT TO PAY TRANSIT COSTS FOR DELIVERY OF INTRAMTA TRAFFIC	28
ISSUE 6:	COMBINATION OF CMRS TRAFFIC WITH OTHER TRAFFIC OVER SAME TRUNK GROUP	32
Issue 7:	(A) POINT OF INTERCONNECTION ("POI")	
	(B) PERCENTAGE OF THE COST OF THE DIRECT CONNECTION FACILITIES TO BE BORNE BY ICO	35
ISSUE 8:	APPROPRIATE PRICING METHODOLOGY FOR RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION RATE FOR EXCHANGE OF INDIRECT OR DIRECT TRAFFIC	38
ISSUE 9:	FACTOR AS A PROXY FOR THE MOBILE-TO-LAND AND LAND-TO- MOBILE TRAFFIC BALANCE	42
ISSUE 10:	COMPENSATION ON A BILL-AND-KEEP BASIS WHERE A CMRS PROVIDER AND AN ICO ARE EXCHANGING ONLY A DE MINIMUS AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC	44
Issue 11:	FACTOR TO DELINEATE PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC AS INTERMTA	45
Issue 12:	(A) DIALING PARITY	47
ISSUE 12:	(B) RATES FOR CALLS TO CMRS NPA/NXX AND LAND LINE NPA/NXX	50
Issue 13:	SCOPE OF THE INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT REGARDING ACCURATE BILLING RECORDS	53
Issue 14:	SCOPE OF THE INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT REGARDING TRAFFIC TRANSITED BY BELLSOUTH	55
ISSUE 15:	SCOPE OF THE INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT REGARDING INDIRECT TRAFFIC	58
ISSUE 16:	INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT: STANDARD COMMERCIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS	60
ISSUE 17:	TERMINATION OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT AND BLOCK TRAFFIC	63
Iccia 18.	ICO CHANCE OF NETWORK	65

ICO Issue 2:	BELLSOUTH SHOULD NOT DELIVER THIRD-PARTY TRAFFIC TO AN ICO THAT DOES NOT SUBTEND A BELLSOUTH TANDEM	
ICO Issue 4:	THE CMRS PROVIDERS SHOULD CLARIFY WHICH OF THEIR AFFILIATE ENTITIES SEEKS NEW TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF INDIRECT "TRANSIT" ARRANGEMENTS:	
ICO Issue 5:	THE CMRS PROVIDERS SHOULD INDICATE THE SPECIFIC SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC ORIGINATING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE NETWORKS THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THESE PROCEEDINGS	
ICO Issue 6:	ACCESS CHARGES APPLY TO BOTH THE ORIGINATION AND TERMINATION OF INTERMTA TRAFFIC ON THE NETWORKS OF THE ICO MEMBERS	
ICO Issue 7:	MANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE NO THE SUBJECT OF ESTABLISHED FCC RULES AND REGULATIONS. THE PARTIES MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THESE ISSUES ARE SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT AND NOT T INVOLUNTARY ARBITRATION	o
ICO ISSUE 8:	ANY AGREEMENT MUST ACCURATELY DEFINE THE SCOPE OF TRAFFIC AUTIORIZED TO BE DELIVERED OVER AN INTERCONNECTION TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERCONNECTION ARRANGEMENT IS NOT MISUSED	
ICO Issue 9:	ISSUES GOVERNING THE PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTION ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BELLSOUTH AND THE ICO MEMBERS MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE EFFECTIVE NEW TERMS AND CONDITIONS CAN BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE CMRS PROVIDERS AND BELLSOUTH	
ICO ISSUE 10:	THE CMRS PROVIDERS MUST PROVIDE ANY SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS OR CONCERNS THAT THEY HAVE WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS PROPOSED BY THE ICO MEMBERS	······
Obbeding CL		

This matter came before Chairman Pat Miller, Director Deborah Taylor Tate and Director Ron Jones of the Tennessec Regulatory Authority (the "Authority" or "TRA"), serving as the arbitration panel in this docket, on January 12, 2005 for final deliberations addressing issues raised in the arbitration of interconnection agreements between certain commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") providers<sup>1</sup> and the Rural Coalition of Small Local Exchange Carriers and Cooperatives (the "Coalition" or "ICO members").<sup>2</sup>

#### FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2003, Verizon Wircless, Cingular Wireless, AT&T Wireless, T-Mobile and Sprint, each a CMRS provider, individually filed a Petition for Arbitration.<sup>3</sup> Each petition requested that the Authority assist in matters relating to the negotiation of an Interconnection and Reciprocal Compensation Agreement between the aforementioned CMRS providers and members of the Coalition. Each petition further explained that although the Coalition is made up of twenty-one independent companies, the negotiations have been conducted jointly. As such, the CMRS providers asserted that it would be an unnecessary burden for the TRA to consider individual petitions from each of the twenty-one ICO members.

<sup>1</sup> CELLCO Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless ("Verizon Wireless"), BellSouth Personal Communications, LLC, Chattanooga MSA Limited Partnership (collectively "Cingular Wireless"), AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC d/b/a AT&T Wireless ("AT&T Wireless"), T-Mobile USA, Inc ("T-Mobile"), and Sprint Spectrum L P d/b/a Sprint PCS ("Sprint")

The Coalition is comprised of the following companies Ardmore Telephone Company, Inc., Ben Lomand Rural Telephone Cooperative, Inc., Bledsoc Telephone Cooperative, CenturyTel of Adamsville, Inc., CenturyTel of Claiborne, Inc., CenturyTel of Ooltewah-Collegedale, Inc., Concord Telephone Exchange, Inc., Crockett Telephone Company, Inc., DeKalb Telephone Cooperative, Inc., Highland Telephone Cooperative, Inc., Humphreys County Telephone Company, Loretto Telephone Company, Inc., Millington Telephone Company, North Central Telephone Cooperative, Inc., Peoples Telephone Company, Tellico Telephone Company, Tennessee Telephone Company, Twin Lakes Telephone Cooperative Corporation, United Telephone Company, West Tennessee Telephone Company, Inc., and Yorkville Telephone Cooperative

In re Petition for Arbitration of CELLCO Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, Docket No 03-00585 (November 6, 2003); In re Petition for Arbitration of BellSouth Mobility LLC, BellSouth Personal Communications, LLC, Chattanooga MSA Limited Partnership, Collectively d/b/a Cingular Wireless, Docket No 03-00586 (November 6, 2003), In re Petition for Arbitration of AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC d/b/a AT&T Wireless, Docket No 03-00587 (November 6, 2003), In re Petition for Arbitration of T-Mobile USA, Inc. Docket No 03-00588 (November 6, 2003), and In re Petition for Arbitration of Sprint Spectrum LP d/b/a Sprint PCS. Docket No 03-00589 (November 6, 2003)

On November 18, 2003, Verizon Wireless, on behalf of the CMRS providers and the ICO members jointly, filed a motion in Docket No. 03-00585 requesting that the TRA consolidate all five petitions for arbitration (Docket Nos. 03-00585, 03-00586, 03-00587, 03-00588, and 03-00589) into one Arbitration Proceeding.<sup>4</sup>

On December 1, 2003, the Coalition filed its response to the petitions. In the response the ICO members explained that these arbitrations are before the Authority as a result of the Generic Universal Service Docket (Docket No. 00-00523) and urged the Authority to consider the totality of the circumstances that have resulted in the arbitration petitions. The issue, according to the ICO members, is the "indirect" interconnection of traffic between CMRS providers and the ICO members' networks. The ICO members stated that while they have no objection to reasonable terms of interconnection, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth") and the CMRS providers have attempted to impose terms and conditions on the ICO members that have not been adopted through appropriate interconnection proceedings.

On December 8, 2003, during a regularly scheduled Authority Conference, Chairman Deborah Taylor Tate consolidated all of the Petitions for Arbitration into the first docket opened, Docket No. 03-00585. During the December 8, 2003 Conference, the panel assigned to Docket No. 03-00585 voted unanimously to accept the Petitions for Arbitration. The panel also designated themselves as Arbitrators and appointed General Counsel or his designee as the Pre-Arbitration Officer to hear preliminary matters prior to the Arbitration.

The Pre-Arbitration Officer convened a Status Conference on February 23, 2004 during which the parties discussed a waiver of the statutory nine-month deadline, the filing of a motion

<sup>6</sup> Id at 3-5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Joint Motion to Consolidate Petitions for Arbitration, p. 1 (November 18, 2003)

<sup>5</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives (December 1, 2003)

addressing the participation of BellSouth in this docket and a proposed procedural schedule which provided for two rounds of discovery and the submission of pre-filed testimony.

On March 4, 2004, the Coalition filed its *Preliminary Motion to Dismiss or. in the Alternative, to Add an Indispensable Party* ("Motion to Dismiss"). In the Motion to Dismiss, the ICO members asserted that because this matter involves the existing indirect interconnection trunk provided by BellSouth and merely seeks new terms to that existing arrangement, BellSouth should be made a party to this proceeding, thus creating a three-party interconnection agreement. According to the Coalition, BellSouth's absence from this proceeding would force the Authority to impose interconnection terms and conditions that are inconsistent with interconnection requirements established by federal statutes and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). Thus, the Coalition asserts that such an imposition would be beyond the scope of the authority of the TRA in arbitrating interconnection agreements. The ICO members asserted that for this reason the arbitrations should be dismissed.

On March 12, 2004, BellSouth responded in opposition to the Coalition's Motion to Dismiss. BellSouth asserted that at no point have the ICO members indicated that they took issue with the request of CMRS providers for arbitration. To the contrary, after a series of negotiations it appeared as if all parties involved had agreed that, if left unresolved, this matter would be arbitrated. BellSouth argued that the Authority has previously recognized arbitrations as two-party matters; the instant proceeding is not a three-party arrangement nor does any law exist in support of such; the ICO members have previously entered into interconnection

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Add an Indispensable Party, p. 2 (March 4, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.'s Response in Opposition to the Preliminary Motion of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives to Disnuss or, in the Alternative, Add an Indispensable Party (March 12, 2004)

agreements with CMRS providers without the involvement of BellSouth; and, finally, this Arbitration is proper and should not be dismissed.

On March 12, 2004, the CMRS providers responded in opposition to the Coalition's *Motion to Dismiss* <sup>10</sup> The CMRS providers argue the appropriateness of the arbitration, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act"), has already been determined by the Authority and agreed to by the parties. The CMRS providers point to the May 5, 2003 Hearing Officer Order in Docket No. 00-00523 which includes language that if the parties failed to reach agreement, arbitration could be contemplated. <sup>11</sup> The CMRS providers further assert that the TRA has a statutory requirement to arbitrate all "open issues" and that no legal authority exists to support the request to make BellSouth a party. Finally, the CMRS providers assert that BellSouth is not an indispensable party and that the *Motion to Dismiss* should be defined as untimely.

On April 12, 2004, the Pre-Arbitration Officer in this docket issued an order denying the Coalition's *Motion to Dismiss*. In the *Order Denying Motion*, the Pre-Arbitration Officer concluded that, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1), the members of the Coalition and the CMRS providers are required to interconnect, either directly or indirectly, with all other telecommunications carriers and, to accomplish interconnection, the Coalition members, as local exchange carriers, have a duty to negotiate in good faith in accordance with the requirements of the Act. There is no provision in federal law for including additional parties in the negotiation process. <sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Id at 2-4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> CMRS Providers' Response to the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives' Preliminary Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Add an Indispensable Party ("CMRS Response") (March 12, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> CMRS Response, p 3, quoting Order Granting Conditional Stay, Continuing Abeyance, and Granting Interventions, In re Generic Docket Addressing Rural Universal Service, TRA Docket No 00-00523, p 5 (May 5, 2003)

<sup>12</sup> Order Denying Motion, p 6 (April 12, 2004)

<sup>13</sup> Id

The Pre-Arbitration Officer ruled that the Coalition failed to adequately support its request to join BellSouth as a party to this arbitration because it failed to prove that BellSouth is necessary to a resolution of the matter at hand. Based upon the bona fide requests to negotiate interconnection and reciprocal compensation agreements, members of the Coalition are obligated to interconnect, either directly or indirectly, with the CMRS providers. The Pre-Arbitration Officer found.

Whether the exchange of traffic between two such carriers is direct or indirect via the BellSouth network, explicit in federal law is the duty of each Coalition member to each CMRS provider, as the requesting carrier, to arrange for reciprocal compensation.<sup>14</sup>

Specifically, the Pre-Arbitration Officer concluded.

To this end, federal law imposes no compensation obligations on any third party, including BellSouth over whose network the traffic is being exchanged. Notwithstanding any agreement between BellSouth and the other carriers for the use of the BellSouth network, each Coalition member must still provide for the exchange of traffic with each CMRS provider. For this specific purpose, BellSouth is an unnecessary third party and need not be joined in this particular arbitration.<sup>15</sup>

The Pre-Arbitration Officer also concluded that TRA Rule 1220-1-2-.03(2)(f) allows the dismissal of a complaint or petition for "failure to join an indispensable party." Nevertheless, because BellSouth is not an indispensable party to the arbitration, the Coalition's *Motion to Dismiss* was denied. 16

Thereafter, the Pre-Arbitration Officer entered an Order establishing a modified procedural schedule for discovery and pre-filed testimony and setting the arbitration hearing for August 9-12, 2004.<sup>17</sup> The parties engaged in discovery in advance of submitting pre-filed testimony. On June 3, 2004, the CMRS providers submitted pre-filed direct testimony from six

15 *Id* at 7-8

<sup>14</sup> Id at 7

<sup>16</sup> Id at 8

<sup>17</sup> Order Modifying Procedural Schedule (April 15, 2004)

witnesses: Marc B. Sterling for Verizon Wireless, Greg Tedesco for T-Mobile, Suzanne K. Nieman for AT&T Wireless, William Brown for Cingular Wireless, Billy H. Pruitt for Sprint and W. Craig Conwell for Verizon Wireless, Cingular Wireless, AT&T Wireless and T-Mobile. The ICO members submitted pre-filed direct testimony on June 4, 2004 from one witness, Steven E. Watkins. On June 24, 2004, the parties submitted pre-filed rebuttal testimony. On July 26, 2004, the Final Joint Issues Matrix was submitted by the parties wherein the parties explained that they had deleted ICO Issues 1 and 3.

#### **Arbitration Hearing**

The Hearing in this proceeding commenced on August 9, 2004 before the panel of Arbitrators: Chairman Miller, Director Tate and Director Jones. In attendance at the Hearing were the following parties as represented by counsel:

AT&T - Henry Walker, Esq., Boult, Cummings, Conners & Berry, P.O. Box 198062, Nashville, TN 37219-8062.

Verizon Wireless – Melvin J. Malone, Esq. and J. Barclay Phillips. Esq., Miller & Martin PLLC, 1200 One Nashville Place, 150 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue, North, Nashville, TN 37219-2433; and Elaine D. Critides, Verizon Wireless, 1300 I. Street, N.W., Suite 400 West, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Sprint PCS – Edward Phillips, Esq., Sprint, 14111 Capital Boulevard, Wake Forest, NC 27587-5900; and Charles McKee, Sprint PCS, 6450 Sprint Parkway, 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, Overland Park, KS 66251.

Coalition – William, T. Ramsey, Esq., Neal & Harwell, 150 Fourth Avenuc, Suite 2000, Nashville, TN 37219-2498; and Stephen G. Kraskin, Esq., Kraskin, Lesse & Cosson, LLP, 2120 L. Street, NW, Suite 520, Washington, DC 20037.

Cingular Wireless - Paul Walters, Jr., Esq., 15 E. First Street, Edmond, OK 73034.

During the four-day hearing from August 9 through August 12, 2004, the Arbitrators heard testimony related to CMRS providers' Issue Nos. 1 through 18 and Issue Nos. 2 and 4 through

The CMRS providers filed the rebuttal testimony of Marc B Sterling, William Brown, Billy H Pruitt and W Craig Conwell, while the Coalition submitted rebuttal testimony from Steven E Watkins

10 of the Coalition. The parties filed post-hearing briefs and supplemental testimony. The Arbitration panel deliberated on these issues as well as a preliminary issue at a public meeting on January 12, 2005.

Preliminary Issue: Whether the issues in this docket regarding indirect interconnection and reciprocal compensation are subject to compulsory arbitration under § 252 of the Federal Telecommunications Act.

#### Position of Parties

The ICO members argue that the Authority does not have the jurisdiction to decide this matter because the issues in contention involve an existing indirect interconnection and the FCC has only established rules for direct interconnection.<sup>19</sup> The ICO members state that 47 U.S.C. §252(c) is the basis of authority for what the TRA can and cannot decide within the scope of an arbitration and provides that the Authority can only ensure that the resolution of an arbitration meets the requirements set forth in Section 251 of the Act and in regulations prescribed by the FCC. The Coalition maintains that because the FCC has not established rules specific to indirect interconnection within its rules for interconnection the Authority is beyond its jurisdiction in imposing rules.<sup>20</sup>

According to the ICO members, proof that no FCC rule exists with regard to indirect interconnection is provided by BellSouth's petition to the FCC dated June 4, 2004, in which BellSouth asks for clarification with regard to third-party transit situations. Specifically, BellSouth asks that it not be obligated to provide this function; that originating and terminating carriers be held liable for compensation; and that a transiting carrier, such as BellSouth, be entitled to a fee for the use of its network.<sup>21</sup>

21 Id at 19

Transcript of Proceedings, v. I, pp. 15-16 (August 9, 2004)

<sup>20</sup> Id at 17-18, referencing 47 C F R. § 51 701 et seq

The ICO members continuously assert that BellSouth is a necessary party to these proceedings and insist that complete relief cannot be afforded if no rules exist on the obligations of a transit provider such as BellSouth. As an example, the ICO members question how a Coalition member would cut-off the defaulting party's traffic in the event of non-payment of fees due a Coalition member.<sup>22</sup>

The ICO members further argue that only those terms and conditions consistent with interconnection standards established by statute or the FCC can be imposed as a result of arbitration unless both parties voluntarily submit the issues to be arbitrated. They assert that simply because the CMRS providers raised issues for arbitration and voluntarily submitted those issues does not render those issues subject to arbitration. The Coalition cites an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the Court reversed a lower court holding that if a state commission arbitrates any open issue there is no limit on what subjects the incumbent must negotiate.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the Court stated that such a holding is contrary to the Act, which lists only a limited number of issues on which incumbents are required to negotiate. The Coalition insists that its members have not voluntarily submitted any issues to arbitration beyond the scope of established interconnection standards.24

The CMRS providers assert that Section 251(a) of the Act obligates telecommunications carriers to interconnect either directly or indirectly and the traffic that is exchanged indirectly is done so through a third party. The Act further requires that when wireline carriers exchange local traffic they in turn pay each other reciprocal compensation and when long distance traffic is carried they pay and collect access charges. In the case of wireless carriers, local calls are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Post-Hearing Reply Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, pp 4-5 (October 5, 2004). referencing MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 298 F. 3d 1269, 1274 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002)
<sup>24</sup> Id

defined in terms of metropolitan trading areas ("MTAs") instead of service areas. The FCC requires that all traffic originated and terminated within the same MTA be considered local and, thus, subject to reciprocal compensation.<sup>25</sup>

The CMRS providers maintain that all intraMTA traffic is subject to reciprocal compensation based on forward-looking costs and that, with regard to reciprocal compensation, the FCC has held that the calling party network pays the reciprocal compensation. Therefore, the CMRS providers argue that the carrier whose customer initiates the call must pay the cost to deliver the traffic to the network of the terminating carrier and pay the appropriate reciprocal compensation.<sup>26</sup>

#### Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The preliminary issue in this arbitration is whether reciprocal compensation is applicable to an indirect interconnection arrangement utilizing the common trunk group of a third party to indirectly connect the originating and terminating parties.

The TRA has rejected the ICO members' claim that this matter is inappropriate as a Section 252 arbitration proceeding. This matter came to the Authority as a direct result of Docket No. 00-00523. In Docket No. 00-00523, the Hearing Officer ordered the parties to continue negotiations and stressed that a settlement of the matter was in the best interest of all parties. The Order was clear that if the ICO members could not reach a settlement with the CMRS providers then the Authority may be called upon to arbitrate disputed issues.<sup>27</sup> The CMRS providers then petitioned the Authority to arbitrate the matter, and the Authority accepted the arbitrations and all the issues raised therein.<sup>28</sup>

Petition of Verizon, Petition of T-Mobile, Petition of Cingular, Petition of AT&T (November 6, 2003) Petition of Sprint (November 7, 2003) Order Accepting Petitions for Arbitration (April 12, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, v. I, pp. 8-10 (August 9, 2004). see 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.701(b)(2) and 51.703 (2004). Transcript of Proceedings, v. I, p. 11 (August 9, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See In re Generic Docket Addressing Rural Universal Service, Docket No 00-00523. Order Granting Conditional Stay, Continuing Abeyance, and Granting Intervention, p 5 (May 5, 2003)

This position is supported by federal statutes and FCC decisions. The ICO members and the CMRS providers are telecommunications carriers.<sup>29</sup> The compulsory arbitration provisions in Section 252 of the Act apply to all telecommunications carriers.<sup>30</sup> As telecommunications carriers, the parties have the duty to interconnect, directly or indirectly, with one another.<sup>31</sup> As local exchange carriers ("LECs"), the ICO members have the obligation to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.<sup>32</sup>

In its Local Competition Order, the FCC stated:

Under section 251(b)(5), LECs have a duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of "telecommunications." Under section 3(43), "[t]he term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received." All CMRS providers offer telecommunications. Accordingly, LECs are obligated, pursuant [footnote omitted] to section 251(b)(5) (and the corresponding pricing standards of section 252(d)(2)), to enter into reciprocal compensation arrangements with all CMRS providers, including paging providers, for the transport and termination of traffic on each other's networks, pursuant to the rules governing reciprocal compensation set forth in Section XI.B., below.<sup>33</sup>

Section 252 of the Act states that upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or network elements pursuant to Section 251, a LEC may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement.<sup>34</sup> Between the 135<sup>th</sup> and 160<sup>th</sup> day (inclusive) after the date when the LEC receives a request for negotiation pursuant to Section 252, the carrier or any party to the negotiation may petition the state commission for arbitration of any open issues <sup>35</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> 47 U S C § 3(a)(49) (2004) defines a telecommunications carrier

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> 47 U S C § 252 (2004)

i la

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  Id

<sup>33</sup> Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499, ¶ 1008 (1996)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>M</sup> 47 U S C § 252(a)(1) (2004)

<sup>35 47</sup> U S C § 252(b)(1) (2004)

Section 252(b)(1) provides in part that any party to the negotiation of an agreement under section 251 "may petition a State commission to arbitrate any open issues." The term "any open issues" has, however, been limited by the courts such that it does not include anything on any subject. In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., the court stated, "If the [state commission] must arbitrate any issue raised by a moving party, then there is effectively no limit on what subjects the incumbent must negotiate. This is contrary to the scheme and the text of that statute, which lists only a limited number of issues on which incumbents are mandated to negotiate." Further, the court upheld a state commission's authority to arbitrate MCI's request that an enforcement mechanism be included in its interconnection agreement with BellSouth because the requested provision fell within the realm of "conditions . . . required to implement" the agreement under Sections 252(b)(4)(C) and 252(c).<sup>38</sup>

The United States District Court for Minnesota in US West Communications, Inc. v

Munnesota Public Utilities Commission<sup>39</sup> addressed the issue of whether a state commission has
the authority to include the issue of the billing of transit traffic in an arbitration under Sections
251 and 252 of the Act. The US West Court stated that "the language of 252(c)(1)... does not
confine the resolution of the issues to the requirements of 251, 40 and stated that "[t]he parties can
bring any unresolved interconnection issue before the state commission for arbitration."

The ICO members, as rural telephone companies, have no duty to negotiate pursuant to Section 251(c) except under very narrow conditions <sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, they each have a duty to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> MC1 Telecommunications Corp v BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 298 F 3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).

<sup>38</sup> Id

<sup>30</sup> US West Communications, Inc. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 55 F. Supp 2d 968 (D. Minn. 1999)

<sup>41</sup> Id at 985 (emphasis added)

<sup>42 47</sup> U S C § 251(f)(1)(A) (2004).

interconnect as a telecommunications carrier and, as a local exchange carrier, an obligation to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications. To the extent this duty and obligation have not been resolved through negotiation, they remain unresolved, open issues. The Arbitrators found that the Authority may arbitrate unresolved issues between two parties where one party seeks, through arbitration, to cause another party to meet its duty to interconnect and obligation to establish reciprocal compensation and identifies these issues in its petition for arbitration.<sup>43</sup>

The Arbitrators further found that this proceeding is properly a Section 252 arbitration proceeding.<sup>44</sup> The CMRS providers have requested terms of indirect interconnection and reciprocal compensation from the ICO members. These two issues are squarely Section 251 matters. Therefore, because the issues have not been resolved through negotiations, they are properly before the Authority pursuant to Section 252(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> 47 U S C § 252(b)(2)(A)(1) (2004), see also 47 U S C. § 252(b)(4)(C) (2004)

<sup>44</sup> Transcript of Proceedings. pp. 2-7 (January 12, 2005)

## Does an ICO have the duty to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers?

#### **Positions of Parties**

The CMRS providers maintain that the FCC's rules, as well as Section 251(a) of the Act, expressly require the ICO members to interconnect either directly or indirectly with other telecommunications carriers including the CMRS providers.<sup>45</sup> The CMRS providers aver that: (1) the industry term "indirect interconnection" refers to traffic one carrier sends to another through the tandem of a third party; (2) CMRS providers employ this type of interconnection when exchanging traffic with small independent telephone companies on a routine basis; and (3) arrangements of this type are standard in the industry and recognized by the Act and the FCC.<sup>46</sup>

The ICO members maintain that they are in full compliance with the requirements of the Act that establish the duty to interconnect either directly or indirectly with the CMRS providers.<sup>47</sup> The ICO members argue that

Section 251(a) of the Act simply identifies the general duty of carriers to interconnect directly and indirectly with other carriers via the public switched network and to use standard equipment and technical approaches that are compatible with other network participants. This subsection of the Act and the associated implementation rules do not impose any specific standards of interconnection, hierarchical network arrangements (e.g., no requirement to subtend a BellSouth tandem), business arrangements (e.g., billing and payment relationships), compensation arrangements, or service obligations.

The ICO members argue that there is no issue here because they are already in compliance with Section 251(a) which mandates the simple requirement to interconnect and which is separate and apart from Section 251(b) and (c) requirements that provide specific interconnection obligations distinct from Section 251(a).49

<sup>45</sup> Petition for Arbitration of Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p. 9 (November 6, 2003)

<sup>47</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 18 (December 1, 2003)

<sup>48</sup> Id at 19 (footnotes omitted)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Id at 19-20

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

All parties agree that they are telecommunications carriers<sup>50</sup> and concede that they are required to interconnect either directly or indirectly.<sup>51</sup> Section 251(a) of the Act defines the general duty of telecommunications carriers as follows:

Each telecommunications carrier has the duty -

- (1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers; and
- (2) not to install network features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines and standards established pursuant to section 255 or 256.

Additionally, 47 C.F.R. § 51.100(a) sets forth the same requirement of interconnection. The FCC Rules define a telecommunications carrier as any provider of telecommunications services, except aggregators of telecommunications services. This definition includes ICO members and CMRS providers. 53

For these reasons, the Arbitrators voted unanimously that an ICO member has the duty to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers, including the CMRS providers. The additional arguments raised in this Issue were addressed in the resolution of Issue No. 2.

53 *Id* 

Joint Post-Arbitration Brief Submitted on Behalf of the CMRS Providers, p 18 (September 10, 2004) Post-Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 19 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>51</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, v I, p 31 (August 9, 2004) & v VII, p 21 (August 11, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> See 47 C F R. § 51 5 (2004)

Do the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) and the ISSUE 2: related negotiation and arbitration process in § 252(b) apply to traffic exchanged indirectly by a CMRS provider and an ICO?

#### Positions of Parties

The CMRS providers maintain that the FCC Rules provide for the payment of reciprocal compensation for all intraMTA traffic regardless of how it is delivered (directly or indirectly) and while rural carriers are exempt from the interconnection provisions of Section 251(c)(2) until a state commission terminates the exemption of Section 251(f)(1), rural carriers are not exempt from the obligations of Sections 251(a) and 251(b).<sup>54</sup> The CMRS providers also aver that unless a state commission determines such an exemption is warranted, rural LECs must comply with the negotiation and arbitration process specified by the Act. 55 The CMRS providers also argue that reciprocal compensation arrangements apply to all telecommunications traffic as defined by 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(b)(2) which includes intraMTA traffic. 56

The ICO members argue that the FCC's Subpart H Rules define transport and termination arrangements for which reciprocal compensation applies and the existing three party transit service arrangement is not within the scope of those rules because the CMRS traffic is commingled with BellSouth's interexchange carrier access traffic.<sup>57</sup> Subpart H.Rules apply only to arrangements where an interconnection point is established between two carriers.<sup>58</sup> The ICO members also maintain that the CMRS providers must establish termination of their traffic to LECs through direct interconnection and reciprocal compensation arrangements with respect to traffic that originates and terminates within an MTA.<sup>59</sup> Additionally, the ICO members state that the three party "transit" traffic arrangement is not an interconnection requirement to which

<sup>54</sup> Petition for Arbitration of Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p. 10 (November 6, 2003)

<sup>55</sup> *Id* at 10-11 56 *Id* at 11

<sup>57</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 21 (December 1, 2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> *ld* at 27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Post Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 19-20 (September 10, 2004)

arbitration applies because "transit" arrangements are not part of the interconnection requirements or rules.<sup>60</sup> The ICO members aver that no LEC is obligated to accept traffic from any physically interconnected interexchange carrier under terms and conditions that alleviate that interexchange carrier from payment for the termination of the traffic, regardless of whether the traffic originates on another carrier's network.<sup>61</sup>

The ICO members maintain that the transit arrangement, under which they now operate to exchange traffic with the CMRS providers, is not an arrangement described as an interconnection requirement either under the Act or by the FCC.<sup>62</sup> Further, the ICO members state that there is nothing in any of the FCC's orders regarding reciprocal compensation that addresses three parties and that "the definitions all discuss an arrangement between two carriers where there's an interconnection point established on the network of the incumbent between the two carriers that are exchanging traffic."

#### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

#### Applicability of Section 251(b)(5)

Section 251(b)(5) of the Act imposes on the ICOs the duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic. Subpart H of the FCC Rules, 47 C.F.R. 51.701 through 51.717, defines telecommunications traffic and includes, as telecommunications traffic, any "traffic exchanged between a LEC and a CMRS provider that at the beginning of the call, originates and terminates within the same Major Trading Area" and establishes that each LEC must establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic with any requesting

<sup>60</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, pp 22-23 (December 1, 2003)

<sup>62</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, v VII, p 23 (August 11, 2004)

<sup>64 47</sup> C F.R. § 51 701(b)(2) (2004)

carrier. The FCC Rules in 47 C.F.R. 51.701 through 51.717 do not distinguish between direct and indirect traffic. The plain language of these rules implies that the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) apply equally to traffic exchanged either directly or indirectly.

The ICO members assert that the definition of transport does not contemplate an indirect network architecture that is subject to reciprocal compensation. The success of the ICO members' argument with regard to the FCC's definition of transport depends on the interpretation of the phrase "from the interconnection point between the two carriers." The ICO members use this phrase to rule out the participation of a third carrier who might be fulfilling the role of intermediary carrier providing indirect interconnection.

Nevertheless, this wording just as easily applies to the present situation where the parties interconnect through BellSouth and the interconnection point between the two carriers is BellSouth. Using this interpretation, a three party process results whereby the LEC and the CMRS provider interconnect through an intermediary carrier who serves as the "interconnection point between the two carriers" and who provides the necessary billing details to the two carriers. This interpretation is wholly consistent with the definition of "interconnection" because here BellSouth serves as the means for the "linking" of two networks and makes possible an indirect interconnection. This is the situation under which the parties are now operating and exchanging traffic. The missing component is the proper exchange of compensation for the traffic being exchanged.

<sup>65 47</sup> C F.R § 51 701(c) (2004)

<sup>66</sup> Post-Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p. 21 (September 10, 2004)

Interconnection in 47 C F R § 51.5 is defined as "the linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic."

This term does not include the transport and termination of traffic.

The Arbitrators conclude that the plain reading of these rules indicates that the FCC intended for the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) to apply to traffic exchanged between a CMRS provider and an ICO member. The Arbitrators also found nothing in the Act or FCC rules or orders to the contrary. Further, the ICO members presented no citations to applicable authority during this proceeding that would indicate otherwise.

#### Applicability of Section 252(b)

This question is resolved upon the finding under Issue No. 1 that an ICO has the duty to connect directly or indirectly pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 251 because Section 252(a)(1), which provides for voluntary negotiations and the subject matter of a Section 252(b) arbitration, encompasses "interconnection, services or network elements pursuant to section 251."

Based upon the record in this proceeding and for the reasons cited above, a majority of the Arbitrators voted that the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) and the related negotiation and arbitration process in § 252(a) and (b) apply to traffic exchanged indirectly between a CMRS provider and an ICO member.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Director Jones agreed with the conclusions, but provided the following alternative reasoning 47 U S.C. § 251(b)(5) requires the ICO members to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of traffic and the ICO members have not filed a petition for suspension or modification of Section 251(b)(5). First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red, 15499 at ¶ 1045 (1996) The ICO members' argument that the indirect interconnection arrangement sought by the CMRS providers is not the type of indirect interconnection arrangement for which the FCC has said that reciprocal compensation applies is erroneous because the referenced language does not provide an exhaustive list of transport alternatives and through the use of the phrase "facilities provided by alternative carriers" includes the interconnection arrangement sought by the CMRS providers Id at ¶ 1039 The language of Section 251(b)(5) and FCC regulations is broad and can reasonably be interpreted to include traffic exchanged indirectly between the CMRS providers and an ICO. This conclusion is consistent with federal district court decisions, FCC comments, and state commission decisions. See Texcom. Inc. d/b/a Answer Indiana v Bell Atlantic Corp d'b/u Verizon Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 6275, ¶¶ 4-6 (2001), reconsideration denied, 17 FCC Rcd 6275 (2002); Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 9610, § 8 (2001), Atlas Telephone Company v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 309 F Supp 2d 1299, 1310-11 (WD Okla 2004) (on appeal to the 10th Cit), 3 Rivers Telephone Cooperative. Inc. v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., CV 99-80-GF-CSO, pp. 48-49 (D. Mont Aug. 22, 2003), In re Application of Southwestern Bell Wireless L.L.C. for Arbitration Under the Telecomm Act of 1996, Cause No PUD 2002200149, Order No 468958, Final Order, p 4. Exhibit A p 17, & Exhibit B p 1 (Corporation Comin Okla Oct 22, 2002)

ISSUE 2b: Do the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) apply to land originated intraMTA traffic that is delivered to a CMRS provider via an Interexchange Carrier (IXC)?

#### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers maintain that the FCC Rules provide for the payment of reciprocal compensation for all intraMTA traffic regardless of how it is delivered or whether the traffic is completed directly or indirectly.<sup>69</sup> Additionally, they state that the reciprocal compensation requirement is not affected by the type of intermediary carrier, whether a transiting carrier or an IXC.<sup>70</sup> They maintain the position that as long as the land originated traffic involved terminates to a CMRS provider within the same MTA, the ICO member should pay the CMRS provider reciprocal compensation.<sup>71</sup>

The ICO members aver that a LEC's obligation to pay reciprocal compensation is applicable only with respect to the LEC's local exchange service traffic and cannot extend to a call carried by the originating customer's interexchange carrier. Interexchange traffic is subject to the framework of access, as recognized by the FCC's position that most traffic between LECs and CMRS providers is not subject to interstate access charges unless carried by an IXC. Therefore, the ICO members argue, ICO calls delivered to a CMRS provider by an IXC are subject to access from the IXC and not reciprocal compensation from an ICO.

#### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

Access charges were developed to address a situation in which three carriers, typically the originating LEC, the IXC and the terminating LEC, collaborate to complete a long distance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 2 and Billy H. Pruitt, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 30 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Billy H Prunt, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 30 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>71</sup> Id at 31

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p. 31 (December 1, 2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Id at 34

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Id at 35-36

call. Reciprocal compensation for transport and termination of calls is intended for a situation in which two carriers collaborate to complete a local call. The FCC has stated that long distance traffic is not subject to the transport and termination provisions of Section 251 of the Act and that the reciprocal compensation provisions of Section 251(b)(5) for the transport and termination of traffic do not apply to interstate or intrastate interexchange traffic.<sup>75</sup>

In its First Report and Order, the FCC stated that traffic between an incumbent LEC and a CMRS network that originates and terminates within the same MTA is subject to transport and termination rates under Section 251(b)(5) rather than interstate or intrastate access charges. The FCC also concluded that traffic between LECs and CMRS providers is not subject to interstate access charges it is carried by an IXC. The FCC in TSR Wireless LLC v US West stated.

[A] LEC may not charge CMRS providers for facilities used to deliver LEC-originated traffic that originates and terminates within the same MTA, as this constitutes local traffic under our rules. Such traffic falls under our reciprocal compensation rules if carried by the incumbent LEC, and under our access charge rules if carried by an interexchange carrier. This may result in the same call being viewed as a local call by the carriers and a toll call by the end-user.<sup>78</sup>

Many times LATA boundaries traverse MTAs. When this situation occurs, an intraMTA call that originates in one LATA and terminates in another LATA will necessarily involve an IXC and will be subject to the access charge regime rather than reciprocal compensation. Nevertheless, based upon the plain language of the FCC, a majority of the Arbitrators found that any wireline-wireless traffic that does not cross a LATA boundary and that originates and terminates within the same MTA is subject to reciprocal compensation whether or not it is carried by an IXC. For these reasons, a majority of the Arbitrators voted that the reciprocal

<sup>75</sup> First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 at ¶ 1034

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Id at ¶ 1043

<sup>77</sup> Ld

<sup>78</sup> TSR Wireless v. US West, Memorandum and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11166 at ¶ 31 (2000)

compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) apply to land originated intraMTA traffic that is delivered to a CMRS provider via an Interexchange Carrier (IXC) unless the call crosses a LATA boundary.<sup>79</sup>

Director Jones did not vote with the majority. It was his position that the reciprocal compensation requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) apply to land originated intraMTA traffic that is delivered to a CMRS provider via an interexchange carrier. Relying on the definition of telecommunications traffic contained in Rule 51 701(b)(2), Director Jones rejected the Coalition's position that "telecommunication traffic" does not include traffic carried by an interexchange carrier. He also stated that his conclusion is consistent with the United States District Court ruling in Atlas Telephone Company v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 309 F. Supp 2d 1299, 1310-11 (W.D. Okla 2004), the FCC's First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499 at ¶ 1043; and the FCC's decision in Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Remand, 16 FCC Red 9151 at ¶ 47 (2001)

#### Who bears the legal obligation to compensate the terminating carrier for ISSUE 3: traffic that is exchanged indirectly between a CMRS provider and an ICO?

#### Positions of Parties

The CMRS providers argue that the carrier on whose network a call originates is responsible for paying the carrier on whose network the call terminates.<sup>80</sup> The CMRS providers assert that federal law establishes that the originating carrier has an obligation to compensate and 47 C.F.R. § 51.703 states that a LEC may not charge another telecommunications carrier for telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC's network.81

The ICO members maintain that when a CMRS carrier utilizes a transit arrangement through a third party instead of establishing a physical point of interconnection ("POI") with the ICO network, the CMRS providers would pay the transiting party transport and termination and the transiting party would pay termination to the ICO members. The payment is based on the contracts and arrangements established between and among the multiple parties. The ICO members assert that the "meet-point billing" arrangement between the ICO members and BellSouth is not an arrangement addressed by the existing interconnection rules and established standards.<sup>82</sup> The ICO members have a similar three-party arrangement in Kentucky, where BellSouth, the party that connects to the ICO member, is responsible for the traffic it terminates to the 1CO member. 83

The ICO members assert that the FCC has confirmed that its interconnection rules have not addressed the transit service situations and that its rules have not established any obligation for a three-party transit arrangement. Per the First Report and Order, the only three-party

Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 5
 Suzanne K Nieman, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 7 (June 3, 2004).

<sup>82</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p. 6.

<sup>83</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 18 (June 4, 2004)

arrangement recognized by the FCC is one where an IXC acts as an intermediary and that arrangement is subject to access charges.<sup>84</sup>

The ICO members rebut the CMRS providers' claim that traffic carried by BellSouth, acting as an IXC and commingling CMRS traffic with its IXC traffic, is an indirect interconnection arrangement applicable to FCC subpart H Rules. Part 51 Rules do not mention a three-party interconnection arrangement as contemplated here. The ICO members are, however, willing to enter into a voluntary arrangement outside the scope of an arbitrated interconnection arrangement.<sup>85</sup>

#### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The Act requires telecommunications carriers to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers. The ICO members have a statutory obligation to interconnect with the CMRS providers. The local exchange carriers who are members of the Coalition are responsible for establishing reciprocal compensation arrangements for both the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic. The FCC Rules require that each LEC shall establish reciprocal compensation for transport and termination of telecommunications traffic with any requesting carrier and a LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for traffic that originates on the LEC's network. 88

Notwithstanding the Coalition's claim that there is no interconnection point between the ICO members and the CMRS providers because the CMRS providers have opted to use the existing BellSouth common trunk group, 89 a majority of the Arbitrators found that a point of

<sup>84</sup> Id at p 17.

<sup>85</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-Filed Rebuttal Testimony, pp. 11-12 (June 25, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> 47 U S C § 251(a)(1) (2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> 47 U S C § 251(b)(5) (2004)

<sup>88 47</sup> C F.R. § 51 703 (a) and (b) (2004)

<sup>89</sup> Post-Heuring Reply Brief of the Rural Coalution of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p. 11 (October 5, 2004).

interconnection exists between BellSouth and the ICO members with regard to that common trunk. The architecture of the common trunk is not at issue. What is at issue in this docket is the point of indirect interconnection on the network which determines the compensation obligation of an ICO member or a CMRS provider. A majority of the Arbitrators concluded that the most efficient means to resolve this issue is by maintaining the point of interconnection that currently exists between the ICO members and BellSouth and between the CMRS providers and BellSouth and voted that, pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(a) and (b), the company that originates the call is responsible for paying the party terminating the call. 90

Ourector Jones concurred with the majority's conclusion only. He takes no position with regard to the point of interconnection between the ICO members and BellSouth and the CMRS providers and BellSouth. His vote rests on the provision of 47 U.S.C. § 251 and 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.11(c), 51.701(e) and 51.703(a) and (b)

ISSUE 4: When a third-party provider transits traffic, must the Interconnection Agreement between the originating and terminating carriers include the transiting provider?

#### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers maintain that any interconnection agreements between the CMRS providers and the ICO members should not include third-party transiting carriers. Rather, the CMRS providers assert that a call from a CMRS provider through a third-party provider should be governed by an agreement between the CMRS provider and the third-party carrier and another agreement between the third-party carrier and the terminating carrier. Also, the CMRS providers argue that the ICO members have a legal obligation to enter into interconnection agreements with the CMRS providers that include reciprocal compensation arrangements. Finally, the CMRS providers assert that the TRA has previously recognized that Section 252 agreements are comprised of two parties and not three.

The ICO members argue that the CMRS providers already have an indirect interconnection arrangement with the ICO members, through the transport services of BellSouth, and the ICO members look solely to BellSouth as having the responsibility for that traffic. Further, the ICO members assert that this arbitration does not involve establishing new interconnection arrangements. Instead, this arbitration pertains to the establishment of new terms and conditions for the existing arrangements.

The ICO members argue that the new terms and conditions the CMRS providers seek with the ICO members cannot be acceptable unless BellSouth fulfills specific obligations and maintains ultimate responsibility regarding the identification of traffic it carries as the

<sup>91</sup> Petition for Arbitration of Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p. 13 (November 6, 2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Joint Post-Arbitration Brief Submitted on Behalf of the CMRS Providers, p 18 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>quot;" *ld*. at 20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p. 40 (December 1, 2003)

intermediary between the CMRS providers and the ICO members. 95 The ICO members maintain that this issue is outside the scope of a Section 252 arbitration because it is associated with indirect interconnection and the FCC has not established standards with respect to indirect interconnection. Therefore, the issue cannot be lawfully addressed in this proceeding consistent with the arbitration standards set forth in Section 252(c) of the Act. 96

#### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The Arbitrators unanimously concluded that when a third-party provider transits traffic, the third party is not required to be included in the interconnection agreement between the originating and terminating carriers.<sup>97</sup> This circumstance will require the ICO members to also negotiate an interconnection agreement with a transit provider. This conclusion is supported by the definition of "interconnection" in 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 which states that interconnection is "the linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic." This definition embraces the linking of two networks which, of necessity, will result in an interconnection agreement between the two networks (parties) being linked. The Arbitrators found nothing in the 1996 Act, FCC Rules or any FCC Order that requires three-party interconnection agreements. To the contrary the FCC has discouraged three-party interconnection agreements. 98

The Arbitrators voted unanimously that when a third-party provider transits traffic, the interconnection agreement between the originating and terminating carriers should not include the transiting provider as a party. Nevertheless, the interconnection agreement between the

<sup>95</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 7
96 Post Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 34-35 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>97</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 22-23 (January 12, 2005)

<sup>98 &</sup>quot;We believe that the arbitration proceedings generally should be limited to the requesting carrier and the incumbent local exchange provider. This will allow for a more efficient process and minimize the amount of time needed to resolve disputed issues. We believe that opening the process to all third parties would be unwieldy and would delay the process. We will, however, consider requests by third parties to submit written pleadings. This may, in some instances, allow interested parties to identify important public policy issues not raised by parties to an arbitration" First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, § 1295 (1996)

originating and terminating carrier should address all terms and conditions relating to the transit traffic including the method of transit and who pays the transiting provider.<sup>99</sup>

Director Jones agreed with the conclusion, but provided the following alternative reasoning. "[T]here is nothing in the Act that prevents the adoption of a three-way indirect interconnection arrangement through the execution of multiple two-party agreements or that requires the use of a single multi-party agreement to create a three-way indirect interconnection agreement.

And the Coalition has agreed, nevertheless, that a three-way arrangement can be memorialized in three distinct agreements." Transcript of Proceedings, p 23 (January 12, 2005)

ISSUE 5: Is each party to an indirect interconnection arrangement obligated to pay for the transit costs associated with the delivery of intraMTA traffic originated on its network to the terminating party's network?

#### Positions of Parties

The CMRS providers assert that the originating party is responsible for paying applicable transit costs associated with the delivery of its traffic to a terminating carrier. According to the CMRS providers, "the FCC has established a 'calling party network pays' ('CPNP') regime ... [covering] all parties that carry telecommunications traffic including both the ICOs and the CMRS providers." The CMRS providers acknowledge their responsibility to pay for traffic originated on their network, delivered through a third-party transit provider, and terminated to the ICO members. Further, they state that the ICO members are, therefore, responsible for paying third-party transit costs for traffic originated on the ICO members' network. The CMRS providers rely on 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) as stating "that [a] LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for traffic that originates on the LEC's network."

The ICO members assert that as incumbent providers, they have no obligation to establish interconnection with other carriers or provide interconnection services at a geographic point beyond their service areas. Therefore, the ICO members state that they are not responsible for transport of telecommunications beyond their own networks. According to the ICO members, to require such an arrangement would impermissibly obligate them to provide a superior network compared to the networks the ICO members use to provide service. Further, the ICO members state that the FCC Rules regarding reciprocal compensation envision traffic exchange

<sup>100</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p. 8

Petition for Arbitration of Celleo Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p. 14 (November 6, 2003) citing TSR Wireless v. US West, Memorandum and Order, 15 FCC Red. 11166, § 31 (2000)

<sup>102</sup> Billy H. Pruitt, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp. 20-23 (June 3, 2004).

<sup>103</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 8.

<sup>104 7.7</sup> 

<sup>105</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp 24-25 (June 4, 2004)

taking place at an interconnection point on the network of the LEC not on another carrier's network. 106

#### Deliberations and Conclusions

The ICO members currently have established points of interconnection ("POI") with BellSouth at the furthest points within the ICO members' serving areas. As part of this arrangement, the ICO members have opted, at this time, not to utilize their own tandem switching, but instead to use a BellSouth tandem switch that is located outside their serving areas. Because the ICOs have opted to utilize the BellSouth tandem as opposed to their own tandem to handle the exchange of traffic between an ICO member and a CMRS provider, the ICO members have in fact extended their networks past the existing POI to the tandem switch. Thus, the Coalition's assertion that the Authority cannot require an ICO to take financial responsibility for transport of CMRS traffic to the tandem switch must be rejected. As the networks exist, utilizing BellSouth's tandem, the ICO members have an obligation for the cost associated with utilizing the trunking facilities.

FCC Rules define transport as the transmission and any necessary tandem switching of telecommunications traffic subject to Section 251(b)(5) of the Act from the interconnection point between the two carriers to the terminating carrier's end office. Currently, the ICO members and CMRS providers are both relying on BellSouth to provide tandem switching in order to complete calls outside their respective networks. Therefore, by rule each is required to include the existing commingled trunk group as part of its network.

<sup>106 1.7</sup> 

<sup>10747</sup> CFR § 51 701(c) (2004)

Each carrier is responsible for transporting a call originated on its network to the interconnect point with the network of the terminating carrier. <sup>108</sup> Therefore, if a call originates in a switch on one party's network then that party is responsible for the transiting costs (the cost associated with the utilization of the BellSouth trunk group) in order to get that call through its network to the POI. In the instance where the CMRS provider originates a call, the CMRS provider has an obligation to pay the cost associated with the transport and termination of the call. The call is handed off at the furthest point on the ICO network where, currently, BellSouth interconnects with the ICO member. 109 Therefore, it is the responsibility of the CMRS provider to negotiate terms with BellSouth for the traffic traversing the commingled trunk group. Similarly, calls that originate on an ICO member's network which traverse the BellSouth trunk group obligates that ICO member to pay the appropriate transport and termination charges associated with getting that call to the POI of the CMRS provider, which is located at the BellSouth tandem. Likewise, the ICO member would negotiate terms to utilize the commingled trunk group or discontinue its traffic exchange via that trunk group.

For the reasons stated, a majority of the Arbitrators concluded that each party to an indirect interconnection arrangement is obligated to pay for the transit costs associated with the delivery of intraMTA traffic originated on its network to the terminating party's network.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> 47 C F R § 51 703(a) and (b) (2004)

109 Transcript of Proceedings, v VIII, pp. 7-8 (August 11, 2004)

In their deliberations, a majority of the Arbitrators further concluded that the cost of transiting traffic, in this case, includes the cost of transporting the traffic over the common trunk line between the ICO members and the transit provider. 110

<sup>110</sup> Director Jones agreed with the conclusion, but provided the following alternative reasoning

I conclude that this issue should be answered in the affirmative, but instead offer the following explanation that, first, according to the FCC's orders in the Texcom docket, transit costs are initially paid to the transit provider

In Texcom, a case involving transit traffic between a paging carrier, GTE North, and a third-party originating carrier, the FCC explained that the payment of transit costs should be such that the originating third-party carrier's customers pay for the cost of delivering their calls to the LEC while the terminating CMRS carrier's customers pay for the costs of transporting that traffic from the LEC's network to their network. The same reasoning would apply when the CMRS provider is the originating carrier and the ICO is the terminating carrier.

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the rates for such services and the terms and conditions through which such payments are billed are best left to negotiations between the ICOs and the transiting provider and the CMRS providers and the transiting provider

Second, the FCC has further determined in Texcom that a CMRS provider – quote – may seek reimbursement of the transiting costs from originating carriers through reciprocal compensation. Thus, transit costs may be recovered through the assessment of transport and termination costs as provided for in Part 51 of the FCC rules.

Third, consistent with my positions on the preceding issues, it is my opinion that reciprocal compensation applies to intraMTA traffic delivered via an indirect interconnection agreement. Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 27-28 (January 12, 2005) (quoting Texcom, Inc. d/b/a Answer Indiana v. Bell Atlantic Corp. d/b/a Verizon Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 21493, ¶ 6, (2001)).

# ISSUE 6: Can CMRS traffic be combined with other traffic types over the same trunk group?

#### Position of the Parties

CMRS providers state that there is no technological reason for requiring CMRS provider traffic to be delivered over segregated trunk groups and that it is also economically inefficient to require separate and distinct groups for CMRS traffic <sup>111</sup> In addition, the CMRS providers state that combining traffic over a single trunk is technologically feasible and a common industry practice. <sup>112</sup> The CMRS providers contend that the ICO members offer no compelling reason why the TRA should depart from the sensible, well-accepted practice and require separate trunk groups for CMRS traffic. <sup>113</sup>

The ICO members state they "do not have technically feasible methods to identify, measure, or switch, on a real-time basis, traffic based on whether the call has been originated by one of the CMRS providers." The ICO members maintain that their switch does not permit them to identify the originating carrier on a real-time basis. "This result is unique to the legacy interconnection arrangement that BellSouth has with each ICO member." According to the ICO members, commingling of different types of traffic on the trunks provisioned by BellSouth to the ICO members for BellSouth's access services, "does not allow the separate treatment or identification of third-party traffic within the commingled traffic." BellSouth's form of trunking for its own interexchange service traffic differs from the trunking that applies to all other IXCs. The ICO members argue that BellSouth should discontinue "this disparate

<sup>111</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 8

<sup>112</sup> Joint Post-Arbitration Brief Submitted on Behalf of the CMRS Providers, p. 26 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>&#</sup>x27;'' *Id* 

<sup>114</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 29 (June 4, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>quot; Id

<sup>116</sup> *Id* 

<sup>117 &</sup>lt;u>Id</u>

<sup>118 7.1</sup> 

arrangement." The current arrangement creates a greater risk business-wise to the ICO members than that to which BellSouth is exposed. 120 The ICO members' witness testified, "depending on the number and type of trunk groups, there will be different types of traffic combined on or separated into individual trunk groups." Further, "the mechanics of billing, the reconciliation of total usage, and the treatment of carriers that have failed to provide compensation" are all factors affected by the identity of the individual usage over each trunk group. 122 "In contrast," according to the ICO members' witness, "it is my understanding that BellSouth has direct trunks with each CMRS provider and is in a position to identify and treat each CMRS provider's traffic separately and distinctly." <sup>123</sup>

#### Deliberations and Conclusions

Currently, BellSouth provides the ICO members EMI 11-01-01 records, which are recorded in the BellSouth tandem. The format and content of these records are defined by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), an industry standards body that manages standardization activities for wireline and wireless networks. 124 Such activities include managing interconnection standards, number portability, toll free access, telecom fraud, and order and billing issues. 125

The ICO Members can use the EMI 11-01-01 records to identify CMRS traffic. 126 These EMI 11-01-01 records are sent to the ICO members on a weekly or daily schedule. 127 In

<sup>119</sup> Id 120 Id 121 Id

<sup>124</sup> BellSouth's Response to Staff Data Request, p. 1 (September 20, 2004)

<sup>127</sup> Id at pp 1-2

addition, BellSouth provides Signaling System No.7 ("SS7") to the ICO members. SS7 architecture is set up in such a way that any node can exchange signaling with any other SS7 capable node, even in an indirect interconnection arrangement. In response to the Authority's data request of August 30, 2004, BellSouth stated that while SS7 data is real-time for call set-up purposes, it is not typically used to generate billing. BellSouth states that the SS7 data may be used to assist in verifying the accuracy of the EM1 11-01-01 records.

While this method of verification may not be real-time, BellSouth can and does provide sufficient information to the ICO members to enable them to identify CMRS traffic and bill accordingly. Therefore, the Arbitrators voted unanimously that either with direct or indirect interconnection, the combining of traffic types over the same trunk should be permitted, provided the calls are properly timed, rated, and billed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Id at 1 SS7 is the standard communication system that is used to control public telephone networks and is a prerequisite for the implementation of an Integrated Digital Services Network ("ISDN")

ISSUE 7: (A) Where should the point of interconnection ("POI") be if a direct connection is established between a CMRS provider's switch and an ICO's switch?

(B) What percentage of the cost of the direct connection facilities should be borne by the ICO?

### Position of the Parties

The CMRS providers state that a POI for a dedicated two-way facility may be established at any technically feasible point on the ICO member's network or at any other mutually agreeable point pursuant to applicable federal rules and the cost of the dedicated facility between the two networks should be fairly apportioned between the parties. The CMRS providers further state that the FCC has "clearly established that with respect to dedicated facilities that interconnect two parties' networks, the parties are to share the costs of such facilities based upon their proportionate use of the facilities, regardless of how the facilities are provisioned, and without regard to the carriers' respective service areas" 130

The ICO members state that this issue is "exclusively related to an actual direct physical interconnection point that the CMRS provider may establish pursuant to Subpart H [of the FCC Rules] for the exchange of traffic." "The indirect arrangement with BellSouth that is the subject of the negotiations and arbitration is not related to this issue." "With the exception of any separate requests and discussions that any individual CMRS providers may have with an individual ICO, the CMRS providers have not requested any interconnection point on the networks of the ICO [members] in the context of these group negotiations." 133

<sup>129</sup> Marc B Sterling, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp. 10-11 (June 3, 2004).

<sup>130</sup> Joint Post-Arburation Brief Submitted on Behalf of the CMRS Providers, p 75 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>131</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 32 (June 4, 2004)

<sup>&#</sup>x27;- Id

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The Act obligates incumbent LECs to provide interconnection at any "technically feasible point within the carrier's network." The FCC has concluded that the term "technically feasible" refers solely to technical or operational concerns, rather than economic, space, or site considerations. Also, the FCC has required that an incumbent LEC must prove to the state commission that a particular interconnection or access point is not technically feasible. The feasible of the state commission that a particular interconnection or access point is not technically feasible.

Interconnection obligations include modifications to incumbent LEC facilities to the extent necessary to accommodate interconnection. <sup>137</sup> In such cases where the incumbent must modify its facilities in order to accommodate such interconnection, the FCC has not said that the costs associated with those modifications cannot be incorporated into interconnection rates.

Any future direct interconnection agreement between the parties would be subject to the CMRS providers designating the point of interconnection. Then, if the ICO member considers that the designated point of interconnection is not technically feasible, the ICO member must demonstrate this to the Authority.

The CMRS providers state that a point of interconnection for a dedicated two-way facility may be established at any technically feasible point on the ICO's network or at any other mutually agreeable point pursuant to applicable federal rules and the cost of the dedicated facility between the two networks should be fairly apportioned between the parties. Once a CMRS provider requests direct interconnection, the parties should negotiate and the specific issue should be brought to the TRA for arbitration if the parties are unable to reach agreement. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> 47 C F R § 20 3 (2004), Definition of Interconnection, 47 C.F R §§ 20 11(a) and (c) (2004), Interconnection of CMRS Providers to Facilities of Local Exchange Carriers, and 47 C F R. § 51 5 (2004), Definition of Technically Feasible

<sup>135 47</sup> C F R. § 51 5 (2004), Definition of Technically Feasible

<sup>136</sup> First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 at ¶ 205

<sup>137 47</sup> C F R § 51.5 (2004), Definition of Technically Feasible

Interconnection Agreement between an ICO member and a CMRS provider, whether negotiated or arbitrated, will determine the rates, terms and conditions for interconnection between the parties.

With regard to Issue 7(A), the Arbitrators voted unanimously that the CMRS providers have the right pursuant to the Act and FCC Rules to designate the point(s) of interconnection at any technically feasible point on the ILECs' network and the CMRS providers shall be responsible for delivering calls to the point of interconnection with the ICO members. The Arbitrators also voted unanimously that the ICO members shall be responsible for delivering calls to the point of interconnection, as they would with any other provider, whether it happens to be an ILEC, CLEC or CMRS provider. As to Issue 7(B), a majority of the Arbitrators voted that the cost for direct connection facilities should be borne by the CMRS provider to the point of interconnection and facilities on the other side of the CMRS provider's point of interconnection should be borne by the ICO member. 138

<sup>138</sup> Director Jones did not vote with the majority as to Issue 7(B), stating he "found that there is insufficient evidence in the record to specify a percentage of the cost of the direct connection facilities to be borne by the ICOs." Transcript of Proceedings, p. 33 (January 12, 2005) Instead, Director Jones directed the parties to the standard in 47 C F R § 51 709(b) (2004)

#### What is the appropriate pricing methodology for establishing a reciprocal ISSUE 8: compensation rate for the exchange of indirect or direct traffic?

### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers maintain that the FCC's default proxy rates have been invalidated. 139 Therefore, the availability of proxies remains unsettled and there are only two alternatives clearly available under FCC regulations for establishing transport and termination rates: (1) forward-looking rates based on appropriate cost studies, or (2) bill-and-keep. (140)

The CMRS providers assert that "because of the ICOs' failure to produce (1) forwardlooking cost studies and (2) balance-of-traffic studies, FCC regulations mandate that the TRA adopt bill-and-keep as the appropriate compensation mechanism."<sup>141</sup> The CMRS providers propose establishing bill-and-keep arrangements as the appropriate compensation mechanism until the ICO members produce a valid, forward-looking cost study or a valid balance of traffic study. 142 The CMRS providers contend that FCC Rule 51.705 sets forth the alternative available to state commissions governing reciprocal compensation arrangements. The CMRS providers assert that of the three alternatives, only the forward-looking cost or bill-and-keep options are warranted. 143 The CMRS providers claim that reciprocal compensation rates must be symmetrical and cost-based per FCC regulations. 144 To the CMRS providers, cost-based rates preclude setting a composite rate for all ICO members. Rather, company specific factors should be utilized to determine a company specific cost. 145 The CMRS providers note that the ICO members have not presented cost studies in this docket and failed to provide support for their

<sup>139</sup> Petition for Arburation of Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p. 18 (November 6, 2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> Joint Post-Arbitration Brief Submitted on Behalf of the CMRS Providers, pp. 55-56 (September 10, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> William H Brown, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 17 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Id

<sup>143</sup> *Id* at 18

<sup>144</sup> Id at 19

<sup>145</sup> Id at 20.

cost claims.<sup>146</sup> For these reasons, the CMRS providers advocate bill-and-keep as a feasible option for setting a reciprocal compensation rate.<sup>147</sup> The CMRS providers further state that the ICO members are not precluded from filing cost and traffic studies to replace the bill-and-keep arrangements.<sup>148</sup>

The CMRS providers supplied benchmark rates to illustrate that the ICO members' proposed rates are too high.<sup>149</sup> The CMRS providers argued that because the rates are only approximate and not based on company specific data, they are not forward-looking and should not be adopted as rates for the purpose of reciprocal compensation. The CMRS providers recognize that the Coalition members are in possession of the necessary information to formulate TELRIC rates for reciprocal compensation. The CMRS providers also note that FCC Rule 51.505(e) requires incumbents to file cost studies to ensure that rates do not exceed TELRIC.<sup>150</sup>

The ICO members assert that the TELRIC pricing methodology does not apply to rural telephone companies.<sup>151</sup> The ICO members also claim that the TELRIC pricing rules apply only to direct interconnection not the existing interconnection arrangements between the parties that include BellSouth.<sup>152</sup> The ICO members stated that they have made voluntary rate proposals to the CMRS providers.<sup>153</sup> The ICO members did not provide cost studies in this proceeding.

### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

FCC Rule 51.705 provides the following regarding rates for an incumbent LEC's transport and termination:

<sup>146</sup> Id at 21

<sup>147</sup> Id at 22

<sup>148</sup> Id at 25

<sup>149</sup> W Craig Conwell, Pre-Filed Rebuttal Testimony, p 10 (June 24, 2004)

FCC Rule 51.505(e) reads, "An Incumbent LEC must prove to the state commission that the rates for each element it offers do not exceed the forward-looking economic cost per unit of providing, using a cost study that complies with the methodology set forth in this section and § 51.511"

<sup>151</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 35 (June 4, 2004)

<sup>152</sup> Id

<sup>153</sup> Id

- (a) An incumbent LEC's rates for transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic shall be established, at the election of the state commission, on the basis of:
- (1) The forward-looking economic costs of such offerings, using a cost study pursuant to §§ 51.505 and 51.511;
- (2) Default proxies, as provided in § 51.707; or
- (3) A bill-and-keep arrangement, as provided in § 51.713. 154

A majority of the Arbitrators determined that the rates should be based on forward-looking economic costs. Specifically, the rates should be set using the TELRIC pricing methodology. Although the ICO members voluntarily proposed rates, the majority agreed with the CMRS providers that those rates are not compliant with the required TELRIC methodology. The rates offered by the ICO members were not based on forward-looking cost studies. Instead, they were derived from interstate access rates, which include embedded costs. Embedded costs that are permissible in the calculation of access rates are not permissible in the calculation of rates based on forward-looking costs.

The majority of the Arbitrators found that the use of interim rates pending the implementation of TELRIC-based rates is legally sound. Specifically, the various state commissions have jurisdiction derived from the Act to set rates when carriers fail to do so voluntarily by contract. State commissions may, consistent with FCC Rules, set interim rates subject to true-up during the process of establishing TELRIC rates. Given the lack of cost or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> 47 C F R § 51 705 (2004)

<sup>155</sup> Director Tate did not vote with the majority See Transcript of Proceedings, p 43 (January 12, 2005)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> 47 U S C § 252(a)-(b) (2004), see also Verizon Communications Inc. v FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 492, 122 S.Ct. 1646.

<sup>158</sup> See AT&T Corp v FCC, 220 F 3d 607 (D C Cir 2000) (court reviewed the New York Public Service Commission's use of an interim or placeholder rate subject to true-up for line conditioning charges in a Section 271 proceeding)

traffic studies upon which to implement permanent rates, interim rates that are subject to true-up are appropriate.<sup>159</sup>

A majority of the Arbitrators voted to establish as the interim rate the reciprocal compensation rate set for BellSouth in the TRA's Permanent Price proceeding (TRA Docket No. 97-01262) subject to true-up. The majority determined that the BellSouth reciprocal compensation rate is appropriate to adopt in the interim for two reasons. First, the interim rate will be subject to true-up, thus mitigating the risk that either the ICO members or CMRS providers will be unduly enriched or left inadequately compensated once the final rate is established. Second, the rate is a reasonable interim rate because it is a rate established for an incumbent LEC. In approving the establishment of an interim rate, the majority also voted to commence additional proceedings to establish a permanent cost-based rate for reciprocal compensation and to resolve the issue of whether such rates must be symmetrical between the ICO members and the CMRS providers. Given this decision, the Arbitrators then appointed Chairman Miller to prepare the additional issues for hearing by the full panel.

Additional precedent for the Authority's use of interim rates in arbitration proceedings can be found in the following dockets In re Interconnection Agreement Negotiations Between AT&T Communications of the South Central States, Inc and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc Pursuant to 47 USC Section 252, Docket No. 96-01152, First Order of Arbitration Awards, p. 35 (November 25, 1996) (ordering interim prices pending the completion of cost studies), In re Petition of Nextlink Tennessee, LLC for Arbitration of Interconnection with BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc, Docket No. 98-00123, Final Order of Arbitration Award, p. 7 (June 25, 1999) (setting interim rates for riser cable and terminating wire), and In re Petition for Arbitration of ITC^DeltaCom Communications, Inc with BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket No. 99-00430, Interim Order of Arbitration Award, pp. 47-49 (August 11, 2000) (setting interim rates for DSL UNEs subject to a true-up retroactive to the expiration date of the current agreement)

ISSUE 9: Assuming the TRA does not adopt bill-and-keep as the compensation mechanism, should the parties agree on a factor to use as a proxy for the mobile-to-land and land-to-mobile traffic balance if the CMRS provider does not measure traffic?

## Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers note that some carriers can measure traffic sent to another carrier while others cannot. For the carriers that cannot measure traffic, a 'traffic factor' will be used to replace actual measurement. The practice is an industry standard and often set at a 60/40 split between the carriers. 162

The ICO members argue that the use of factors should not be imposed by the Authority but should be solely voluntary. <sup>163</sup> The ICO members assert that the use of factors is not a statutory requirement. <sup>164</sup> The ICO members further claim that they cannot directly measure traffic because BellSouth delivers CMRS traffic over a feature Group C trunk. <sup>165</sup> Given the indirect interconnection arrangement, the ICO members aver that factors are unnecessary because BellSouth can, and should be required, to provide traffic records. <sup>166</sup>

### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

Having approved the establishment of an interim rate subject to true-up for reciprocal compensation, the Arbitrators voted unanimously to require the parties to file an agreed upon factor to use as a proxy for the mobile-to-land and land-to-mobile traffic balance if the CMRS providers do not measure traffic. The Arbitrators established January 25, 2005 as the date by which the factor shall be filed with the Authority. The Arbitrators further determined

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> William H Brown, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 29 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>162</sup> Id

<sup>163</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 38 (June 4, 2004)

<sup>™</sup> Id

<sup>165</sup> Id

<sup>166</sup> Id

unanimously that if an agreement on a factor has not been reached by January 25, 2005, the parties shall submit this information through final best offers ("FBOs") no later than February 8, 2005. 167

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> The CMRS providers and the ICO members subsequently agreed to a traffic ratio factor of 70% mobile-originated/30% landline-originated that establish a de minimus factor of 5,000 MOUs per month below which no billing will occur. See Joint Letter submitted on behalf of the CMRS providers and the members of the Rural Independent Coalition (February 9, 2005)

ISSUE 10: Assuming the TRA does not adopt bill-and-keep as the compensation mechanism for all traffic exchanged and if a CMRS provider and an ICO are exchanging only a de minimus amount of traffic, should they compensate each other on a bill-and-keep basis? If so, what level of traffic should be considered de minimus?

### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers argue that the transaction costs associated with billing are sometimes greater than the amounts billed for reciprocal compensation.<sup>168</sup> The CMRS providers claim that their request is not frivolous because they terminate traffic to over 1300 small phone companies.<sup>169</sup> The CMRS providers request that if less that 50,000 minutes of use occur, no bills should be issued.<sup>170</sup>

The ICO members assert that there is no interconnection requirement to allow for de minimus billing amounts and that this issue is frivolous.<sup>171</sup>

### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

As to this Issue, the Arbitrators voted unanimously that the parties should exchange de minimus amounts of traffic on a bill-and-keep basis. Further, the Arbitrators found that, in the absence of an agreement among the parties as to what level of traffic should be considered as de minimus, the parties shall file with the Authority by January 25, 2005, what level of traffic is to be considered de minimus. If agreement on a de minimus amount cannot be reached by this date, the parties shall file FBOs on this amount no later than February 8, 2005. 172

<sup>168</sup> William H. Brown, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp. 31-32 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>169</sup> Id at 32-33

<sup>170</sup> Id at 32

<sup>171</sup> Steven E. Watkins. Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 39 (June 4, 2004).

The CMRS providers and the ICO members subsequently agreed to a de minimus factor of 5,000 MOUs per month. See Joint Letter submitted on behalf of the CMRS providers and the members of the Rural Independent Coalition (February 9, 2005)

ISSUE 11: Should the parties establish a factor to delineate what percentage of traffic is interMTA and thereby subject to access rates? If so, what should the factor be?

### **Positions of Parties**

The CMRS providers explain that because the Act requires reciprocal compensation for telecommunications traffic that originates and terminates in the same MTA, traffic that originates outside the MTA is subject to access charges.<sup>173</sup> The CMRS providers argue that there is no evidence that interMTA traffic is anything other than an insignificant amount, nor is there evidence that the traffic is anything other than balanced. The CMRS providers therefore request that interMTA traffic be bill-and-keep. In the event the parties agree to replace bill-and-keep because of increasing volumes of traffic that create an imbalanced situation, then interMTA traffic would be based on actual measurements, unless a party lacks the capability to measure traffic. In the case where a carrier could not measure traffic, a traffic factor would apply. 174 InterMTA factors currently exist in arrangements with similarly situated LECs in other states. 175

During negotiations, the ICO members were willing to negotiate a mutually agreeable factor. The ICO members want a factor that adequately represents traffic that is interMTA. Furthermore, the ICO members acknowledge that because the traffic may vary with the ICO member and proximity to a CMRS provider's service area, many factors are involved. 176 The ICO members assert that the amount of interMTA traffic is growing. This traffic is subject to intrastate and interstate access charges payable to the ICO members. The ICO members opine that the TRA should require the CMRS providers to produce data that would indicate the

<sup>173</sup> William H Brown, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp 33-34 (June 3, 2004).

<sup>174</sup> Id at 33-35.

<sup>175</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 12
176 Id

appropriate level of interMTA traffic, per ICO member. Further, the TRA should affirm that this traffic is subject to interstate and intrastate access charges.<sup>177</sup>

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

A majority of the Arbitrators found that there is insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether a factor should be used and what percentage of traffic is interMTA. Therefore, a majority of the Arbitrators voted to require the CMRS providers to provide each ICO member with six (6) months of interMTA traffic data showing the amount of traffic originated by each CMRS provider and terminated to each ICO member. The majority further voted that in the event this information is insufficient to permit the parties to determine whether a factor is appropriate or to calculate the traffic percentage, the parties can petition the Authority for assistance.

The Arbitrators also determined unanimously that the six months data should be provided no later than January 25, 2005, with the parties notifying the Authority by February 8, 2005 if they are unable to reach an agreement. Chairman Miller also directed the parties to contact him, as Hearing Officer, as soon as possible if the parties should come to an impasse. In addition, the Arbitrators voted to place the matter on the Authority Conference scheduled for January 31, 2005, for the parties to report on the status and to provide an opportunity for them to discuss any issues they considered necessary to be brought to the attention of the Arbitrators or the Hearing Officer. 179

177 Steven E Watkins Prc-Filed Direct Testimony, pp. 39-40 (June 4, 2004)

Director Tate did not vote with the majority See Transcript of Proceedings, p 46 (January 12, 2005)

The CMRS providers and the ICO members subsequently agreed to an interMTA factor of 3%, which states that the factor is based on terminating wireless MOUs and will be paid only by the CMRS providers. See Joint Letter submitted on behalf of the CMRS providers and the members of the Rural Independent Coalition (February 9, 2005)

## ISSUE 12(A): Must an ICO provide dialing parity?

### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers, through Verizon Wireless witness Mark B. Sterling, assert that FCC Rules expressly require dialing parity regardless of the called party's provider. Specifically, they posit that where they have numbers associated with the local calling area of an ICO member, the ICO members should afford local treatment to their customers for calling those numbers to avoid customer confusion. 180

Witness Sterling states that "CMRS providers have built wireless networks in their licensed areas in Tennessee in order to provide service in those areas" and have obtained telephone numbers for specific rate centers to be able to offer their end users local calling from wireline customers in those areas. 181 The CMRS providers maintain that while the association of a telephone number with a rate center may not be very important for mobile originated calls, it is critical for land-to-mobile calling. The CMRS providers obtain local numbers because a telephone number is associated with a particular geographic area and being able to retain local calling from landline numbers is important to CMRS customers. They opine that if number association was not important, the FCC would not have ordered intermodal local number portability. The CMRS providers state "Independent LEC-originated calls to local numbers should be able to be dialed by their customers using the same number of digits regardless of the calling or call parties' service providers."182

The ICO members argue that LECs are not required to rely on rate center information of other carriers contained in industry databases in providing intrastate local exchange service, stating that "the FCC has concluded that NPA-NXX information is generally meaningless with

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Mark B. Sterling, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, pp. 13-14 (June 3, 2004).
 <sup>181</sup> Mark B. Sterling, Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony, p. 4 (June 24, 2004).

<sup>182</sup> Transcript of Proceedings, v. II, p. 23 (August 9, 2004)

respect to mobile wireless services . . . [and] that not all carriers utilize this information for the definition and billing of services. . . ."<sup>183</sup> The ICO members summarized their position on this issue in the joint issues matrix by stating that "[t]he ICO members fully understand and abide by the Section 251(b) dialing parity obligation to the extent that the obligation is applicable."<sup>184</sup>

### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

Dialing Parity is addressed as an obligation of all local exchange carriers in 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) as follows:

DIALING PARITY. – The duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the duty to permit all such providers to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.<sup>185</sup>

FCC regulations require local exchange carriers to provide local and toll dialing parity to competing telephone exchange service or telephone toll service. Specifically, 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 provides:

Local dialing parity. A LEC shall permit telephone exchange service customers within a local calling area to dial the same number of digits to make a local telephone call notwithstanding the identity of the customer's or the called party's telecommunications service provider.

While Section 251 of the Act does not specify CMRS providers, it does state that dialing parity will be provided to "competing providers of telephone exchange service." In its First Report and Order, the FCC found that cellular, broadband PCS (personal communication service) and covered SMR (specialized mobile radio) providers fall within the definition of telephone exchange service providers because they provide "comparable service" to telephone

<sup>183</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 45 (June 4, 2004).

<sup>184</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> 47 U S.C. § 251(b)(3)

<sup>186</sup> Id

exchange service. 187 In the Second Report and Order, the FCC held that "to the extent that a CMRS provider offers telephone exchange service, such a provider is entitled to receive the benefits of local dialing parity."188

The Arbitrators unanimously found that, because the FCC clearly includes CMRS providers in the definition of "competing providers of telephone exchange service," ICO members must provide dialing parity to the CMRS providers.

<sup>187</sup> First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 at ¶ 1013
188 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report and Order and Memorandian Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392, 9 65 (1996).

ISSUE 12(B) (excluding Cingular):

Must an ICO charge its end users the same rates for calls to a CMRS NPA/NXX as calls to a land line NPA/NXX in the same rate center?

### Positions of the Parties

The CMRS providers assert that the rules of fairness and nondiscrimination require ICO members to charge the same end user rates for calls to CMRS and landline NPA-NXXs in the same rate center. 189 They argue that "FCC rules expressly require dialing parity regardless of the called party's provider and other state commissions and basic principles of fairness and nondiscrimination requires [sic] ICO members to charge the same end user rates." 190

The Coalition argues that the CMRS providers are seeking "a favorable and disparate arrangement under which the ICOs are forced to provide calling for their wireline end users to make unlimited calls to mobile wireless users that may be located anywhere in the nation. ... "191 The Coalition further states that "... the NPA-NXX of a mobile user does not determine the mobile user's geographic location. And with respect to jurisdiction, it is the actual location of the mobile user and the other party to a call that determines the jurisdiction of a call, not the telephone number "192

It is the position of the Coalition that LECs may treat as toll calls any call to a mobile user that must be delivered to an interconnection point beyond the normal local calling area of the ICO member regardless of the NPA-NXX and that ILECs "have no obligation to provision some superior form of local exchange service calling to CMRS networks."193 The Coalition asserts that toll calls are not subject to local dialing parity or to toll dialing parity. 194 The

<sup>189</sup> See In re Petition of Arbitration of Cellco Partnerships d/b/a Verizon Wireless, p 22 (November 6, 2003)

<sup>190</sup> Billy H. Pruitt, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p 31 (June 3, 2004) 191 Steven E. Watkins, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 43 (June 4, 2004)

<sup>193</sup> Id. at 44 194 Id

Coalition also states, "Local dialing parity is a concept that applies to a specific geographic area, not telephone numbers." Further, a mobile user's telephone number "does not conform to a specific and defined geographic area as that which a LEC uses for local exchange service calls." Instead, a wireless service area is based on a licensed MTA.

The Coalition asserts that LECs are not required to rely on rate center information of other carriers contained in industry databases in provision of intrastate local exchange service.

The Coalition argues that telephone numbers assigned to users do not determine call jurisdiction and that reliance on numbers is an arbitrary practice. 197

The Coalition summarizes its position as to this issue in the joint issues matrix by stating:

Neither the Section 251(b) dialing parity obligation, associated FCC rules and regulations, nor any applicable statute or regulation establish requirements with respect to the rates any LEC, including ICOs, charge their end user customers for the provision of wireline to wireless calls. Any issue related to ICO end user service charges is not properly the subject of arbitration <sup>198</sup>

The Coalition further states, "The matter raised by this issue addresses how the rural LECs provision service to their end users, and not how the rural LECs provide transport and termination services." For this reason, the Coalition argued that this issue is beyond the scope of the arbitration and the CMRS providers are seeking to impose requirements on the ICO members that have not been established as interconnection standards by the FCC.<sup>200</sup>

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The FCC has interpreted 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(b)(2) as requiring "LECs to deliver, without charge, traffic to CMRS providers anywhere within the MTA in which the call originated."<sup>201</sup>

<sup>196</sup> Id

198 Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 13.

<sup>200</sup> Id at pp 48-49

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> Id

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Id at 46

<sup>199</sup> Post-Hearing Reply Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 48 (October 5, 2004)

<sup>201</sup> Memorandum and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11166 at ¶ 31

An MTA may encompass multiple LATAs and could cross state boundaries. The FCC has stated that LECs may not charge CMRS providers for facilities used to deliver LEC-originated traffic that originates and terminates in the MTA because this is local traffic.<sup>202</sup> Moreover, such traffic "may result in the same call being viewed as a local call by the carriers and a toll call by the end-As such, even though intraMTA CMRS to LEC calling is local for reciprocal compensation purposes, nothing prevents the LEC from charging its end users for toll calls.<sup>204</sup> LECs and CMRS providers may enter into wide area calling or reverse billing arrangements to make it appear to end users they have made a local call rather than a toll call.<sup>205</sup>

The Arbitrators voted unanimously that the ICO members are not required to charge end users the same rate for calls to a CMRS NPA/NXX as calls to landline numbers, unless the calls originate and terminate within the rate center<sup>206</sup> of the LEC. In addition, ICO member end users may be charged toll charges for calls that terminate outside of the ICO member's rate center.

<sup>202</sup> Id <sup>203</sup> Id

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> In the context of this arbitration, the term "rate center" is equivalent to "local exchange area"

ISSUE 13: Should the scope of the Interconnection Agreement be limited to traffic for which accurate billing records (11-01-01 or other industry standard) are delivered?

### Position of the Parties

The CMRS providers' testimony indicates that the ICO members propose to limit the scope of the interconnection agreement to intermediary traffic for which the intermediary provider supplies accurate and complete billing records. The CMRS providers support the goal of exchanging accurate billing records. Nevertheless, billing errors should not exempt certain segments of traffic from the scope of the agreement. Instead, the interconnection agreement should cover all traffic and billing errors should be addressed pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions in the agreement. <sup>208</sup>

The ICO members argue that accurate billing records are an indispensable requirement for any three-way indirect interconnection arrangement, and the terms and conditions to such an arrangement must require the availability of accurate and complete records.<sup>209</sup> According to the Coalition, this issue, like others raised by the CMRS providers, illustrates why three-way interconnection arrangements are not subject to the rules and standards established for Section 251(b)(5) reciprocal compensation arrangements between connecting carriers.<sup>210</sup> It is the position of the Coalition that traffic that is within the scope of the agreement is defined as traffic for which BellSouth provides accurate and complete information and that BellSouth should be responsible for compensation for any traffic not identified by accurate and complete billing information.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Suzanne K. Nieman, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 11 (June 3, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Id

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 47 (June 4, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Id

<sup>211</sup> *Id* 

### **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The Arbitrators found that the provision of billing records is the responsibility of the parties to the interconnection agreement. Nevertheless, either or both of the parties can enter into a separate agreement with a third party to furnish billing records to the other. If either party in a two-party interconnection agreement does not have the ability to identify all types of traffic, such as transit traffic, then it will be imperative that the party: (1) make the necessary modifications to its network to provide that ability; or (2) enter into an agreement with a third-party provider for the needed billing records. This might require some or all of the small ICO members to enter into such agreements with the provider that transits the traffic between the parties. Many such agreements already exist between BellSouth and various CMRS providers.

Accordingly, the Arbitrators voted unanimously to require that the scope of the interconnection agreement set forth all terms and conditions that include traffic for which billing records are provided in a manner that enables parties to accurately bill one another. Such billing may be accomplished using EMI 11-01-01 records and SS7 data or any other acceptable method. Billing errors that may occur should not be used as an excuse to limit the type of traffic covered by the agreement. The Arbitrators unanimously determined that the billing party is responsible for determining the amount to be billed. If the billing party does not have its own records for billing purposes, then it should use records made available to it by a third party, until such time as the billing party can install its own billing system. Further, the Arbitrators voted that the parties shall utilize a standard industry record for billing purposes such as that furnished by BellSouth, the current provider of transit services. Any disputes relating to the provisions of the interconnection agreement can be brought before the Authority for resolution.

## ISSUE 14: Should the scope of the Interconnection Agreement be limited to traffic transited by BellSouth?

## Position of the Parties

The CMRS providers maintain that nothing in the Act or FCC regulations require that the specific transiting provider be listed in the interconnection agreement. CMRS providers further argue that, under the Act, the ICO members are obligated to provide interconnection to and accept traffic from any transiting carrier that the CMRS providers may choose. Suzanne Nieman, a witness for AT&T Wireless, testifies, "[m]oreover, as long as the Agreement provides that the ICO members are to be compensated for all CMRS provider originated traffic that terminates on their network, it should not matter which carrier performs the transiting function. The CMRS providers assert that listing the specific transiting provider would limit the CMRS providers' flexibility to send the traffic to the provider of choice since each change in transit provider would require an amendment to the interconnection agreement to be negotiated, filed and approved. The CMRS providers assert that the ICO members are attempting to limit the scope of the interconnection agreement to traffic transited by BellSouth by requiring that the specific transiting provider be listed in the interconnection agreement.

The ICO members argue that a transit service arrangement cannot be enacted unilaterally by a tandem provider such as BellSouth.<sup>216</sup> Steven Watkins, testifying on behalf of the ICO members, states, "[n]o carrier has the right to establish interconnection unilaterally for it with other carriers."<sup>217</sup> The ICO members further contend that BellSouth is the only transit provider involved in the negotiations and arbitration although BellSouth has not yet established a transit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Suzanne K Nieman, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 10 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>213</sup> Id

<sup>214</sup> Ic

<sup>215</sup> Id et pp. 10-11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 48 (August 4, 2004)

BellSouth is the only carrier that claims to be a transit provider, "there is no basis and no need to arbitrate terms and conditions under the speculation that there may be other carriers."

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

In deciding this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect interconnection. The Arbitrators found that interconnection agreements are, by design, for direct interconnection and, therefore, are intended to be two-party agreements.

It is not necessary for an interconnection agreement between two parties to name a specific transit traffic provider because the provider for transit traffic may change during the term of the agreement. Nevertheless, it remains the responsibility of the party originating the transit traffic to ensure that the transiting carrier has established a connection with the terminating carrier and that traffic is identified in a manner that allows the terminating carrier to bill for such traffic. When existing agreements between the various parties and the transit provider expire, new agreements may be negotiated with other carriers to provide transit service. Although transit traffic provisions are not a requirement in the interconnection agreement that is the subject of this docket, the originating carrier should ensure that the third-party transiting carrier will comply with the terms and conditions contained in the interconnection agreement between the originating and terminating carriers.

For these reasons, the Arbitrators unanimously determined that the scope of the interconnection agreement is a two-party agreement and is not limited to traffic transited by a third party. The Arbitrators also determined that if an ICO member is receiving transit traffic, this traffic is subject to the agreement between the terminating carrier and transiting carrier. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Id

<sup>219</sup> Id

Arbitrators further concluded that third-party transit traffic may be routed in the way that either party to an interconnection agreement sees fit, provided that the transited traffic reaches the terminating carrier and that such traffic is properly identified and billed. The Arbitrators voted unanimously to require that the originating carrier be responsible to ensure that the transiting carrier has established a connection with the terminating carrier and that traffic is identified in a manner that allows the terminating carrier to bill for such traffic.

## ISSUE 15: Should the scope of the Interconnection Agreement be limited to indirect traffic?

## Position of the Parties

The CMRS providers presented testimony to the effect that the ICO members desire the scope of the interconnection agreement to be limited to traffic exchanged indirectly through an intermediary provider and assert this position is contrary to the provisions of the Act. The CMRS providers argue that the ICO members' position on this issue is significantly undercut by the fact that the agreement the ICO members propose in this arbitration includes provisions relating to direct as well as indirect traffic.<sup>220</sup>

The ICO members state that the subject of discussions with the CMRS providers has been the indirect transit arrangement with BellSouth.<sup>221</sup> The ICO members' witness, Steven Watkins, testified that "direct connection arrangements are, by necessity, company-specific. While boiler-plate commercial terms could be addressed in a collective arena, matters related to specific point of interconnection, provision of facilities, and other voluntary discussions pursuant to Section 252 of the Act cannot be achieved in a collective discussion."<sup>222</sup>

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The parties have included in this proceeding only issues that involve indirect traffic and indirect interconnection. Nevertheless, while the scope of the resulting agreement may be seen as only applying or limited to indirect traffic, the parties are free to continue negotiating not only the issues in this docket but also issues not before the Authority. An agreement that is the product of arbitration may incorporate the rulings of the arbitrators. In fact, the decisions of the arbitrators often serve to spur additional negotiations between the parties. The final

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Suzanne K Nieman, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p. 9 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>221</sup> Steven E. Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 50 (June 4, 2004)

interconnection agreement may contain rates, terms and conditions inconsistent with the arbitration decisions. The FCC recognized that to the extent the parties mutually agree, the decision reached through arbitration is not binding.<sup>223</sup>

For these reasons, a majority of the Arbitrators found that, notwithstanding the fact that the only issues in this proceeding involve indirect traffic and indirect interconnection, the scope of the interconnection agreement is a two-party agreement and is not limited to indirect traffic. The scope of the resulting agreement will be determined by the continuing negotiations of the parties and should include the terms and conditions for all traffic exchanged between the parties. The Arbitrators further determined unanimously that if an ICO member is receiving indirect traffic, such traffic is subject to the agreement between the terminating carrier and transporting carrier. Indirect and/or third-party transit traffic should be routed in the way that parties to an interconnection agreement see fit, provided that the indirect traffic reaches the terminating carrier and that such traffic is properly identified. 224

223 First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499 at ¶ 1293

Transcript of Proceedings, p. 57 (January 12, 2005)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> Director Jones provided the following analysis as the basis for his agreement with the conclusion On this issue I find that the law is silent. The record, however, indicates that the terms and conditions for direct traffic [we]re, in fact, exchanged between the parties during the negotiations. Although the parties may have focused on the indirect terms and conditions, this is not a reason to limit the scope of the interconnection agreements

# ISSUE 16: What standard commercial terms and conditions should be included in the Interconnection Agreement?

### Positions of Parties

The CMRS providers refer to standard commercial agreements as those contractual terms that include indemnification, limitation of liability, definitions, the term of the contract, and terminations. Although the agreements proposed by the ICO members and the CMRS providers contain similar language, there are two areas where the differences are significant -- the grounds for termination of the interconnection agreement and post-termination obligations. The CMRS providers argue that the termination language proposed by the ICO members is unduly broad by requiring the termination of the agreement for any material breach of any material term. The CMRS providers propose that termination should only occur as a result of a non-payment for an undisputed amount that continues for over sixty days after written notice and the appropriate regulatory body has been notified at least twenty-five days prior to termination of service. 225

Regarding post-termination obligations, the CMRS providers object to the ICO members' proposal which allows for the blocking of traffic in the case of default. The CMRS providers assert that blocking traffic is not in the public interest and occurs only in the most exceptional of circumstances. Therefore, the CMRS providers argue that the ICO members' proposed terms should be rejected and the Arbitrators should instead adopt the standard terms and conditions proposed by the CMRS providers.<sup>226</sup>

The ICO members state that the Arbitrators should adopt the standard terms and conditions contained in either Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2 of the ICO members' Response.<sup>227</sup> Exhibit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Suzanne K. Nieman, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, pp. 12-13 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> *Id* at p.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 13.

I is entitled Multi-Party Agreement for the Exchange of CMRS Traffic Tennessee. This agreement is a three-party agreement between BellSouth, a CMRS provider, and the rural LEC. In addition to the inclusion of BellSouth, this agreement calls for a dispute resolution process that includes mediation and arbitration by a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator. There is no mention of Section 252 of the Act as a prevailing guideline for arbitration. 228

Exhibit 2 is entitled CMRS-LEC Agreement. This agreement is a two-party agreement between a CMRS provider and a rural LEC. Many of the items in this agreement are noted as, "Subject to Change and the resolution of other terms and conditions with Intermediary Provider."

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

Both the ICO members and CMRS providers submitted many similar standard terms and conditions for the proposed interconnection agreement. Nevertheless, the ICO members repeatedly included BellSouth in their proposed terms, and the adoption of such terms would be inconsistent with the fact that this agreement is between the ICO members and CMRS providers and the Hearing Officer's previous ruling against the joinder of BellSouth as a necessary party in this matter.<sup>230</sup>

A majority of the Arbitrators found that any provision that calls for the blocking of traffic, without first exhausting all measures of resolution, does not promote the public interest. For these reasons, a majority of the Arbitrators voted to adopt the standard commercial terms and conditions proposed by the CMRS providers with the addition that traffic may be blocked and

230 See Order Denying Motion (April 12, 2004)

Response of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, Exhibit 1 (December 1, 2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> Id at Exhibit 2

the Interconnection Agreement may be terminated only in the event of default of a non-disputed amount or upon a ninety-day notice and permission from an appropriate governing body.<sup>231</sup>

Director Jones did not vote with the majority, and instead, moved that the Arbitrators hold Issue No 16 in abeyance "pending further negotiations by the parties, so that some of this broad language can perhaps become more specific as the terms of the agreement are hammered out." Transcript of Proceedings, pp 60-61 (January 12, 2005)

## ISSUE 17: Under which circumstances should either party be permitted to block traffic or terminate the Interconnection Agreement?

### Positions of Parties

The CMRS providers argue that a party may terminate the agreement when the other party defaults in the payment of an undisputed amount due under the terms of the agreement or upon the requisite notice ninety days before the end of the term. All other disputes should be resolved pursuant to the dispute resolution procedures proposed by the CMRS providers. Specifically, the CMRS providers maintain that blocking traffic should not be permitted <sup>232</sup>

The ICO members assert that interconnection services provided to a CMRS provider can be terminated if, after appropriate notice and opportunity to cure default, the CMRS provider remains in default. The provision of the notice and opportunity to cure default should be consistent with that provided to other interconnecting carriers pursuant to existing standards, terms and conditions.<sup>233</sup> The ICO members further propose that in the event the default cannot be cured, written notice will be sent to the CMRS provider and BellSouth, and BellSouth would agree to discontinue sending traffic to the ICO member. To the extent that BellSouth fails to discontinue the delivery of such traffic, BellSouth would be responsible for the appropriate payment to the ICO member.<sup>234</sup> The ICO members later proposed that they would include language that is incorporated into their effective interstate access tariff, but did not provide copies or examples of the suggested language.<sup>235</sup>

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

The original proposal by the ICO members is inconsistent with previous TRA Orders because the Authority has previously ruled that BellSouth did not need to be a party to this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> Id

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Steven E Watkins, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, Exhibit B, p. 10 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Post-Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p. 67 (September 10, 2004)

proceeding.<sup>236</sup> As such, the proposal requiring BellSouth to comply with terms of an agreement when BellSouth is not a party to the contract is unacceptable. The later proposal by the ICO members to incorporate language currently in effect in the interstate access tariff cannot be considered because no language was supplied or specified.

This proceeding is predominantly about the treatment of local traffic exchanged between the CMRS providers' and ICO members' end users. The CMRS providers are carriers of a significant amount of local traffic. Cellular service may be used in emergencies and as a substitute for Coalition and local service. Considering the manner of use of cellular service, the Arbitrators determined not to adopt any policy that would put the flow of this traffic at risk. Therefore, the Arbitrators voted unanimously that traffic may be blocked and the Interconnection Agreement may be terminated only in the event of default of a non-disputed amount and upon a ninety-day notice. Further, before blocking traffic, a carrier shall obtain approval from the FCC, the TRA or some other governing body having the appropriate jurisdiction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> Order Denying Motion (April 12, 2004)

## ISSUE 18: If the ICO changes its network, what notification should it provide and which carrier bears the cost?

### Position of Parties

The CMRS providers assert that the ICO members must comply with the FCC's Rules in 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.325 through 51.335 regarding notification of network changes and should bear the cost of those changes.<sup>237</sup> The ICO members argue that the rules regarding notification of network changes are not applicable to the ICO members and offer to provide the CMRS providers with greater notice of network changes than the FCC Rules require. Further, the ICO members have not requested the CMRS providers bear the costs of an ICO member network change.<sup>238</sup> The ICO members propose that this arrangement assures that each party to this agreement has the right to alter its network. Further, the ICO members assure that the party making the change believes the change materially affects this arrangement, and the party making the change will provide at least 120 days notice to the other party. According to the ICO members, each party will be responsible for the cost and activities associated with accommodating such changes.<sup>239</sup>

## **Deliberations and Conclusions**

Sections 51.325 through 51.335 of 47 C.F.R. directly address network changes. The ICO members failed to substantiate their claim that these rules do not apply to them. While the ICO members may offer terms exceeding that which is required by the FCC, they must at a minimum offer terms that are compliant with FCC Rules.

Therefore, the Arbitrators voted unanimously that any LEC that wishes to initiate a network change must do so in accordance with the FCC Rules found at 47 C.F.R. §§

Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Billy H. Pruitt, Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, p 25 (June 3, 2004)

<sup>239</sup> Steven E. Watkins Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, Exhibit B p. 10 (June 4, 2004)

51.325 through 51.335 and should bear the cost of those changes. An objection by affected providers initiates the dispute resolution process, during which time the LEC proposing modifications must maintain the existing network configuration.<sup>240</sup>

<sup>240</sup> Final Joint Issues Matrix at p 14

- ICO ISSUE 2: BellSouth should not deliver third-party traffic to an ICO that does not subtend a BellSouth tandem;
- ICO ISSUE 4: The CMRS providers should clarify which of their affiliate entities seeks new terms and conditions for the utilization of indirect "transit" arrangements;
- ICO ISSUE 5: The CMRS providers should indicate the specific scope of the traffic originating on their respective networks that is the subject of these proceedings;
- ICO ISSUE 6: Access charges apply to both the origination and termination of interMTA traffic on the networks of the ICO members;
- ICO ISSUE 7: Many of the issues raised in these proceedings are not the subject of established FCC rules and regulations. The parties must recognize that these issues are subject to voluntary agreement, and not to involuntary arbitration;
- ICO ISSUE 8: Any agreement must accurately define the scope of traffic authorized to be delivered over an interconnection to ensure that the interconnection arrangement is not misused;
- ICO ISSUE 9: Issues governing the physical interconnection arrangement between BellSouth and the ICO members must be resolved before effective new terms and conditions can be established between the CMRS providers and BellSouth; and
- ICO ISSUE 10: The CMRS providers must provide any specific objections or concerns that they have with the terms and conditions proposed by the ICO members.

Issue Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are included in the final matrix by the ICO members; however, no testimony was filed on behalf of the Coalition with regard to these issues. The Coalition states that the ICOs' additional issues have been incorporated with the discussions addressing CMRS issues and that the ICO issues were submitted as an opportunity to highlight some of the issues that were more significant with regard to new terms and conditions for an existing indirect interconnection.<sup>241</sup>

The Arbitrators voted unanimously that because the ICO members have incorporated these issues into other issues considered previously, there is no need for the Arbitrators to render any decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Post-Hearing Brief of the Rural Coalition of Small LECs and Cooperatives, p 68 (September 10, 2004)

## IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT;

The foregoing Order of Arbitration Award reflects the Arbitrators' resolution of Issues Nos. 1 through 18 and ICO Issues 2 and 4 through 10. All resolutions contained herein comply with the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and are supported by the record in this proceeding.

Deborah Taylor Tate, Director<sup>243</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> Chairman Miller prevailed on all his motions

Director Tate voted with the majority on all issues with the exception of Issues 8 and 11 Director Tate resigned her position as director with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority prior to the issuance of this order

244 Director Jones concurred in the results only on Issues 2, 4, 5, and 15 and dissented on Issues 2b, 7b, and 16